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A capitalist society has two defining features. The first is well-known. A capitalist economy 
leaves coordination of exchange and production largely to private authority. The dissertation 
investigates a second feature. In a capitalist economy, individuals and firms coordinate 
exchange through contracts that involve obligations to pay money. Financial contracts allow 
individuals to defer payment and save money for expenditures at a later point in time. 
My dissertation assigns a crucial role to the structure of institutions and to the rules that 
create and define the authority over money. I refer to such a structure as a monetary 
constitution. In existing capitalist societies, money is not entirely under public control, as 
proponents of socialism or full reserve banking require. Nor is it entirely in private hands as 
libertarian free bankers would ideally have it. Instead, the supply of money to the economy 
takes place through a hierarchical order of money creation. Money issued by the central bank 
stands at the top of the hierarchy. Below it, private financial institutions issue different forms 
of credit money. In this sense, the monetary constitution is a hybrid of both public and private 
authority over money.  
Political philosophy has said virtually nothing about the authority over money. I aim to 
persuade the reader that this is a grave neglect. The three main claims of the dissertation are: 
1. Money and finance are central to any account of distributive justice that is adequate 
for a capitalist society. 
2. There are five objections to unregulated private money creation. 
3. Existing monetary constitutions need fundamental reform. 
In support of the first claim, I argue that money is a crucial metric for any theory of 
distributive justice that is adequate for a capitalist society. I also put forward a new account 
of the crucial role of credit and saving in realising a fair intertemporal distribution. Finally, 
the second and third claims support the first claim where it concerns the authority over 
money.  
In support of the second claim, I argue that unregulated private money creation leads to (1) 
financial instability, (2) macroeconomic instability, (3) unsustainable use of natural 
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resources, (4) an unfair distribution of economic means, and (5) an undemocratic 
concentration of political power. I also put forward a new account of why financial instability 
matters from the perspective of distributive justice.  
In support of the third claim, I argue for the incremental abolition of private money creation. 
Although the delegation of public money creation to an independent central bank is not 
objectionable in principle, I go on to argue that existing mandates are insufficiently 
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1 Justice and money 
To understand a capitalist society, political philosophers must take two defining features into 
account. First, capitalist coordination means that exchange and production are left largely to 
the authority of private individuals and firms. A theory of justice that has no resources for 
dealing with issues of personal responsibility will be inadequate for theorising a capitalist 
society. In discussing the topic of distributive justice, philosophers have paid ample attention 
to private authority, but have neglected a second feature. In a capitalist society, individuals 
and firms coordinate exchange through contracts that involve obligations to pay money. In 
the following, I will seek to convince the reader that this is a grave neglect and that theories 
of justice should give money a much more prominent role than is now generally the case. 
In theorising justice, philosophers develop moral principles for evaluating the major social 
and political institutions of a society. Although economic institutions have always been 
important to this endeavour, political philosophers have only recently turned their attention to 
financial markets. Money, and the institutions that govern it, are in the background of many 
topics that these philosophers have so far treated in isolation. My dissertation contributes to 
these efforts by putting the role of money centre stage. I will both describe the decisive role 
of money and, more innovatively, put forward normative concepts that recognize its 
significance.  
Despite the obvious importance of money in the coordination of exchange and production, 
political philosophers have often treated it as a mere proxy for what should be of final interest 
to normative theorizing. Instead, as I discuss in §2 ‘The metric of democratic capitalism’, 
philosophers have focused on topics such as the distribution of welfare, economic resources, 
capabilities, social power and standing. This, I will argue, led them to ignore the crucial role 
of monetary metrics in the politics of a democratic society. In §3 ‘Income, credit, and 
saving’, I argue that political philosophers have also inadequately thematised the role of 
financial contracts. In these two foundational chapters I put forward an understanding of 
money as central to any account of justice for a capitalist society.  
After an investigation of money itself, I turn to the institutions that govern money. The 
existing financial system raises a wide range of political questions, which I explore to further 
illustrate the crucial role of money and finance for distributive justice. In the dissertation, I 
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focus on the extensive role of private authority over the creation of money in existing 
capitalist societies. As I explain in §4 ‘The monetary constitution’, the authority to issue 
money is not only held by publicly-owned central banks, but also by private banks. In §5 
‘Financial instability’ and §6 ‘Incremental abolition’, I articulate a range of objections to this 
feature of the financial system and explain how they relate to longstanding topics in the 
theory of distributive justice. The question of what reform is required, a topic that is itself 
very much contested, again raises new challenges, which I also seek to address in §6 and also 
in §7 ‘The ethics of delegating monetary authority’.  
In the course of the dissertation, I argue for three claims.  
1. Money and finance are central to any account of distributive justice that is adequate 
for a capitalist society. 
2. There are five objections to unregulated private money creation. 
3. Existing monetary constitutions need fundamental reform. 
In this introductory chapter, I outline these main claims in more detail and explain how my 
argument for them will contribute to the existing philosophical literature. I also say more 
about the sense in which theories of distributive justice have unduly neglected money and 
finance. In §1.1 I discuss capitalism and the monetary constitution to outline the subject 
matter of the dissertation. I also discuss the difficulties that political philosophers face in 
dealing with the often arcane world of finance and what the challenge is that I set myself in 
the following chapters. In §1.2 I outline the conception of distributive justice that informs the 
dissertation. In §1.3 I provide an overview of the individual chapters of the dissertation. 
1.1 Money 
In this section I outline the subject matter of the dissertation and its contribution to the 
philosophical literature. In §1.1.1 I explain the crucial role of money and finance in a 
capitalist society. In §1.1.2 I outline how capitalist societies distribute the authority over 
money between private financial institutions and public political institutions. In §1.1.3 I 
discuss existing philosophical work on financial markets and two challenges that the field 
faces: describing financial markets accurately and developing adequate moral concepts for 
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reflecting on them. In §1.1.4 I explain how the dissertation contributes to meeting both 
challenges.  
1.1.1 Capitalism and money 
As I already mentioned, capitalist societies have two features that are crucial from the 
perspective of justice.1 The first is well-known. A capitalist economy leaves coordination of 
exchange and production largely to private authority. Property rights demarcate a domain 
within which it is up to economic agents themselves to make decisions. The consequences of 
their choices are for them to bear and economic agents are generally not accountable to 
everyone who is affected by their decisions. Rather, political institutions are responsible for 
ensuring just outcomes on the systemic level. The role of choice in generating distributive 
outcomes has been a central topic in debates over distributive justice in recent decades.2 
Although the issue of private authority will come up repeatedly, my attention in the following 
will go to a second feature. In a capitalist economy, individuals and firms coordinate 
exchange through contracts that involve obligations to pay money. To allow economic agents 
to meet their obligations to pay at a particular point in time, a capitalist economy has a 
financial system. This system, which involves both public and private institutions, has not 
been given due recognition by existing theories of distributive justice.3 The aim of my 
dissertation is to persuade the reader that this is a grave neglect. 
The dissertation brings out three ways in which money and finance have such a role. 
First, a capitalist economy is a monetary economy. It is, as John Maynard Keynes puts it, ‘an 
Economy in which Money plays a part of its own and affects motives and decisions and is, in 
short, one of the operative factors’.4 In §2 I will develop my version of this claim by 
explaining that in a capitalist economy, money acts as an independent unit of account. 
Economic agents do not owe each other hours of labour or amounts of natural resources. 
                                                 
1 On the definition of capitalism, see Black 2012; Streeck 2012; Hodgson 2015. 
2 Important contributions are Rawls [1971] 1999a, Nozick 1974; Dworkin 1981a; 1981b; Cohen 1989; Anderson 
1999; Scheffler 2003. Blake & Risse (2008) put forward an insightful overview of the issues at stake. 
3 A search for ‘money creation’ and ‘money supply’ on PhilPapers returns six articles, but none are in a 
philosophy journal. The terms do not even appear in a full-text search of Philosophy and Public Affairs. 
4 Keynes [1933] 1963, p. 7. 
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Rather, they owe each other money and use the money to acquire the economic means they 
need. Failure to meet obligations to pay when these are due results in an insolvency 
procedure. 
Second, because money itself coordinates exchange and production, it has a central role in 
political deliberation on topics as diverse as economic inequality and the impact of alternative 
policy measures. Catastrophic climate change will not only kill millions of people, scientists 
think, but will also cost $12 trillion in lost growth, or 10% of world GDP, by 2050.5 As I 
argue in §2, there are good reasons to use money rather than alternative metrics in political 
deliberation, which in turn impacts the theory of distributive justice that is appropriate for a 
capitalist society.  
Third, as I argue in §3, due consideration of money also forces us to recognize the pivotal 
role of financial contracts in a capitalist economy. Philosophers cannot simply treat economic 
justice as a matter of redistributing income and wealth. In focusing on such non-financial 
metrics, they miss out on the role of financial contracts in allowing individuals and firms to 
spend money before they earn it and earn money to be spent at a later point in time. Taking 
the issue of intertemporal spending requirements into account means recognizing that a just 
intertemporal distribution requires ample provision of finance.  
Theories of distributive justice have not only neglected money and finance. There likewise 
remains a sizable gap in the understanding of the financial institutions of existing capitalist 
economies. Crucial economic institutions such as the banking system, capital markets and the 
central bank have only recently captured the attention of political philosophers. Due 
recognition of money and finance as topics of distributive justice should lead us to think in 
new ways about the role of these institutions. In §4 I will therefore discuss what I refer to as 
the monetary constitution to outline the main features of the existing financial system and the 
way it distributes access to finance. Monetary constitutions, I will argue, merit our detailed 
attention because their design has pervasive consequences for the ability of capitalist societies 
to realise just outcomes. As I argue in §§5, 6, and 7, the institutions that currently govern 
money are not up to their task. I put forward an ambitious programme of reform. 
                                                 
5 UNDP 2016. 
15 
 
1.1.2 The hybrid monetary constitution 
The monetary constitution is the set of legal and non-legal rules that govern the authority 
over money. I will now provide the reader with a first brief outline of the main features of 
existing monetary constitutions.  
The central bank is often described as the ‘monetary authority’, but in the existing financial 
system, the provision of money actually takes place through a hierarchical order of money 
creation. Money issued by the central bank stands at the top of the hierarchy. Below it, 
private financial institutions issue different forms of credit money. In this sense, the monetary 
constitution is a hybrid of both public and private authority over money.  
Money, in this system, is created in the act of granting credit. I refer to the authority over the 
decision to issue new money as monetary authority. It has a formal and an effective 
component. The formal sense of monetary authority concerns whether it is within the law for 
a given institution to issue money. Effective monetary authority concerns the ability to issue 
assets that economic agents use as means of payment. Counterfeiters have the effective 
ability, but not the formal right. During a period of hyperinflation, the central bank retains its 
formal rights, but its effective ability is very limited. When I talk about monetary authority, I 
will be talking about institutions that have both forms of authority. 
The monetary constitution governs who is allowed to issue money. It is a set of legal and 
non-legal rules that create and define the authority over money. The monetary constitution 
determines not only the limits of public authority over money but also delineates a sphere of 
private authority over money. In the latter chapters of the dissertation I will call existing ways 
of delineating these spheres into question. To do this, I first describe the existing monetary 
constitution in more detail.  
It will turn out that monetary authority is itself diffuse and difficult to situate. Even if 
economic textbooks still describe the volume of money as set by the central bank, my 
dissertation will start from the otherwise widely accepted view that this account of false.6 In 
fact, structures of monetary authority are strikingly invariant across different capitalist 
societies. Money creation is largely in the hands of private financial institutions, banks, which 
                                                 
66 I review the economic literature on this topic in §4.3. 
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are regulated and supervised by a publicly-owned central bank. Although banks are subject to 
banking regulation and face economic incentives to ensure that their operations are profitable, 
they too have the authority to issue money. As a form of private authority, issuing money is a 
decision that banks make based on their own private motives.  
Although both the central bank and private banks have monetary authority, their authority is 
ordered in a hierarchy. Central banks issue money that serves as the means of final 
settlement. It takes the form of cash and central bank deposits. The central bank deposit is a 
deposit for banks and is used to settle large volume payments between financial institutions. 
The central bank does not, save in exceptional circumstances, provide credit to the economy 
directly. Instead, money creation for the real economy is a private prerogative of commercial 
banks, which seek profit within the confines set by regulation and monetary policy. The 
central bank thus leaves the authority over credit money to banks, which decide on the 
provision of credit, at what interest rates and under what conditions. Public authority is 
limited to the operations of the central bank and to the decisions of governments in how to 
regulate their banking sector. Together, private banks and central banks constitute the heart of 
the financial system. 
1.1.3 The financial system and philosophy 
The dissertation contributes to the work of recent authors in ethics, political philosophy and 
epistemology that seek to develop a philosophical understanding of the financial system. I 
will now discuss the challenges that philosophy faces in developing a theory of distributive 
justice for financial markets.  
It is far from uncontroversial that financial markets should have any place in a theory of 
justice. Elizabeth Anderson, for example, claims that a just distribution of economic means 
involves three things: (i) a minimum level of income and wealth at the bottom; (ii) a 
maximum at the top; and (iii) measures to ensure that most individuals are somewhere in the 
middle.7 If financial markets matter for realising distributive justice, this is so in ensuring that 
the distribution of income and wealth meets these three constraints. But it is hard to see how 
                                                 
7 Anderson 2007, pp. 265f; See §5.2.1. 
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today’s regulation of financial markets can be justified in this way. Anderson, indeed, 
invokes financial instability as a welcome means for redistribution:  
While the most advantaged may find it distressing to be subject to market risks that 
threaten to reduce them to merely middling status, there is no public interest in 
securing them against such risks.8 
In §5 I will return to this claim and explain why I believe it is false. Here I merely aim to 
show that a theory of distributive justice that focuses on income and wealth has no obvious 
place for financial institutions. 
The claim that the financial system should have some place in a theory of distributive justice 
in not new. Great political thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx wrote 
extensively on monetary institutions and their role in the distribution of societal wealth.9 
More recently, John Rawls remarks in his A Theory of Justice that the political institutions of 
a property-owning democracy should retain adequate public control of financial markets.10 
In conformity with political decisions reached democratically, the government 
regulates the economic climate by adjusting certain elements under its control, such as 
the overall amount of investment, the rate of interest, and the quantity of money, and 
so on.11 
But despite recognizing a role for financial institutions, Rawls’ treatment has two 
deficiencies, which my dissertation seeks to avoid. First, there is the issue of getting the facts 
straight. The passage suggests that political institutions, more specifically, democratic 
governments, can effectively control the rate of interest and the volume of money. But as 
§1.1.2 explained, in a hybrid monetary constitution, political institutions do not have such 
control. The central bank leaves it to private banks to determine the cost and volume of credit 
available to individuals and firms. Moreover, the central bank cannot at the same time set 
                                                 
8 Idem, p. 267. 
9 See Arnon 2011 for a discussion of the history of monetary thought with a particularly prominent, although not 
entirely favourable role, given to these thinkers.  
10 I write on Rawls’ views on this topic in more detail in my ‘Central Banking in Rawls’ Property-Owning 
Democracy’ (unpublished manuscript). 
11 Rawls [1971] 1999a, p. 241. 
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interest rates and volumes of money. Second, Rawls’ claim in the passage does not follow 
from his two principles of justice, which concern basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, 
and the distribution of primary goods. The remark appears in Part II of his book, where Rawls 
applies his principles to institutions. But macroeconomic stability is crucial for neither equal 
basic liberties nor equality of opportunity. As I argue in §3, his account of the primary goods 
income and wealth also precludes any prominent role for finance. In this sense, the principles 
that Rawls develops in Part I of the book are inadequate for supporting his claims on the 
authority over money in Part II.  
But neglect of money is not specific to Rawls. In his ‘Money and Freedom’, Gerald Cohen 
takes as his starting point a negative conception of freedom, according to which individuals 
are free in so far as they are not hindered by others from doing things.12 Although Cohen 
rejects such a conception, it leads him to write on the social role of money in a way that 
reduces its role to making the use of economic goods permissible to individuals. Money, 
according to Cohen, allows individuals to do thing, use certain resources, board certain trains, 
that would not otherwise be permissible to them. 
[T]he whole point of money is to extinguish interference: that is its defining function, 
even if further conditions are required for it to perform it. Compare: the defining 
function of a knife is to cut, but that is not to say that any knife can cut any block of 
stone.13 
But, in focusing on money as a means of preventing interference, he puts forward a narrow 
account of money’s social function. In fact, this conception of money is not very different 
from that of libertarians like Robert Nozick, who conceive of money as a mere medium for 
facilitating the consensual exchange of goods and services.14 Cohen’s narrow account fits the 
libertarian he seeks to criticize but is not adequate for understanding the complex 
interrelation of money and more egalitarian conceptions of freedom. In a capitalist economy, 
money serves as an independent unit of account that enables decentralized coordination of 
production and exchange over time. This role as an arbiter for entitlements and obligations 
                                                 
12 Cohen 2011. 
13 Idem, p. 178. 
14 E.g. Nozick 1974, p. 18. 
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concerning economic resources brings up a range of new normative issues that are sidelined 
by a narrow focus on money’s role in facilitating exchange. In §5, for example, I discuss the 
role of money in individual life planning. Money is not just a thing that gives individuals 
access to economic means. Money is itself a medium that individuals use to reflect on the life 
plans that are open to them. In contrast to the libertarian, a liberal egalitarian should 
understand such reflection as a constitutive part of living a free life. This is only one of the 
many ways in which, so I will show, money and freedom are interrelated. 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008 has led philosophers to give more attention to 
financial markets. This trend fits with a general turn away from various forms of ideal theory 
and towards more empirically informed philosophy. Authors have discussed a wide range of 
topics such as credit provision and debt,15 ethics for financial institutions,16 ethical and 
sustainable investment,17 microcredit,18 financial inclusion,19 central bank independence,20 
financial instability,21 monetary policy,22 and sovereign debt.23  
In tackling such topics, philosophers face two challenges, already illustrated by the 
deficiencies of the accounts of Rawls and Cohen. First, there is a descriptive challenge in 
accurately portraying the relevant facts. In many economics courses taught at universities in 
recent decades, for instance, exchange and production are modelled as if taking place in a 
barter economy.24 Money is controlled by the central bank and merely serves as a neutral veil 
for non-monetary prices. In fact, most economic models in the tradition of general 
equilibrium theory have no independent role for money. Although Walras’ model takes one 
of its n commodities as its numeraire, his system of simultaneous equations determines the 
                                                 
15 Gourevitch 2012; Vague & Hockett 2013; Douglas 2015.  
16 Boatright 2010; Baradaran 2014; De Bruin 2015.  
17 Sandberg 2013; Schücking 2015. 
18 Ronzoni & Valentini 2015; Sorell & Cabrera 2015. 
19 Hudon 2009; Brownlee & Stemplowska 2015; Gershan & Morduch 2015; Herzog forthcoming. 
20 Best 2016. 
21 James 2012; Linarelli 2017.  
22 Claveau, Dietsch, & Fontan 2016. 
23 Reddy 2003; Barry 2011.  
24 I describe the historical development of this conception of economics in my ‘Scope and method in the early 
Methodenstreit’ (unpublished manuscript). 
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value of this commodity in the same way as that of the other n-1 commodities. The model 
thus describes what is essentially a barter economy.25 In some more recent macroeconomic 
models, the volume of money is given and economic prices are determined by technological 
possibilities and consumer preferences.26 The real world of financial institutions, however, is 
incomparably more complex and the role of money is crucial. Economists often disagree 
amongst themselves so that it is difficult to decide who gets the facts right. To accurately 
portray financial markets, philosophers need to delve into the empirical issues. 
Second, there is the conceptual challenge of finding adequate normative concepts for 
reflection on financial markets. Writing on finance often does not require an entirely new 
normative framework. In the following, my thinking about the relation between private and 
public authority will draw on familiar liberal egalitarian ideas. But, neither should 
philosophers just take existing normative theories off the shelf. To reflect on the issues of 
distributive justice that arise in financial markets, philosophers need normative concepts that 
are suitable for a capitalist economy in which money is crucial. Here, again, the economics 
taught at universities will often not be of much help. Under conditions of perfect competition, 
private financial institutions are led by an invisible hand to realise an efficient intertemporal 
allocation of resources. The only distributive questions concern initial endowments. Even 
ignoring its reliance on interpersonal aggregation, the assumptions of neoclassical welfare 
economics are simply not met by financial markets as we find them in existing capitalist 
economies. Nor can philosophers simply have recourse to existing theories of distributive 
justice. In §§2, 3, and 5 I discuss ways in which philosophical arguments apply a pre-existing 
theory of distributive justice to financial markets and thereby fail to fit the salient features of 
a capitalist economy. Rawls’ focus on income and wealth, for example, provides him with a 
metric of justice that fails to assign an adequate place to options for credit and saving.27 Luck 
egalitarian theories such as that of Cohen are, so I argue, inadequate for theorising personal 
responsibility in a capitalist economy because of the pervasiveness of uncertainty.28 
                                                 
25 Hicks 1967; Ingham 2004.  
26 Friedman 1968; Romer 2011, Chapter 5.  
27 As I argue in §3. 
28 As I argue in §5.3.4.  
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1.1.4 Contribution of the dissertation 
The dissertation contributes to both the descriptive and the conceptual challenge that 
philosophy faces in dealing with financial markets.  
First, I contribute to describing the role of financial markets in the distribution of economic 
means. The most important contribution in this regard is §4, where I introduce the idea of a 
hybrid monetary constitution. The authority over money stands in the background of a wide 
range of issues now treated by philosophers in isolation. As I discuss in §3, individual 
decisions to save and take out credit have systemic repercussions. In an economic upturn, 
fired on by a liberal provision of credit, all want to spend before they earn, which eggs on the 
business cycle, thereby causing inflation, financial instability, and an unsustainable level of 
GDP growth. Conversely, in a downturn, banks contract credit and individuals are more eager 
to save, which leads to a slump in economic activity, unemployment and low levels of 
investments. This systemic perspective is crucial because it shows that individual access to 
options for credit and saving raise distinct distributive conflicts, which go beyond individual 
entitlements to credit and saving. In this dissertation, I put forward a detailed account of the 
role of the hybrid monetary constitution in realising a fair intertemporal distribution of 
money. This will introduce monetary authority as crucial to the philosophical study of 
financial markets.  
A second contribution is my account of monetary systems and the ability to issue money as 
constitutional. Philosophical discussions of constitutionalism have focused on the role of the 
judiciary in reviewing exercises of legislative and executive power for conformity with a 
written constitutional document. In these discussions, the paradigmatic issue is the relation of 
the US Supreme Court to the elected branches of government.29 There is also an extensive 
literature on the operation of the legislature and the executive in the realisation of various 
democratic and egalitarian ideals.30 While an analysis of constitutional authority over money 
shares some features with the traditional concerns of the literature, it also raises its own 
                                                 
29 E.g., Bickel 1986; Dworkin 1999; Waldron 2006. 
30 E.g., Christiano 1996; Waldron 1999; Richardson 2002.  
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distinct questions. §§4 and 7 develop a detailed account of hybridity and the distribution of 
authority over money in existing capitalist societies. 
The dissertation also makes more specific contributions. In §2 I discuss defining features of a 
capitalist mode of coordination as part of my argument for money as a metric of justice. In §3 
I describe how financial contracts enable life plans. In §5 I discuss the cyclical patterns of 
manias, panics and crises from the perspective of distributive justice. In §6 I review existing 
proposals for reform of the banking system. In §7 I put forward a new account of the central 
bank as a political institution. Although these discussions are descriptive, they also make a 
contribution to political theorizing of financial markets. Adequate normative principles for 
financial markets need an account of the features of financial markets that matter for 
identifying these principles.31 
The main contribution of the dissertation, however, is in developing normative concepts that 
are adequate for thinking about money and finance. To this end, I extend the liberal 
egalitarian theory of distributive justice. I put forward an account of money as a metric of 
justice (§2). I also explain how options for credit and saving fit into this account (§3). Finally, 
I put forward a new account of financial instability. This account assigns a crucial role to the 
way in which macroeconomic fluctuations disrupt individual life plans (§5). The dissertation 
also makes contributions to the normative evaluation of political institutions of a capitalist 
society. I argue for the role of experimentation in political representation (§6) and develop a 
framework for evaluating the delegation of political decisions to unelected officials (§7). To 
explain these contributions in more detail in §1.4 of this chapter, I will now introduce the 
liberal egalitarian framework from which I start.  
1.2 Liberty and equality 
Existing capitalist societies are characterized by pervasive economic inequalities. To evaluate 
such inequalities, political philosophers have proposed different theories of distributive 
justice. A theory of distributive justice puts forward principles for deciding which inequalities 
are permissible, which are not, and what demands apply to institutions for ensuring a just 
distribution.  
                                                 
31 Wollner & Risse 2014.  
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The starting point for my account is a liberal egalitarian conception of justice, which receives 
its classical exposition in Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. Throughout the dissertation, I will rely 
on his formulations of these ideas, although a much wider group of political philosophers 
have articulated similar ideas.32 
In this section I first outline three Rawlsian ideas. I describe the values that inform liberal 
egalitarianism in terms of two moral powers (§1.2.1). I explain that demands of distributive 
justice apply to the basic structure (§1.2.2). I then outline the idea of liberal neutrality 
(§1.2.3). In §1.2.4 I draw on these ideas to put forward an account of the public and the 
private sphere that will inform the dissertation. I conclude with some caveats concerning the 
scope of the normative discussion (§1.2.5).  
1.2.1 Liberal egalitarianism 
A liberal egalitarian endorses a specific conception of equality and liberty. Liberal 
egalitarianism is egalitarian in that it holds that individuals have equal moral worth. This 
means that their interests should be weighed against the interest of others irrespective of 
contingent characteristics such as gender, race, or social background. The ideal is opposed to 
social hierarchies between citizens and the concentration of power in the hands of elites. 
Instead, individual citizens are thought of as bearers of fundamental rights irrespective of 
their ‘talents, intelligence, wisdom, decision-making skill, temperament, social class, 
religious or ethnic affiliation, or ascribed identity’.33 For a liberal egalitarian, social rules 
stand in need of justification in light of this foundational commitment to equality.  
Liberal egalitarianism is liberal in that it ascribes extensive freedoms to individuals. They are 
left free to pursue their conception of the good life while taking into account the freedom of 
others. It is left to individuals to form their conceptions of value, to weigh competing values 
and draw on these values in their life planning. Individuals are free to take risks and expected 
to bear their consequences. Again, the commitment to freedom places a demand of 
justification on social rules and the authorities that issue them. For a liberal egalitarian, how 
to live well is not for political institutions to judge.  
                                                 
32 E.g., Nagel 1975; Raz 1986; Barry 1989; Anderson 1999; Dworkin 2000; Scheffler 2003.  
33 Scheffler 2003, p. 22. 
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Liberal egalitarianism, finally, takes justice to have priority over aggregate social welfare or 
other forms of interpersonal aggregation. The interests of some cannot simply be overridden 
for the benefit of the majority. Doing so would fail to adequately respect the ‘distinctness of 
individuals’.34 Liberal egalitarianism is incompatible with the use of neoclassical welfare 
economics as the final standard by which to evaluate economic institutions. To respect the 
rights of individuals, institutions should be acceptable to all who are affected by them, not 
just those who stand to benefit.  
All liberal egalitarians share a commitment to these ideas. I do not have much to say about 
their justification and I do not believe that much could be said at all. Readers who do not 
share these foundational commitments can still agree with my main claims concerning money 
and finance, but will disagree with some steps in my argument. The aim of the dissertation is 
to contribute to the interpretation of the liberal egalitarian ideal as applied to a capitalist 
economy. That interpretation is not obvious, however, and raises many questions of its own. 
Liberal egalitarians disagree over how to interpret the values of equality and liberty, and how 
to weigh these interests of individuals where they conflict. I will be interested in such 
disagreements, not in the justification of the more basic moral values that underpin them.  
To focus on the substantive issues at stake, I will often rely on the work of Rawls to articulate 
these basic moral values. Drawing on his work, I analyse what it means to treat individuals as 
free and equal in terms of two moral powers. The first moral power is the capacity for a 
conception of the good. To be free in this sense, individuals must be able to have, devise and 
revise, and pursue a particular conception of the good against the background of a just basic 
structure. I will refer to this conception of freedom as liberal freedom. The second moral 
power is a sense of justice, which concerns the ability ‘to understand, to apply and to act from 
[…] the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation’.35 To 
be free in this sense is to be able to participate in the political process and to accept but also 
challenge a justification for a political decision. I will refer to this conception of freedom as 
political freedom. In §2 I will discuss political freedom in formulating my account of 
democratic justification. In §6 I will draw on the same ideas in my argument against the 
                                                 
34 Rawls [1971] 1999a, p. 26. 
35 Rawls 2001, p. 19. 
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concentration of political power in the banking system. In §7 I develop a framework for 
thinking about central bank independence and political participation. My primary focus, 
however, will be on liberal freedom, for which, so I will argue, finance and money are 
crucial.  
1.2.2 The basic structure 
I now explain the Rawlsian idea that demands of distributive justice apply to the basic 
structure of society.  
The conception of individuals as having two moral powers is compatible with the demand 
that all are equally successful in exercising their moral powers. This is not what liberal 
egalitarians believe. Their conception is egalitarian: societies should have institutions in place 
to secure that individuals are treated as equals with regard to their two moral powers. But it is 
also liberal: it is up to individuals to successfully exercise these powers. To reconcile these 
two demands, liberal egalitarians focus their theorising on the major social and political 
institutions of a society.36  
Institutions shape the options that are available to individuals in making their life plans. They 
make up  
a public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and 
duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of 
action as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and 
defenses, and so on, when violations occur.37 
Institutions, then, generate a wide range of professional and societal roles that come with 
various benefits and burdens. They specify the terms on which individuals take part in the 
cooperation that is constitutive of the social order.  
Following Rawls, I will understand the topic of distributive justice as that of the distribution 
of societal outcomes generated by social and political institutions. By societal outcomes I 
                                                 
36 Rawls 1996, pp. 257-288; [1971] 1999a, pp. 6-10, pp. 73-77. For objections to this focus on the basic 
structure, see Cohen 1997; 2008. For responses, see Williams 1999; Tan 2012, pp. 19-83. 
37 Rawls [1971] 1999a, pp. 47f. 
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mean the extent to which individuals are successful in exercising their two moral powers. 
There is not one institution that enables individuals to do this. Rather, the lives that 
individuals lead are conditioned by the whole of what Rawls refers to as the basic structure. 
The basic structure is 
the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into 
one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and 
regulate the division of advantages that arise from social cooperation over time.38 
Within the context of the basic structure, the ability of individuals to successfully exercise 
their moral powers depends on motivation, talent, and luck. In this way, institutions will 
accommodate diverse life choices. Their chances of success and the outcomes that they can 
hope for depend to some extent on these choices. If they are motivated, talented, and lucky, 
their life plans will succeed. If they are not sufficiently talented, motivated, or lucky, they 
might fail. Even if they fail, they are still free. In this sense, the idea of a basic structure 
comes with a strong conception of personal responsibility, which limits the extent to which 
outcomes are regulated by distributive justice.39 
Limiting demands of distributive justice to the basic structure allows the liberal egalitarian to 
reconcile the ideals of liberal and political freedom.40 Liberal freedom is realised by allowing 
individuals to pursue a particular conception of the good while taking the social and political 
institutions as given. A just basic structure is such that if individuals follow the societal rules, 
the distribution of benefits and burdens that results is just, whatever the outcome turns out to 
be. The basic structure thereby realises what Rawls refers to as imperfect procedural justice. 
Within the context of the rules set by the basic structure, distributive justice is ‘left to take 
care of itself’, although ‘in a restricted range’.41 Political freedom is realised by allowing 
individuals to take up positions in political institutions where citizens collectively decide on 
the rules that constitute their terms of social cooperation. Theories of distributive justice put 
forward principles that are to inform such deliberation.  
                                                 
38 Rawls 2001, p. 10. 
39 Scheffler 2003; Blake & Risse 2008.  
40 Cohen 2003; Tan 2010. 
41 Rawls [1971] 1999a; 2001, p. 50. 
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1.2.3 Liberal neutrality 
So what does it mean for a basic structure to treat individuals as equals? I will now explain 
this idea in terms of two conceptions of liberal neutrality.  
Principles of justice are normative for the basic structure. Accordingly, they provide a basis 
for evaluating and justifying the rules that govern the private sphere. The principles spell out 
criteria by which to evaluate the basic structure as it affects the lives of individuals. Whether 
a given basic structure is sufficiently just depends on whether it meets the demands spelt out 
in such principles. 
Citizens disagree on what justice requires. This disagreement results in part from what Rawls 
refers to as the burdens of judgment. The burdens of judgment explain disagreement amongst 
reasonable citizens. Rawls provides the following list of these burdens: (a) empirical 
evidence on issues can be conflicting and complex; (b) even where the facts are clear, there 
are different ways to weigh their relevance; (c) the empirical and moral concepts we use to 
debate questions are vague and there can be disagreement over their application; (d) our 
personal experience shapes how we ‘assess evidence and weigh moral and political values’, 
but we often do not know exactly how; (e) there are different ways to compare competing 
considerations; (f) there is a limit to the values that particular institutions can be expected to 
live up to, so that we have to choose some and weigh their importance against others.42 
Recognizing that some disagreement is unavoidable, political philosophers seek to articulate 
more abstract criteria by which to evaluate the quality of alternative conceptions of justice. In 
this evaluation, a crucial role goes to liberal neutrality. Principles of justice must be neutral in 
that they do not take a stance on topics where citizens hold a wide range of competing but 
reasonable views. In this way, liberal neutrality requires that a conception of justice provides 
a shared basis for the justification of the basic structure.  
There are two importantly different senses in which principles of justice can be neutral. First, 
there is what may be called political neutrality, which concerns different views that citizens 
have on what justice requires.43 From the perspective of political neutrality, whether or not 
                                                 
42 Rawls 1996, p. 56f. 
43 Larmore 1990; Rawls 1996; Habermas 1998; Gaus 2010; Nussbaum 2011; Quong 2011. 
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institutions are just cannot be determined with reference to a deep moral or religious truth. 
Instead, principles of justice must make a claim to being acceptable to reasonable citizens 
irrespective of such particular commitments. To be neutral in a political sense, the 
justification must be composed of principles that recognize that there is often room for 
reasonable disagreement over what justice requires.  
My argument in the dissertation will not depend on this conception of neutrality, but neither 
should anything I say conflict with it. Rather, the crucial questions are about egalitarian 
neutrality, which concerns different views on what constitutes a good life.  
Egalitarian neutrality requires treating individuals as equals with regard to their ability to 
pursue a particular conception of the good. Principles of justice are neutral in this sense if 
they do not privilege life choices that are tied to any particular religious or moral beliefs. My 
interest in what follows, then, will not be in deep disagreements over religion and 
metaphysics, but rather in much more mundane life decisions. Some people want to work as 
accountants, others want to open their own coffee bar. Depending on such conceptions of 
value, individuals will not only want to spend their money in different ways but also at 
different points in time. In §2 I argue that a metric of justice should be neutral between 
different conceptions of what it means to live a life well. In §3 I argue that a narrow focus on 
income fails to be neutral between life plans which involve spending money in different ways 
over time. Some life plans will require spending money before it is earned, while others 
involve earning money before it is spent. Principles of distributive justice, so I will argue, 
should accommodate such different conceptions of value.  
The question of the extent to which liberal egalitarians should endorse a principle of 
neutrality is controversial.44 Perfectionist liberals tend to reject a strict adherence to 
neutrality. They believe that liberal egalitarianism should be understood as a pluralist theory 
that recognizes a wide range of valuable ways of living one’s life as valuable.45 My argument 
in the following will not depend on any strong anti-perfectionist conception of neutrality. 
What matters for the conception of neutrality at issue here is that principles should 
accommodate a wide range of ideas concerning what it means to live a life well. The notion 
                                                 
44 For more detailed discussions: Raz 1986, pp. 114f; Dworkin 2000, pp. 237-284; Patten 2012. 
45 Berlin [1959] 1990; Raz 1986.  
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of neutrality that I invoke should, therefore, be acceptable to both perfectionists and anti-
perfectionists.46 
Philosophers do not generally agree that principles of justice, even at an abstract level, can be 
established through a priori philosophical argument. Instead, as famously argued by Jürgen 
Habermas, questions of distributive justice are to be settled in the actual deliberation of a 
political community.47 This issue raises profound questions, but not much hangs on it here. 
Even if Habermas is right, his argument does not preclude articulating criteria by which to 
evaluate the quality of alternative conceptions of justice. The criteria of neutrality are not 
only applicable to philosophical theories that seek to articulate the appropriate moral 
premises for political deliberation.48 They also apply to conceptions of justice that are 
invoked in actual democratic deliberation. The normative concepts that I develop are meant 
to inform such deliberation. 
1.2.4 Public and private authority 
I have outlined the framework of distributive justice that informs the dissertation. As already 
noted, a central topic of the dissertation is the relation between the public and the private 
sphere of a capitalist society. Financial markets involve a complex interrelation of private and 
public institutions and it is often contested where the boundaries should be drawn. I will now 
explain how I understand this distinction in terms of (i) the agent that makes a decision; (ii) 
the moral demands that apply to that decision; and (iii) the type of justification that the agent 
should formulate for the decision.  
To ensure that the basic structure meets a demand of political equality, societies need 
political institutions. Political institutions exercise public authority over citizens. In saying 
that a decision is left to public authority I mean that (i) decisions are in some way made by 
citizens jointly, rather than individually; (ii) that the goal of decisions is to ensure outcomes 
that are fair to all individuals concerned; and therefore that (iii) decisions are to be justified 
                                                 
46 Joseph Raz claims that his version of perfectionist liberalism is compatible with the device of the original 
position (1986, p. 126). 
47 E.g., Habermas 1998; Benhabib 2002.  
48 My focus here is specifically on justifications provided by political institutions, for which it is not 
controversial to say that relatively stringent norms apply. See, e.g., Young 2002, p. 167. 
30 
 
with reference to a conception of justice. That at least some decisions are made in this way is 
crucial for respecting the political freedom of citizens. They should be able to participate in 
the exercise of public authority and receive a justification for decisions that are made. To this 
end, constitutional legal and non-legal rules that govern the exercise of public authority are to 
ensure that decisions are taken jointly, in a way that is fair to all individuals concerned and so 
that citizens have an adequate justification. In §4, I say more about the idea of a constitution 
and in §7 I discuss what democratic participation is required for the exercise of public 
authority by the central bank. 
The basic structure of a capitalist economy does not only consist of political institutions. In a 
capitalist economy, the coordination of exchange and production of economic means is 
largely left to private authority. In the private sphere of a capitalist economy, individuals, but 
also larger associations such as private firms, are free to make their own choices. It is left to 
them to value ends and make plans to pursue them. Choices are a matter of personal 
responsibility in the sense that (i) decisions are left to private individuals, either individually 
or jointly; (ii) the outcomes of decisions are largely for them to bear; and (iii) they are not 
expected to justify their decisions with reference to a conception of distributive justice.  
A basic structure can meet some demands of distributive justice by relying on private 
authority. Consider the right to nutrition. In the context of a capitalist economy, nutrition is 
provided by firms, which are subject to public regulation. Social security is in place to ensure 
that individuals can pay for it. The distribution of food itself, however, is not under the direct 
authority of any political institution. Rather, it is left to private authority, where decisions are 
made by private individuals who are allowed to make a profit and not expected to say much 
about how their work contributes to a just society. A capitalist society can meet the rights of 
individuals to nutrition without relying on public authority over the exchange and production 
of food. The primary burden of justification goes to the political institutions that regulate the 
market. Only when political institutions fail does the responsibility for providing nutrition 
shift to private citizens. 
The question of which decisions societies should leave to political institutions and where 
private authority does better will be a recurring topic in the dissertation. A theory of 
distributive justice that is adequate for a capitalist economy needs to have principles that can 
inform deliberation on such questions.  
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1.2.5 Some caveats 
I conclude with some caveats concerning my account of political institutions and national 
borders.  
Under a system of representative government, citizen delegate their responsibility for 
realising just outcomes largely to political institutions. In his work on representative 
government, Bernhard Manin describes four crucial features of political representation from 
the 18th century onwards.49 First, governments are elected by citizens at regular intervals. 
Second, the government is independent in that systems of elected government do not provide 
citizens with any means of direct control. They cannot issue imperative mandates, which 
would require the government to pursue a particular course of action and citizens are not able 
to recall their vote when the government acts against their views. Third, citizens have 
extensive freedom in expressing their opinions on the decisions of the government. Fourth, 
there is a public sphere in which decisions undergo the trial of debate.  
The political institutions that currently govern the authority over money look very different 
from Manin’s system of representative government. First, while most coercive laws are 
distinctly national in origin, the rules that govern the banking system are increasingly global. 
From the 1950s and 1960s onwards, the UK and US created a large offshore financial system, 
where the currency is the Dollar, and which national governments have limited ability to 
regulate.50 With the increased integration of financial markets in the following decades, the 
need for a global regulatory framework arose. Crucial to this framework are the Basel 
Accords, which I will discuss in more detail in §§4 and 6.  
Second, these accords and other important parts of financial regulation are not drafted by 
parliaments but by transnational institutions such as the Financial Stability Board and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.51 In the context of these institutions, public 
officials from central banks and treasuries negotiate the terms of global financial regulation. 
                                                 
49 Manin 1997. 
50 Helleiner 1996. 
51 Avgouleas 2012; Brummer 2015. 
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Parliaments only come in to implement these agreements by making them into domestic 
law.52 
Third, even within national borders, many of the most consequential decisions regarding 
financial markets are left to central banks. In §7 I discuss how under central bank 
independence, governments delegate control over monetary policy to a central bank board or 
independent committee. Their members are not elected but are rather appointed by 
governments. Positions come with long, fixed terms. Central bankers justify monetary policy 
by invoking a legal mandate, which they are largely free to interpret. The primary mechanism 
of democratic accountability is such a legal justification.  
These three observations raise many questions but, with the exception of §7, I do not engage 
with these issues here.53 The focus of the dissertation is on political institutions in so far as 
they are part of the monetary constitution. If the central bank is not independent, the 
government itself has authority over money creation, but such independence is now very rare. 
Because public money creation is part of the monetary constitution, I put forward a 
framework for evaluating the role of governments in setting monetary policy in §7. There, my 
focus is on the question of how to design the monetary constitution. The question of what 
type of political institutions should decide the design of the monetary constitution falls 
outside the scope of the dissertation. Still, in light of this status quo it would be misleading to 
talk of governments as the default agents. Instead, I will use the general term political 
institutions for the institutions that are responsible for ensuring that the basic structure meets 
demands of distributive justice. By using these vague terms, I sidestep the difficult question 
of how to legislate for a global monetary order. 
A similar issue concerns national borders. I often talk about the basic structure as if it is one 
clearly defined set of institutions within national borders. I do not systematically discuss the 
issues of global justice that money raises. In §4 I do briefly extend the descriptive account of 
the monetary constitution to the global order, but I do not provide any normative premises to 
evaluate the status quo. It is also fair to say that many of the problems that I raise are specific 
to high-income economies, although I do occasionally touch on global issues. As far as I can 
                                                 
52 Idem. 
53 I also discuss these topics in van ‘t Klooster forthcoming a; forthcoming b. 
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see, my arguments concerning money, finance, and the objections to existing hybrid 
structures should apply to both high- and low-income economies.  
1.3 Outline of the dissertation. 
This section will outline the road ahead. In §1.3.1 I describe the content of the individual 
chapters. In §1.3.2 I discuss how the three main claims of the dissertation are internally 
related.  
1.3.1 Individual chapters 
In §2 ‘The metric of democratic capitalism’, I discuss the crucial role of money as a metric of 
justice for a society that is capitalist, but also a democracy. I draw on historical accounts of 
socialist planning to outline two defining features of a capitalist economy; Coordination is 
left to private authority and money serves as an independent unit of account. I then reflect on 
what this means for the metric of justice that is appropriate for such a society. To this end, I 
outline three criteria for ways of making interpersonal comparisons. First, metrics should be 
sufficiently neutral between alternative conceptions of the good. Second, disagreement over 
the application of a given metric should be limited. Third, political institutions should be able 
to effectively control what a metric measures. I review the most prominent accounts of the 
evaluation of outcomes in the literature: welfare, resources, capabilities, primary goods, and 
social relations. I then argue that for capitalist institutions, money is the metric that does best 
in meeting these criteria. 
In §3 ‘Income, credit, and saving’, I put forward my account of how theories of distributive 
justice should deal with questions of financial inclusion. Philosophers have often thought 
about options for credit and saving as a means for realising a more fundamental good, such as 
welfare or capabilities. But such an account is incompatible with the argument in §2 for the 
crucial role of money. More recently, philosophers have argued that all individuals are 
entitled to a determinate minimum level of options for financial contracts. I argue that such 
an account obscures crucial distributive conflicts. Rather, so I argue, we should think of 
income, options for credit and options for saving as means for realising a just intertemporal 
distribution of money. A just distribution is neutral between those who wish to spend money 
before they earn it and those who earn money to spend it later, as well as those who spend 
their income immediately. Under capitalist coordination, realising a just intertemporal 
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distribution requires adequate options for credit and saving, which should, therefore, be at the 
centre of an account of distributive justice. I conclude by arguing that capitalist provision of 
options for credit and saving systematically privileges the already well-off. 
In §4 ‘The monetary constitution’, I turn to the authority over money and my conception of 
the monetary constitution. I explain how under a hybrid monetary constitution, the private 
banking system creates money in the act of granting loans, while at the same time subject to 
constraints imposed by political institutions. A crucial role in the monetary constitution goes 
to the central bank, which provides banks with reliable access to central bank credit. 
Financial regulation, the public central bank, and the private banking system together 
determine the options for credit and saving that are available to citizens. In this sense, the 
monetary constitution of existing capitalist societies involves a hybrid of private and public 
authority over money.  
Starting with §5 ‘Financial instability’, I turn to the normative evaluation of the hybrid 
monetary constitution. A banking crisis, a regular occurrence in societies with a hybrid 
monetary constitution, can disrupt individual lives in dramatic ways. I discuss the dynamic by 
which financial crises unfold and put forward an account of why financial instability is 
objectionable from the perspective of distributive justice. I focus on two types of distributive 
consequences. First, I draw on §3 to argue that financial instability undermines the ability of 
political institutions to realise a just distribution of income and options for credit and saving. 
Second, I argue that financial instability undermines the epistemic position of individuals. 
The deceptive period of stability before the crisis leads individuals to make life plans which 
they would not have made had the information available to them been better. I also explain 
why epistemic positions are to be taken seriously in the normative evaluation of capitalist 
societies. 
In §§6 and 7 I turn to the question of how political institutions should respond to these and 
other objections to the existing financial system. In §6 ‘Incremental abolition’ I outline five 
objections to unregulated private money creation. Drawing on §3, I focus on the unfair 
distribution of money that results from capitalist coordination. Drawing on §5, I discuss 
financial instability. I also raise objections to private authority over money that invoke 
macroeconomic instability, ecological unsustainability, and political inequality. I then turn to 
the difficult question of how to reform private money creation. I review proposals for 
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abolition of the hybrid monetary constitution known as Full Reserve Banking. I argue that 
although at least some of these proposals promise to address the objection to hybridity, it is 
not clear that they will, nor is it clear that better regulation of a hybrid system cannot achieve 
the same goals. I discuss what uncertainty of this kind means for the theory of political 
representation and argue for the importance of experimentation. On this basis, I propose a 
programme of incremental abolition. By gradually reducing the role of private authority over 
the provision of credit and deposits, political institutions will generate the evidence that is 
needed to reform the existing financial system.  
Finally, in §7 ‘The ethics of delegating monetary authority’ I explore the constitutional 
structures that govern public money creation through a discussion of central bank 
independence. In contrast to those who reject central bank independence entirely, I argue that 
it should in principle be permissible for governments to delegate political choices to 
unelected experts. From a democratic perspective, what matters is whether the act of 
delegation serves the government’s ultimate economic policy aims. But, as I argue, central 
banks today face different, and much more complex, political choices. Nonetheless, they have 
retained their pre-crisis independence, and their monetary policy mandates remain virtually 
unchanged. I will argue that this situation is untenable and that reform is overdue.  
1.3.2 Structure of the argument 
I will now explain the relationship between the three main claims in more detail (See Figure 
1.1 for an overview).  
Main claim 1 holds that money and finance are central to any account of distributive justice 
that is adequate for a capitalist society. This is the central claim of the dissertation and has 
two sub-claims, which I refer to as the distributive and the institutional claim. The 
distributive claim concerns the crucial role of the distribution of money in a capitalist society. 
My main arguments for the distributive claim are in §§2 and 3. In §2 I argue that where 
capitalist coordination governs exchange and production, money acquires a crucial role as a 
metric of justice. In §3 I argue that a just distribution of economic means should not only 
concern income, but also options for credit and options for saving. These arguments together 
serve to establish a crucial role for the distribution of money.  
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The institutional claim holds that the authority over money is crucial for theories of 
distributive justice. I argue for the institutional claim by establishing the second and third 
main claim of the dissertation.  
In arguing for the second main claim in §§3, 5, and 6, I outline five distinct objections of 
distributive justice to private money creation. In §3 I argue that the current system of private 
authority over money privileges the wealthy, thereby failing to realise a fair intertemporal 
distribution of money. In §5 I argue that the current system of private authority gives rise to 
cyclical patterns of manias, panics and depression, thereby undermining a fair interpersonal 
distribution and the ability of individuals to make life plans. In §6 I restate these objections 
and add three new ones. Private money creation (i) exacerbates business cycles through the 
extension of credit in economic upturns and contraction in downturns; (ii) enforces the status 
quo of unsustainable levels of natural resource use, rather than contributing to required 
transition; and (iii) centralises political power in a small number of private financial 
institutions. These arguments show that leaving money to private authority can hinder a 
society in meeting the demands of distributive justice that apply to it. A theory of distributive 
justice should, therefore, have something to say on the extent to which authority over money 
should be private. 
The third main claim of the dissertation provides support for the institutional claim by 
arguing that the existing monetary constitution needs fundamental reform.  
In §6 I turn to reform of the rules and institutions that govern private money creation. Main 
claim 2 establishes that there are weighty objections to private authority over money. To 
establish that reform is desirable, there should also be an alternative that does better. I review 
existing proposals for reform, both those that argue for abolishing private money creation 
altogether and those that merely argue for stricter regulation. I argue that the arguments on 
both sides are inconclusive. I put forward a proposal for incremental abolition of private 
money creation. In §7 I argue for reform of the independent mandate of central banks and 
their exercise of public authority over money.  
These arguments together should convince the reader of the crucial role of both the 




Main Claims Sub-claims Supported by 
Main claim 1: Money and finance 
are central to any account of 
distributive justice that is adequate 
for a capitalist society. 
Distributive Claim: The 
distribution of money and finance 
is central. 
§§2 and 3 
 Institutional Claim: The authority 
over money and finance is central. 
Main claims §§2 and 3 
Main claim 2: There are five 
objections to unregulated private 
money creation. 
 §§3, 5 and 6 
Main claim 3: Existing monetary 
constitutions need fundamental 
reform. 
 §§6 and 7 





2 The metric of democratic capitalism 
A society’s major social and political institutions will unavoidably benefit some more than 
others. Theories of distributive justice propose criteria for deciding which inequalities are 
permissible, which are not, and what role goes to institutions in realising just outcomes. In §1 
I have outlined a liberal egalitarian conception of distributive justice. This conception is 
egalitarian in that it requires that institutions treat individuals as equals. But it is also liberal 
in that it is left to individuals to make their own plans assuming these institutions as given. In 
this chapter and the next, I turn to the questions of how to decide whether institutions do 
enough to realise a just distribution and what role goes to monetary and financial institution. 
In the past decades, philosophers have put forward detailed theories that focus on the 
distribution of welfare, economic resources, capabilities, primary goods, social power and 
standing but have largely neglected money and finance. This is a striking departure from our 
everyday political discourse, and I think that it is a mistake. I will seek to amend this neglect 
by arguing that the distribution of money should be at the centre of any theory of justice for a 
capitalist society. In the next chapter, I discuss the distribution of money over time by means 
of financial contracts. In this chapter, I turn to money as a metric of justice and do two things.  
First, I put forward an account of what I take philosophers to have neglected. In thinking 
about capitalist institutions in non-monetary terms, philosophers have proposed theories that 
are suitable for a barter economy, but not for a monetary economy. I explain that in existing 
capitalist societies, money plays a role of its own as an independent unit of account.  
Second, I investigate how money fits into debates over the metric of justice. I approach this 
topic by emphasising two features that define a capitalist democracy. Such a society (a) 
assigns an important role to capitalist coordination of the economy and (b) has democratic 
political institutions that are accountable to citizens. I argue that for a society with these two 
features, widely used metrics of distributive justice are simply inadequate. Instead, the 
democratic justification of capitalist institutions should give a prominent role to money. In 
this sense, money is the metric of democratic capitalism. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows.  
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In §2.1 I discuss the coordination of exchange and production in a capitalist economy. The 
capitalist mode of coordination leaves authority over production and exchange largely to 
private individuals and firms. Money incentivizes them to realise an efficient use of economic 
means. If distribution is left to capitalist coordination, political institutions will only have 
limited knowledge of and ability to control what happens in the economy.  
In §2.2 I turn to the second feature of a capitalist economy, which is that it has democratic 
political institutions that are accountable to citizens. I argue that a metric that can have a role 
in democratic justification should meet three criteria: First, egalitarian neutrality: the metric 
should be sufficiently neutral between alternative conceptions of the good that individuals 
hold. Second, objectivity: the room for disagreement over the way in which political 
institutions measure outcomes should be limited. Third, controllability: political institutions 
should be able to control outcomes effectively.  
In §2.3 I review the most prominent accounts of the evaluation of outcomes in the literature: 
welfare, resources, capabilities, primary goods and social relations. I argue that where 
exchange and production are left to capitalist coordination, money is often the most 
appropriate metric. 
2.1 Capitalist coordination 
In this section I explain the coordination of exchange and production that is characteristic of a 
capitalist economy. I do this by discussing the general concept of economic coordination 
(§2.1.1). I then discuss the centralised coordination of socialist economies and its most 
notorious weaknesses, namely bureaucratic incentives and collection of information (§2.1.2). 
In §2.1.3 I explain that the capitalist mode of coordination has two key features: (i) It assigns 
legal authority over production and exchange largely to private individuals and firms; (ii) 
Money is used to determine entitlements to resources and obligations to provide resources. In 
§2.1.4 I explain how capitalist coordination solves the problems faced by social planners. In 
§2.1.5 I argue that where distribution is left to capitalist coordination, political institutions 
will only have limited information concerning consumer preferences and economic means.  
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2.1.1 Modes of coordination 
To explain the idea of economic coordination, I will introduce a simple model by Piero Sraffa 
of a self-reproducing system of production and exchange over time.54 This model is 
particularly useful here because it is compatible with different modes of coordination and 
thereby helps to bring out their differences.  
The Sraffian model describes the economy as a self-reproducing system of exchange and 
production over time. The outputs of individual sectors serve as input to other sectors in order 
to reproduce the economic system in the next period of production. The simplest Sraffian 
economy has only two sectors. Consider an example in which one sector produces iron and 
the other produces wheat which are both used for consumption and production. The wheat 
sector consumes 280 quarters of wheat and 12 tons of iron. It produces 400 quarters of wheat. 
The iron sector consumes 120 quarters of wheat and 8 tons of iron and produces 20 tons of 
iron. At the end of the period, one sector will hold 400 quarters of wheat and the other 20 
tons of iron. For this economy to reproduce itself in such a way that production can be the 
same in the next period, both sectors need to produce one ton of iron for every ten quarters of 
wheat. In Sraffa’s scheme this is represented as follows: 
280 qr. wheat + 12 t. iron → 400 qr. wheat 
120 qr. wheat + 8 t. iron → 20 t. iron 
For this simple economy to reproduce itself, the sectors must produce the required volumes 
of goods and exchange these goods at certain points in time. For exchange to take place, the 
sectors must also decide on prices at which to exchange commodities. The iron sector needs 
120 quarters of wheat, in exchange for which it provides 12 tons of iron. In this sense, the 
price of iron is 10 quarters of wheat. Barter at this price will allow both sectors to reproduce 
themselves. The coordination of an economy determines entitlements to economic means and 
obligations to provide them.  
The simplest example of a mode of coordination is barter. The two-sector economy can 
reproduce itself if the iron and the wheat sector are both willing to exchange 1 ton of iron 
                                                 
54 Sraffa [1960] 1975.  
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against 10 quarters of wheat. Reproduction of the economy is possible in so far as there is 
such a coincidence of wants. The question of coordination becomes more challenging when 
we extend the model to think of a more complex economic system. The left-hand side 
describes the resources that the sector uses (denoted a, b,…,k) and their quantities (A, B, …, 
K). The right-hand side lists the resource that the sector produces (a, b,…,k) and its quantity 
(A, B, …, K). For this system to reproduce itself in its entirety, there must be a set of prices 
(denoted p) at which sectors sell their products and that allow sectors to acquire the resources 
needed as input for production: 
Aapa+Bapb + …. + Kapk → Apa 
Abpa+Bbpb + …. + Kbpk → Bpb 
….. 
Akpa+Bkpb + …. + Kkpk → Kpk 
As the number of sectors increases, coincidence of wants becomes very unlikely. In an 
economy with a higher number of goods and services, some sectors will unavoidably require 
inputs from other sectors that do not accept their output in return. For this reason, no 
historical economy ever relied only on barter as its mode of coordination.55 
To realise an efficient distribution of economic means, a complex economy needs a mode of 
coordination that is more sophisticated than barter. In the most general sense, efficiency 
concerns the costs of producing individual resources and the value that these resources have 
for their final consumer. To say that an allocation is efficient means that it is not possible to 
better satisfy the preferences of any individual consumer in light of consumer needs and 
technological possibilities without making someone else worse off.56 The concept of 
efficiency is limited, though, in that it ignores distributional concerns. It takes resource 
endowments as given and asks how exchange and production should be organized to enable 
individuals to best satisfy their preferences. But even if efficiency is not the only criterion by 
which to evaluate an economic system, it matters in its own right and it is also closely related 
                                                 
55 Pre-capitalist economies assigned a crucial role to tradition, where coordination takes place based on long-
standing entitlements and obligations. E.g., Graeber 2011.  
56 Buchanan 1985, pp. 14f. 
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to other evaluative criteria. An economic system that is grossly inefficient will fail to meet 
the entitlements of at least some individuals to a fair share of economic means.  
Capitalist economies are premised on the belief that an efficient allocation is best realised by 
leaving decisions to private individuals. But leaving coordination to private individuals may 
also hinder political institutions from realising outcomes that they morally prefer. There is, 
then, no simple answer to the question of how to allocate resources efficiently. Rather, this is 
one of the decisive questions that a society faces in designing its major social and political 
institutions. I will now explore the nature of this choice in more detail.  
2.1.2 Centralised coordination 
Consider centralised coordination. Under centralised coordination, exchange and production 
are a matter of public authority. As I explained in §1.3.4, this means that (i) decisions are 
made by political institutions; (ii) whose goal is to ensure that outcomes are fair to all; and 
which (iii) use principles of justice to justify the distribution of entitlements and obligations 
that apply to economic agents. 
The socialist economies of the 20th century saw experiments with entirely centralised 
economic coordination. But elements of centralised coordination are crucial to any existing 
capitalist society. All governments provide individual and collective goods and services such 
as education, health, defence, and security. In existing democratic systems, government 
expenditures are decided based on legislative approval of a government budget. In this sense, 
every existing capitalist society still assigns a crucial role to public authority over production 
and exchange. 
While centralised coordination can allow for a rapid transformation of the economy, it can 
also make adapting to new circumstances difficult. 20th-century socialist economies, for 
instance, realised industrialisation at a pace rarely seen in any capitalist economy. Until the 
late 1960s, eastern and western economies were perceived to grow at a roughly similar pace. 
As their economies become more complex, however, socialist states faced considerable 
difficulties in keeping up with the pace of technological innovation and changing consumer 
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preferences. Drawing on the historical account of Michael Ellman, I will discuss two flaws of 
socialist economies.57  
First, there is a problem of bureaucratic incentives. In historical socialist economies, the 
incentives of political officials often worked against the development and efficient use of 
technological possibilities, available resources and labour. In general, Soviet industries had 
only one monopoly R&D institution responsible for developing new ideas and deciding on 
their use. These institutions often chose to retain existing ways of production even when 
better alternatives were available. Political institutions tended to make choices that benefited 
their organisation rather than the wider economy. For example, because the Soviet Union 
only evaluated the quantity of steel produced, it suffered from a persistent lack of sufficiently 
high-quality steel. Although bureaucratic incentives did to some extent track the interests of 
consumers, there was no systematic mechanism to ensure that these incentives in fact lined 
up with them.  
Second, planners had immense difficulty collecting the information they needed to realise 
consumer preferences and technological possibilities. This is because when the number of 
sectors in an economy increases, the informational complexity of the economy goes up 
dramatically. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly difficult to collect information 
regarding both the preferences of individual sectors and their productive capacity. Thus, in a 
complex economy it is not only difficult to make the necessary computations once 
information is available. It is also difficult to collect the relevant information in the first 
place. An increasingly rapid pace of change compounds these difficulties. The Soviet 
planning bureau Gosplan, for example, spent 80% to 90% of its efforts in collecting 
information. The complexity of their task was enormous. As Gosplan officials write: 
For the problem which enables the maximum production of shoes subject to the 
structure of demand and the given resources to be calculated, shoes are divided into 
257 types, and the full nomenclature of shoes and related items runs to about 36,000 
items.58 
                                                 
57 Ellman 2014, pp. 137-180. 
58 Cited in Ellman 2014, p. 159. 
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The problems of setting the right incentives and collecting information are not unsolvable in 
principle. Institutions can learn, and where they fail to achieve their ends, they can be 
reformed. But the autocratic nature of socialist regimes was, to say the least, not conducive to 
such processes. The technical challenges of centralised coordination were greatly 
compounded by lack of democratic accountability and other institutional mechanisms to 
incentivise improvement. These objections will be important again in §6 when I turn to the 
discussion of public provision of credit.59 
2.1.3 Decentralised coordination and money 
The difficulties faced by social planners have led developed countries to assign an important 
role to capitalist coordination of exchange and production. As discussed in Chapter one, 
capitalist coordination has two features that are crucial for my account: first, decision-making 
is decentralised and second, money acts as an independent unit of account.  
First, concerning decentralised coordination. In a capitalist economy, decisions over 
exchange and production are treated as a matter of private authority.60 This means that (i) 
decisions are made by individuals rather than political institutions; (ii) the outcomes of these 
decisions are to benefit or burden those who make them; and (iii) individuals need not justify 
their decisions with reference to principles of distributive justice. A system of private 
property rights serves to codify the distribution of private authority. 
Capitalist economies feature two kinds of economic agents with private authority over 
exchange and production. First, individuals who consume goods and services as part of their 
life plans, either alone or as part of larger households or other associations. Second, firms that 
make decisions in producing and selling goods and services.  
The second feature of a capitalist economy is the crucial role money has as an independent 
unit of account. One can easily imagine a non-capitalist form of decentralised coordination. 
The crucial feature of a capitalist economy is the role it assigns to money. Although 
individuals and firms are different in many ways, their operations both depend on the 
generation of cash inflow from private economic transactions. To this end, they sell goods, 
                                                 




services and labour, as well as receive wages and income from capital. The activities of 
economic agents also create obligations to pay bills, taxes, and repay loans.  
Under capitalist coordination, money has a role that is distinct from its role in other modes of 
coordination.61 In virtue of the prices at which sectors exchange their goods, every self-
reproducing economy can be said to have money as a unit of account. Prices are the ratios of 
exchange between individual resources. But, exchange under barter and centralised 
coordination remains essentially an exchange of goods and services. The economy is 
coordinated through legal obligations denominated in non-monetary terms and theoretical 
prices can be defined in terms of any resource produced in the economy. Thus, it does not 
matter whether we say that the price of a ton of iron is 10 quarters of wheat, or that the price 
of a quarter of wheat is 100 kilos of iron. In this sense, there is no role for money as an 
independent unit of account. 
In the context of a capitalist economy, money, however, does serve as an independent unit of 
account.62 By this I mean that economic agents have monetary entitlements and obligations 
that are distinct from the entitlements and obligations that govern economic means. If 
someone buys a ton of iron, it is possible that they will in the end indirectly ‘pay’ for it by 
selling 10 quarters of wheat, but they do not acquire a legal obligation to provide wheat. The 
agent that receives the payment is not entitled to wheat, but only to the agreed upon monetary 
price. Money serves as an alternative to coordination of production and exchange in real 
terms.  
2.1.4 Capitalist incentives 
Under capitalism, economic agents are incentivised to invest time and effort into the 
decisions they make concerning the use of economic means. A capitalist economy leaves 
economic coordination to private authority and the outcomes of choices are, for better or for 
worse, for individuals to bear. The benefits of good choices as well as the burdens of bad 
                                                 
61 The connection of money to division of labour is an important topic in the works of Adam Smith and Karl 
Marx. See Weber 2015. 
62 Marx discusses money as an independent unit of account in the first chapter of Capital. Also Keynes [1930] 
2012; [1933] 1963; Ingham 2004. 
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ones are meant to incentivise individuals to realise an efficient coordination of exchange and 
production. 
Consider first individual consumers. Available resources, labour and technology all have a 
price, which consumers pay if the production of economic means requires their use. It is up to 
consumers to make their income line up with their expenditures and to use these expenditures 
in the best way to realise their life plans. I will turn to the role of money in life planning in 
§3.1.  
Consider now the way in which a capitalist economy incentivises efficient production.63 To 
make profits, firms seek to discover what goods and services consumers want and how to 
provide these to them given available resources, labour and technological possibilities. Yet, 
firms often lack information concerning their technological constraints and the willingness of 
consumers to buy certain products. If a firm makes the right assumptions about where to 
invest in light of technological possibilities and consumer needs, its operations will be 
profitable. If it gets the decision wrong, however, the firm needs to try again. A firm that 
systematically gets investment decisions wrong goes out of business. In the process of 
developing and testing assumptions, the firm develops expertise, the right infrastructure and 
other means for providing better goods and services. In this way, the profit-motive leads 
firms to use their situated knowledge to realise an efficient use of economic means. Firms, in 
turn, are incentivised to pursue profits by their owners.  
By leaving decisions on production and exchange to private authority, capitalist coordination 
promises to address both problems faced by socialist planning. First, it incentivises firms to 
make efficient use of resources and technological possibilities for meeting the needs of 
individuals. This is a solution to the problem of bureaucratic incentives. Second, by leaving 
decisions to individual consumers and firms, a capitalist economy also reduces the need for 
political institutions to collect information.  
                                                 
63 For the classical perspective, e.g., Shaikh 2016. For the neoclassical perspective, e.g., Bowles 2009. For the 
Austrian perspectives Hayek 1945; 1982; 2002; Kirzner 1997; Burczak 2006. For the Post-Keynesian 




2.1.5 Capitalism and knowledge  
The issue of whether economies should rely on capitalist coordination and if so, when, is very 
much contested. My aim here is not to say much about this issue. Rather, I want to argue that 
when the choice is made to rely on capitalist coordination, political institutions will have 
limited information regarding consumer preferences and technological possibilities. Political 
institutions will also have limited control over individual outcomes. These epistemic and 
practical limitations will be the basis for my argument for money as a metric of justice.  
There are two reasons why political institutions will tend to have limited knowledge of and 
control over outcomes that result from capitalist coordination. First, capitalist coordination is 
only justifiable for coordinating economic decisions where the ability of political institutions 
to collect and process information effectively is limited to begin with, as historical socialist 
economies demonstrated. Second, by relying on capitalist coordination, political institutions 
further reduce their ability to collect information and control outcomes. I discuss both reasons 
in order.  
On the first reason. The justification of capitalist coordination rests crucially on the epistemic 
and practical limitations of political institutions. Although market competition leads to 
efficient outcomes, it does little to realise more general considerations of fairness. Consider 
two forms of systematic unfairness. First, a capitalist economy requires individuals to make 
choices in the face of a largely uncertain future. The risks individuals take are rarely 
conscious gambles but are, as a rule, rather steps into the unknown. Taking these risks is 
incentivised by the promise of high returns for those who are successful. But this leads to a 
second problem, which is that the unconstrained operation of the market process primarily 
benefits those with high wealth and marketable skills. Capitalist coordination provides these 
individuals with social prestige and power, while those without wealth and skills are 
systematically disadvantaged. There is no clear tendency towards equality inherent in 
capitalist coordination.64  
In the face of these objections, the justification for capitalist coordination cannot rest on the 
right of any individual to use economic means as they please. Such a notion of unconstrained 
                                                 
64 E.g., Piketty 2014; I discuss this issue in more detail in §3.3. 
48 
 
discretion may fit the use of consumer goods, but not fundamental decisions on the rules that 
govern exchange and production. This is not to deny that individuals may have some interest 
in free choice over the use of means of production. For example, entrepreneurship may be 
seen as a form of expression, which the state should not needlessly obstruct.65 But, the 
interest of individuals in these forms of self-expression cannot by itself justify the effects on 
others of a given mode of economic coordination. A successful egalitarian liberal case in 
favour of capitalist coordination must rely at least in part on the efficiency argument above. 
Even a staunch free-market defender such as Hayek admits that capitalist coordination can 
only be justified where centralised coordination cannot realise efficient outcomes: ‘Wherever 
the use of competition can be rationally justified, it is on the grounds that we do not know in 
advance the facts that determine the actions of competitors.’66 And, reflecting on this fact, 
‘the manner in which the benefits and burdens are apportioned by the market mechanism 
would in many instances have to be regarded as very unjust if it were the result of a deliberate 
allocation to particular people’.67 Again, my point is not to defend or critique capitalism, but 
to describe the circumstances in which it can make sense for a society to rely on capitalist 
coordination.  
Once a society had made that decision, this also work to increase the epistemic and practical 
limitations that political institutions face. When private agents make decisions over exchange 
and production, they decide on private grounds and are under no obligation to communicate 
the considerations to others. Under capitalism, a large part of the economy is far removed 
from political institutions. Information on consumer needs remains with individuals, while 
production possibilities are known by individual firms. Where exchange and production are 
left to decentralised coordination, political institutions will face considerable epistemic 
obstacles. Because decisions are left to individuals in accordance with a system of private 
property rights, outcomes are also no longer entirely under the control of political institutions.  
I now turn to the question of what these epistemic and practical limitations mean for the 
democratic justification of capitalist institutions. 
                                                 
65 E.g., Tomassi 2012. 
66 Hayek [1968] 2002, p. 9.  
67 Idem, p. 64. 
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2.2 Democratic justification 
Political institutions of a capitalist society have limited information concerning consumer 
preferences and available economic means. They also have limited control over individual 
outcomes. In §2.3 I will explore how these epistemic and practical considerations constrain 
the metric that is suitable for the evaluation of individual outcomes. Before turning to my 
comparison of different metrics discussed in the literature, this section explains why 
epistemic and pragmatic considerations should be important in the first place. I do this by 
focusing on the role of a metric in democratic justification. 
In §2.2.1 I explain what I mean by a metric and how this understanding of what constitutes a 
metric relates to existing debates in the theory of distributive justice. In §2.2.2 I outline three 
criteria for the intersubjective comparison of outcomes that follow from the role of a metric 
in democratic justification: neutrality, objectivity, and controllability.  
2.2.1 Metrics of justice 
Public deliberation and justification of political decisions are a crucial feature of systems of 
representative government. In a democratic society, institutions and officials that exercise 
political authority are expected to explain to citizens why they institute certain rules or take 
certain actions. A democratic justification is a justification of a political decision by officials 
or political institutions of a society, which is addressed to the members of that society.  
Providing a democratic justification has two important functions. First, public scrutiny of 
political institutions contributes to making better decisions. By demanding a justification, 
members of a political community ensure that the decisions of political institutions meet 
certain minimal demands of justice. By ensuring that the deliberation of political institutions 
is accessible and open to a wide range of individuals, citizens can contribute to the quality of 
decisions and hold those who make decisions to account. In short, adhering to the demand of 
democratic justification ensures that proposals contribute to just outcomes.  
Second, public reason has a crucial role in meeting the political rights of members of a 
political community. Members of a political community are not only expected to treat each 
other as equals with regard to their particular conception of the good, but also with regard to 
their sense of justice. As explained in §1, to be free and equal, citizens must not only be able 
to participate in the political process, they must also have access to a justification for political 
50 
 
decisions. Members of a political community are entitled to a democratic justification of 
political decisions. 
My aim in the following is to find metrics of justice that are appropriate for democratic 
justification. I will use the term metric of justice to refer to the unit by which political 
institutions compare outcomes of individuals. My focus will be on metrics as used to justify 
the institutions of the basic structure that shape those outcomes. In justifying the institutions 
that make up the basic structure, political institutions must have some way of comparing 
individual outcomes. For example, the difference principle refers to the greatest benefit of the 
least-advantaged. If political institutions invoke it, how should they spell out what it means to 
be more or less advantaged than others? I believe that this is the linguistic context in which 
the idea of a metric of justice is most naturally at home. Therefore, I will investigate what 
metric is appropriate for comparing the outcomes of capitalist coordination by considering 
their role in a democratic context.  
In §2.3 I will engage principally with metrics for the distribution of economic means, but my 
claim that money is the metric of democratic capitalism has a more general application. As I 
will now explain, there are broadly two ways to think about distributive justice. My argument 
is meant to apply to both.  
On a distributive account, the evaluation of outcomes concerns the means that are available to 
individuals to pursue their conception of the good. The choices made in the design of the 
basic structure will further the ability of some to pursue their particular conception of the 
good to the disadvantage of others. The question that the distributive egalitarian asks is 
whether the distribution of means treats all individuals as equals. It is here that the question 
of a metric comes in to compare the means that are available to individuals.68  
Relational egalitarians, in contrast, are concerned with the social relations that individuals 
stand in. Just institutions prevent economic inequality that ‘reflects, embodies, or causes 
inequality of authority, status, or standing’.69 For the relational egalitarian, individual 
outcomes are evaluated in terms of the social standing that citizens have. My focus will be on 
                                                 
68 For the notion of the metric, see Sen 1980. Also, Dworkin 1981a; 1981b; Arneson 1989; 2000; Cohen 1989. 
69 Anderson 2010, p. 3. 
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distributive egalitarianism, but the line of argument that I develop applies in the same way to 
relational egalitarians, which I discuss in §2.3.5.  
2.2.2 Three criteria 
I will now argue that a metric for democratic capitalism should meet three criteria: egalitarian 
neutrality, objectivity and controllability. These are criteria that I will apply whenever I 
discuss ways of comparing outcomes from the perspective of justice. I use these criteria in the 
discussion of intersubjective fairness in §2.3 of this chapter, intertemporal fairness in §3, and 
financial instability and epistemic positions in §5.  
First, any democratic justification is subject to a demand of egalitarian neutrality. To serve its 
role in democratic justification, intersubjective comparison cannot depend on the ways in 
which individuals value their lives. Rather, any adequate metric should respect disagreement 
over what is of final value. It would not be neutral to invoke the desirability of different lives 
in evaluating the relative advantage that individuals derive from social cooperation. For this 
reason, the metric should not make direct reference to the value of the life plans that 
individuals pursue. Rather, it should enable democratic exchange that treats a wide range of 
conceptions of the good with equal concern.  
Mere neutrality is insufficient to ensure that a metric provides a good basis for democratic 
justification. A crucial insight that I take from Rawls is that the epistemic needs of a political 
community can shape what forms of intersubjective comparison are appropriate for that 
community. Against the utilitarians, Rawls argues that a metric must be a ‘publicly 
recognized objective and common measure that reasonable persons can accept’.70 I will 
expand on this insight by considering in more detail what sort of metric reasonable persons 
can accept knowing that they will live in a capitalist society. 
Rawls invokes epistemic considerations to argue that parties in his original position would 
choose primary goods as the metric of a public conception of justice. I will not take a stance 
on what metric is appropriate at the level of the original position. My interest is in the 
question of what metrics will be needed in later stages of democratic deliberation (what 
                                                 




Rawls refers to as the constitutional, legislative and judicial stages). This focus fits the 
applied aims of the dissertation. Moreover, it is in these later stages that epistemic and 
practical considerations are known that determine what metric is suitable. For example, in the 
original position, the parties do not know whether they will live in a capitalist or a socialist 
society.71 But, as I argued in §2.1, the role of money as an independent unit of account is 
specific to capitalist societies. Money will have a different, less prominent role in other 
societies. Therefore, parties in the original position will not be able to decide whether money 
meets their democratic needs until they know whether they live in a capitalist society.  
Consider two further criteria. First, like Rawls, I will assume that the evaluation of outcomes 
must be objective. By objective, I mean that disagreement over the measurement of 
individual outcomes should be limited. Objectivity implies that the metric meets a criterion of 
political neutrality, but the reasons that speak for the criterion of objectivity are not 
dependent on a principled endorsement of political neutrality. Rather, this criterion can be 
defended in terms of the more general reasons for democratic justification from §2.2.1. By 
invoking an objective metric, citizens can verify whether institutions meet the relevant 
demands of justice. If they do not, citizens can hold political institutions to account. 
Moreover, an objective measure contributes to ensuring that a justification makes sense to 
citizens. The less room for disagreement over the size of benefits and burdens of individual 
citizens, the better political institutions will be able to justify decisions. 
Consider now my third criterion. Political institutions should focus their justifications on 
outcomes that they can adequately control. Rawls only invokes epistemic conditions in his 
argument for primary goods. Robert Hockett and Mathias Risse have extended his argument 
for primary goods to include practical considerations.72 As they argue, because the final aim 
of public deliberation is to realise and maintain just institutions, a democratic society needs to 
                                                 
71 Rawls 1999a, p. xv. 
72 Their demand of publicity requires that a metric can ‘(1) actually be collectively regulated with reasonable 
effectiveness […], (2) can be verified to a reasonable degree of certainty […], and (3) can be verified without 
drawing on essentially private information, information that can only be obtained through declarations of or 
intrusion upon the relevant parties.’ (Hockett & Risse 2006, p. 9). Their demand of guidance requires that 
‘citizens be able to relate to a currency of regulation in such a way that a language of politics drawing on that 
currency can guide their actions and decisions as citizens.’ (Idem, p. 12).  
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measure outcomes in a way that it can control. The role of the metric is not only to evaluate 
whether the basic structure is sufficiently just. If it is not, institutions should be reformed. A 
metric should, therefore, compare outcomes in terms of something that is under sufficient 
control of political institutions. I will interpret this criterion to require effective control, 
which can either mean direct control or indirect control through a reliable social mechanism. 
As I will now discuss, both objectivity and controllability raise particular problems in the 
context of a capitalist economy, which existing metrics do not address. 
2.3 Fair intersubjective distribution 
In this section I argue that in the evaluation of capitalist institutions, a crucial role should go 
to money itself as a metric of justice. The reason for this is that money is the metric that does 
best in being neutral, objective and is under the control of political institutions. 
In section §2.3.1 I show that money meets the demands of objectivity and controllability, but 
is not always neutral. I then discuss more moralized ways of evaluating outcomes: welfare 
(§2.3.2), resources (§2.3.3), capabilities and primary goods (§2.3.4), and social relations 
(§2.3.5). As I show, the demands of objectivity and controllability often preclude 
comparisons in these terms. On balance, there is a strong case for comparison in monetary 
terms.  
2.3.1 Money 
Consider first the role of money as a metric of justice. Amongst existing proposals for a 
metric, the only account that gives a role to money is the Rawlsian account of primary 
goods.73 Primary goods, according to Rawls, are things that are valuable for pursuing a 
conception of the good irrespective of what that particular conception is. Primary goods are 
all-purpose means in that they are ‘things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever 
else he wants’.74 As Rawls explains: 
                                                 
73 On primary goods, see Rawls [1971] 1999a, p. 78f; Rawls [1982] 1999b; Rawls 2001, pp. 168-176.  
74 Rawls [1971] 1999a, p. 79. I believe Rawls means every individual.  
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Income and wealth are general all-purpose means required to achieve a wide range of 
(permissible) ends, whatever they may be, and in particular, […] advanc[e] the ends 
of the (complete) conceptions of the good that citizens affirm or adopt.75 
In this chapter, I will simply focus on the claim that the relevant metric should be monetary. 
The argument is compatible with the view that comparisons of distributive shares should be 
made in terms of income and wealth, but also leaves open other ways of comparing monetary 
outcomes. In §3 I will argue that income and wealth are inadequate for the evaluation of the 
distribution of money. Rather, comparisons of distributive shares in monetary terms should 
focus on the distribution of income, options for credit and saving. My focus here will be on 
the question whether measuring distributions in monetary terms is an adequate basis to begin 
with.  
A monetary metric is both objective and something that political institutions can control. In 
so far as ownership relations are clear and goods are traded in markets, there is an objective 
basis for measuring distributive shares.76 States routinely establish these facts in order to tax 
citizens. Governments can effectively control the monetary value of distributive shares 
through taxation, expenditures and the organisation of economic institutions.77 
Even if money is an all-purpose means, a monetary metric itself is not entirely neutral 
between different conceptions of the good.78 Money is not normally valuable in and of itself. 
Rather, it has value to individuals in so far as they need it to buy things. Many things are not 
for sale, e.g., well-functioning communities and social status. There are good economic 
reason not to provide some things through capitalist coordination; education, health services 
and transportation tend to be put in this category. Therefore, merely considering distributive 
shares in monetary terms can accommodate a wide range of conceptions of the good, but will 
be more conducive to some than others. Accordingly, it will sometimes be more neutral to 
                                                 
75 Rawls 2001, p. 169. 
76 Even if states currently have difficulty establishing the relevant ownership relations, there are effective ways 
to increase objectivity. See e.g., Zucman et al 2015. 
77 Murphy & Nagel 2002; O’Neill & Williamson 2012; O’Neill 2012. 
78 For this objection, see Schwartz 1973, p. 304; Nagel 1973, p. 228f. 
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use metrics that consider what individuals can do with money, the goals that it allows them to 
achieve, or the broader relational consequences of a certain distribution. 
The fact that monetary metrics will advantage some life plans over others is thought to count 
decisively against it, but I think this is to put too much value on neutrality. Once we also 
consider objectivity and controllability, the picture shifts. If political institutions cannot know 
and/or control what individuals can do with money, or the goals that it allows them to 
achieve, then there is no value in added neutrality. I will now consider prominent alternative 
metrics in contemporary theories of justice and explore to what extent they can meet the 
demands of objectivity and controllability. I argue that where coordination of exchange and 
production is left to a capitalist coordination, these metrics will often do very badly on 
criteria of objectivity and controllability. In these circumstances, money is the more 
appropriate metric. 
2.3.2 Welfare 
Welfare egalitarians are interested in whether citizens can achieve things that they value. 
Because demands of distributive justice apply to the basic structure, welfare egalitarians do 
not consider those outcomes directly. Rather, as a metric of justice, welfare concerns the 
lifetime expectation of welfare that citizens can achieve provided they make sufficiently 
prudent choices.79  
From the perspective of welfare egalitarianism, money is only of interest where it allows 
individuals to achieve things that they value. The value of ends to individuals can be 
characterized in terms of hedonic states, subjective preferences or more objective conceptions 
of well-being.80 Money allows individuals to realise their ends, but, at least in most cases, it 
has no value in and of itself. The welfare theorist, therefore, evaluates individual outcomes 
without assigning any final value to money beyond its role as a mere means.  
Under centralised coordination, welfare can meet the demands of objectivity and 
controllability. To be able to make their plans, political institutions must know what 
individuals will need to do for the production of goods and services, what use these goods 
                                                 
79 On opportunities for welfare, see Arneson 1989; 2000; Cohen 1989.  
80 For an overview of alternative theories of welfare, see Sumner 1996. 
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and services have to those who consume them, and whether consumers can access them. 
Therefore, in so far as political coordination of the economy is possible, it is often possible to 
evaluate outcomes in terms of welfare.  
But, the same conditions cannot be assumed to hold for capitalist economies. Indeed, 
complexity is a crucial reason to rely on capitalist coordination in the first place. Under 
capitalist coordination, welfare tends to be both unknown and, even when known, outside the 
direct control of political institutions. It is true that it is both controversial what kind of state 
welfare is and whether it is open to objective measurement.81 Obstacles to measurement are 
most obvious where welfare is understood as a hedonic state, as such states need not be 
reflected in behaviour at all. But even if welfare can be reliably inferred from behaviour, 
capitalist coordination as a rule precludes collecting the information needed to impute such 
states. As a consequence, there will be a range of possible views to take on the distribution of 
welfare that results from capitalist institutions. Any attempt to measure welfare will not be 
objective in the required sense. If production and exchange are decided on by private 
economic agents, welfare cannot be effectively controlled either. What goods and services are 
available is left to private authority and is therefore outside the direct control of political 
institutions. The dynamics of constant change and innovation that characterize capitalist 
societies also preclude relying on a stable social mechanism to control opportunities for 
welfare. 
These practical considerations do not constitute an objection to welfare egalitarianism outside 
the context of capitalist coordination. I have merely shown that welfare is inappropriate for 
democratic exchange over capitalist institutions. Because welfare cannot be adequately 
measured and controlled, democratic justification must have recourse to a different metric of 
justice.  
The reader may not be surprised that a capitalist economy raises particular difficulties for 
welfare as it is often thought to be a subjective state. The question is whether other metrics do 
better. I will, therefore, say more about other prominent alternatives in contemporary theories 
of justice and show that similar problems apply. 





Resource egalitarians evaluate individual outcomes in terms of the distribution of resources.82 
The value of a resource is equal to what others are willing to give up for using the resource in 
their particular life plan.83 Interpersonal comparison, therefore, requires that the value of 
resources can be determined on some actual or hypothetical market.84 But, resource 
egalitarians are not primarily interested in money prices. Rather, they care about a fair 
distribution of resources, where the value of resources depends on what others would have 
been willing to give up for acquiring these resources. In this sense, they are interested in what 
I will refer to as the theoretical price. 
There are at least three reasons to think that resources do better than welfare on the criteria of 
objectivity and controllability.85 Political institutions can determine the distribution of 
resources without knowing anything about private subjective states. Moreover, the resource 
egalitarian compares the values of resources in terms of their theoretical prices, and, so the 
argument goes, a capitalist society can rely on markets to discover these prices. Finally, even 
in the absence of markets, it is surely easier to control the means available in markets than the 
opportunities for welfare that they give rise to.  
These reasons are in line with my argument for money as a metric, but do not have the same 
force for resources. Dworkin and others tend to equate the theoretical price of resources with 
their money prices.86 For example, Rawls notion of income and wealth as a primary good is 
sometimes mistakenly described as a form of resource egalitarianism.87 But this is a mistake.  
A proper recognition of the difference between the money price and the theoretical price of a 
resource makes clear that its advantages are not as large as they seem. Resource egalitarians 
care about theoretical prices. To discover the theoretical price of resources, a hypothetical or 
                                                 
82 On resource egalitarianism, see Dworkin 1981a, 1981b, 2000. I discuss Linarelli (2017)’s resource egalitarian 
account of financial instability in §5.  
83 e.g. Dworkin 1981b, p. 294. 
84 Dworkin 1981b, p. 284. 
85 Dworkin 1981a, p. 187. 
86 E.g. Dworkin 1981b, p. 296. 
87 E.g. Arneson 2008. 
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actual market must determine their value. But, using a hypothetical market makes theoretical 
prices conditional on an estimate of subjective value, which, as I have already discussed, 
raises considerable issues of objectivity. Indeed, as Dworkin admits, any account of a 
hypothetical insurance market ‘would be speculative and open to a variety of objections.’88 
Resources must then be priced in actual markets to provide a sufficiently objective measure. 
This raises the question whether prices in actual markets can be assumed to track the 
theoretical prices of resources or, at least, whether the theoretical prices of resources can be 
inferred from observed prices in a sufficiently objective way. If markets function more or less 
in line with textbook microeconomics that would be the case.89 Under conditions of perfect 
competition, markets will realise a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources, in which no 
individual is willing to give up any of their resources to acquire a resource at market prices. 
Therefore, prices will approximate the price that would induce others to give up their 
resources to acquire it, just above their theoretical price. Once the price of a resource drops to 
the theoretical price, someone buys it. 
If political institutions can assume that markets indeed realise a Pareto-optimal distribution, 
they can rely on money prices as an objective metric for the distribution of resources. But 
few, if any, markets in a capitalist economy do realise a Pareto-optimal distribution. Rather, 
to use money prices as a guide to the theoretical prices of resources requires a judgment on 
whether a market approximates the ideal of a Pareto-optimal distribution and, if not, what the 
theoretical prices of resources would be in the counterfactual situation of a Pareto-optimal 
distribution. This task is no less daunting than that of imagining a hypothetical insurance 
market.  
The absence of adequate information about theoretical prices also precludes effectively 
controlling the distribution of resources. Because the theoretical prices of resources are 
unknown, political institutions can do little to ensure that markets realise a fair distribution. 
                                                 
88 Dworkin 1981b, p. 299. 
89 Dworkin 1981b, pp. 287f. 
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2.3.4 Capabilities and primary goods 
Resource and welfare egalitarianism provide a complete account of how to compare 
distributive shares. I now turn to two approaches that are more open-ended. Both the 
capabilities approach and the primary goods approach characterise what is to be distributed, 
but give a more prominent role to political institutions in spelling out what distributive shares 
consist in. Any list of capabilities or primary goods is preliminary and open to revision. 
Primary goods, as already explained, are all-purpose means. They are things that are valuable 
to individuals irrespective of their conception of the good. In addition to income and wealth, 
Rawls distinguishes four further primary goods: (i) civil liberties such as freedom of thought 
and expression; (ii) freedom of movement and free choices of occupation; (iii) powers and 
prerogatives of offices; and (iv) the social basis of self-respect.90 This list, however, is open-
ended in that it can be extended by other means that are neutral and objective in the same 
way.  
For a capability theorist, what matters are capabilities, which are the things individuals can 
do.91 The capability theorist does not care about money directly. Rather, what matters are 
functionings, various things that individuals value doing or being.92 Capability theorists reject 
primary goods as a metric of distributive justice. Primary goods are of value in so far as they 
provide individuals with certain functionings, but because primary goods do not necessarily 
do this, the capability theorist believes that it is not an appropriate metric. Rather, what 
matters is what individuals can do with their share of primary goods.  
Capabilities and primary goods are both open-ended in that it is up to political institutions to 
specify what counts as a capability or primary good. It is therefore not incompatible with 
these accounts to say that money should be used as a metric. Amartya Sen sometimes claims 
that the capability theorist should not care directly about levels of income and wealth.93 But 
this view doesn’t follow from the capability framework. Rather, I have already explained 
that, in the context of a capitalist economy, what individuals can in the end do with money is 
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often not known objectively and/or outside the control of political institutions. Therefore, any 
justification of a set of non-monetary capabilities or primary goods will face the problems of 
objectivity and controllability already discussed. In those circumstances, money presents 
itself as the appropriate metric. In line with its focus on what individuals can do, the 
capability theorist should simply focus on the ability of individuals to buy things. In §2.3.1 I 
explained that income and wealth count as primary goods. 
2.3.5 Social relations 
Relational egalitarians evaluate individual outcomes in terms of the social relations that 
citizens stand in within their community.94 This conception of distributive justice is distinct 
from the accounts that I have previously discussed in that it does not focus on the evaluation 
of outcomes, but rather on the social relations that individuals stand in. Just institutions 
should prevent economic inequalities to the extent that these create systematic inequalities in 
the authority, status or standing of individuals.95 Because the relation between economic 
inequalities and social standing is complex, and even more difficult to establish than 
resources and welfare, money again comes in as an important metric for the evaluation of 
capitalist institutions from a relational egalitarian perspective.  
Social standing is difficult to measure and outside the direct control of political institutions. 
Crucially, it is difficult to measure the role of economic inequalities in undermining equal 
standing. Still there is a clear relation. In fact, social standing can be affected by relatively 
modest forms of economic inequality. To give some empirical evidence, DeCelles and 
Norton (2016) show that when economy class passengers merely walk past first class seats 
while boarding a plane, antisocial behaviour inflight is over two times more likely. Antisocial 
behaviour such as being abusive, antagonizing crew members and passengers, or endangering 
flight safety is almost 12 times more likely for the first class passengers that the economy 
class passengers walk past. From a theoretical perspective, Martin O’Neill suggests at least 
five ways in which economic inequalities can undermine social standing.96 Those who lack 
money (i) may not be able to meet their basic needs; (ii) will be seen as inferior by 
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96 O’Neill 2008. Also, Scanlon 1997. 
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themselves and others; (iii) can be subject to social domination; (iv) experience low self-
esteem; and (v) can be forced into servile and deferential behaviour.  
By distributing money fairly, a capitalist democracy fosters equal standing. First, the 
distribution of money is itself a way to acknowledge equal standing. Income, but also the 
options available for saving and the conditions under which individuals acquire credit signal 
a valuation of ways of living. By explaining distributions of money, political institutions take 
away the impression that economic inequalities reflect unequal standing. Second, a fair 
distribution of money provides individuals with the means to live as equals in those respects 
that they find important. A capitalist democracy cannot control where passengers sit in 
aeroplanes, but it can control to what extent they can buy different quality plane seats.  
Because the effects of capitalist coordination on equal standing can be neither objectively 
measured nor controlled, a fair distribution of money is the best way of determining what it 
means for institutions to assign equal standing to individuals. Relational egalitarians should 
also evaluate individual outcomes in terms of money. 
2.3.6 Objections  
My claim in this chapter concerning money as a metric of justice is unlikely to strike a reader 
without a philosophy background as surprising. But for some philosophers, the claim will be 
surprising, if not obviously false.97 
Consider first this objection: even if I am right that money has an important role in the day-
to-day operations of the government, that does not show that it is a metric of justice. Instead, 
my argument only shows that money should be used to apply a more adequate metric. For 
example, a welfare egalitarian may argue that I merely show that political institutions should 
measure and control money because they cannot measure and control welfare directly. 
Money, on this account, is a proxy for the true metric, rather than itself a metric. But this 
objection relies on an implausible conception of moral concepts. The claim that a concept 
that acts as a proxy for a more fundamental moral concept is not a true moral concept would 
apply to almost all moral concepts. Consider a utilitarian who believes that what makes an 
                                                 




action right is that it maximizes subjective welfare. For such a theorist, almost all of our 
everyday moral vocabulary is at best a proxy for utilitarian concepts. But, presumably, the 
utilitarian should not take this to show that our every language does not involve true moral 
concepts. It just shows that for the utilitarian, there is a level of moral concepts that is in some 
sense more fundamental.  
Consider now Richard Arneson’s objection to primary goods, which has four steps. His 
starting premise is the observation that the decision on whether a metric is an appropriate 
proxy for what is of final value requires a prior decision on what is of final value. From this 
he infers, second, that the metric of justice should be something that is of final value. But, 
third,  at least some primary goods are not of final value. Therefore, primary goods are an 
inappropriate metric of justice. Arneson is, of course, correct that if the metric is supposed to 
tell us what is of final value, money will be a grossly inadequate candidate. But I reject his 
move from the starting premise to claim that the metric should be something that is of final 
value because I do not ascribe a role to money in deliberation on what is of final value. 
Rather, my argument concerns the role of money in the democratic process. As I explained in 
§2.2.1, every egalitarian liberal should recognize the value of democratic exchange. To 
realise a just society, individuals need a democratic process in which they deliberate and 
justify outcomes generated by their economic institutions. It is in this role that money is 
crucial.  
A different objection claims that my account of a metric of justice is unduly conservative. By 
taking capitalism as given, I forego the critical potential of a metric, such as welfare, which 
applies to both capitalist and non-capitalist modes of coordination. This, then, would bar 
fundamental critiques of capitalism. In response, I argue that a focus on distributive outcomes 
of capitalist institutions does not preclude fundamental critique of such institutions. For an 
example of how such critique might look, consider the income and wealth statistics of 
Thomas Piketty.98 More generally, the most effective objections to capitalism describe the 
inequalities generated by such coordination on its own terms. Marx himself focused almost 
all his analytic efforts on the mechanisms that govern the distribution of income to capital 
and labour, rather than the comparison of this distribution with distributions under a 
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hypothetical socialist alternative. If the decision is made to replace democratic capitalism 
with an alternative, political institutions should then use a different metric for intersubjective 
comparison. 
Finally, there may be an objection according to which there is a non-monetary metrics that I 
have not discussed but does better than money even for capitalist institutions. I have 
compared money to the most prominent alternatives in the literature on distributive justice 
and shown where the strengths of money lie. I recognize that there could be alternative 
metrics that I have not discussed but are superior to money on all three criteria that I have 
distinguished. My argument seeks to establish that such a metric cannot do well on 
objectivity and controllability without using nominal prices in measuring outcomes. In any 
case, I recognize that there is a lot more to be said about metrics. Careful consideration of the 
criteria of objectivity and controllability should have an important role in such discussions. 
2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that money is the metric of democratic capitalism. Where exchange 
and production are left to capitalist coordination, money is a neutral metric, that also meets 
the criteria of objectivity and controllability. In §2.1 I explained that under capitalist 
coordination, political institutions will only have limited knowledge of technological 
possibility and consumer needs. They are also limited in their ability to control economic 
outcomes. In §2.2 I discussed in what sense a democratic society features a relation of 
accountability between citizens and political institutions. I invoked this relation to spell out 
three criteria for an appropriate metric of justice: neutrality, objectivity and controllability. In 
§2.3 I argued that due to the epistemic and pragmatic limitations of political institutions in the 




3 Income, credit, and saving 
Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is often easy to 
get more. The great difficulty is to get that little.99 
We now have money centre stage in the theory of distributive justice, but it is not yet clear 
that much follows from what I have said concerning finance. For all I have said, realising a 
just distribution of money may require nothing more than limiting income and wealth 
disparities. Indeed, this may be described as the received view of economic justice. Although 
many theorists reject Rawls’ account of primary goods, they share his account of what it 
means to distribute money fairly: A just distribution of money consists in a just distribution 
of income and wealth.100 
But if demands of distributive justice are limited to income and wealth, then the role of the 
financial system is likely to be very limited. At best, the demands that apply to financial 
institutions are instrumental for realising non-financial outcomes. Individuals are entitled to 
credit and savings in so far as this contributes to a just distribution of income and wealth. My 
aim in this chapter is to show that this neglect of finance is mistaken: Political institutions 
cannot realise a just distribution without paying close attention to financial markets. I argue 
for three claims: 
First, I argue that wealth should have no place in the evaluation of outcomes at all. Wealth is 
an accounting variable that is derived by netting assets and liabilities. I put forward three 
objections against assigning to it direct significance in evaluating distributions. 
Second, I argue that income does have a place in the evaluation of outcomes, but cannot have 
this role by itself. Rather, it needs to be complemented by the consideration of the options for 
credit and saving that are available to individuals. Life plans have different intertemporal 
spending requirements. Some individuals wish to spend income before they receive it. Others 
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save income to spend later. A narrow focus on income privileges life plans that involve 
spending money as it is earned. To meet a demand of egalitarian neutrality, a just distribution 
must be neutral between alternative intertemporal spending requirements. Therefore, a just 
distribution of money consists in a just distribution of income, options for credit and options 
for saving.  
Third, I argue that leaving the provision of options for credit and saving to private authority 
privileges the wealthy and therefore fails to realise a just intertemporal distribution of money. 
In thinking of options for credit and saving as part of the metric of justice, I propose a new 
way of thinking about individual entitlements to financial inclusion. The most widespread 
way of thinking about options for credit and saving is to think of them as instrumental for 
realising a more fundamental good, measured in metrics like welfare or capabilities. In the 
previous chapter, I argued against the evaluation of individual outcomes in terms of more 
fundamental metrics. An alternative perspective is to think of the entitlement to financial 
inclusion as a right to an invariant minimum level of financial provisions. In this chapter, I 
argue against the idea of a right to financial inclusion. Instead, I propose a third perspective: 
Options for credit and saving are constitutive parts of a just distribution of money. By 
thinking of entitlements to finance as a component of a fair distribution of money, I highlight 
the distributive conflicts that arise from the different intertemporal spending requirements of 
life plans. This chapter thereby makes a crucial contribution to my aim of developing 
normative concepts that are suitable for reflection on distributive justice in a capitalist 
society.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In §3.1 I describe the role of money in life plans and 
show that options for credit and saving have a crucial role in determining what life plans are 
available to individuals. Inability to spend money before it is earned or to earn money and 
spend it later severely constrains the life plans available to individuals.  
This account informs my claim in §3.2 concerning money as a metric of justice. I first argue 
against wealth and then explain why income by itself is insufficiently neutral between 
alternative intertemporal spending requirements. I discuss the role of options for saving and 
credit in realising a fair intertemporal distribution of money and conclude by arguing against 
the idea that financial inclusion should be understood in terms of invariant rights.  
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In §3.3 I turn to a critique of capitalist provision of options for credit and saving. As I show, 
private authority over money systematically offers better options for credit and saving to the 
already well-off. 
3.1 Capitalist life planning 
In §2 I focused on the private authority of firms in a capitalist society. I now turn to the 
extensive role of private authority in individual lives. My focus will be specifically on 
intertemporal constraints that individuals face. Knowing that their life plans will require 
income to be successful, individuals must seek to ensure that their expenditures and revenues 
line up over time. Financial contracts allow them to do this. This section lays the ground for 
my arguments in §§3.2 and 3.3, by developing a framework for thinking about the crucial 
role of credit and saving in determining the life plans that are available to individuals.  
In §3.1.1 I explain in more detail what it means to have a life plan for the pursuit of a 
conception of the good. In §3.1.2 I discuss the role of economic contracts in life plans. I 
explain in what sense life plans are subject to capitalist budget constraints in §3.1.3. In §3.1.4 
I explain how financial contracts extend the rational life plans that are available to 
individuals.  
3.1.1 Life planning 
This section expands on §1.2.1 to explain what it means to treat individuals as equals with 
regard to their capacity for a conception of the good. A conception of the good is ‘an ordered 
family of final ends and aims which specifies a person’s conception of what is value in 
human life’.101 To exercise the capacity for a conception of the good is to be able to have, 
devise and revise, and pursue a conception of the good. 
This capacity has three aspects. First, it concerns the ability to decide what is of value to 
individuals. Rawls suggests that such conceptions are closely tied to deep moral and religious 
views of individuals, but the core idea is much more basic. Some people want to work in a 
flower reseller, others want to have their own coffee bar. Some people want to have lot of 
money when they retire, others do not. Everyone has ideas on how to live their life and, more 
                                                 
101 Rawls 2001, p. 19. 
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fundamentally, ideas on what it means to live a life well. This is what it means to say that an 
individual has a conception of the good.  
The second aspect of the capacity for a conception of the good is to be able to devise and 
revise a life plan that realises a particular conception of the good. I will often refer to this 
aspect of freedom simply as life planning. In planning their life, individuals exercise their 
rational capacity to connect adequate means to ends that they value. Drawing on Henry 
Sidgwick, Rawls makes a distinction between an objectively and a subjectively rational life 
plan. The objectively rational life plan is what an agent would decide to do under conditions 
of perfect information and in the absence of cognitive limitations. As Rawls formulates this 
idea: 
It is the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which 
the agent reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry 
out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his 
more fundamental desires.102 
As a rule, individuals lack full knowledge of both their own desires and the means available 
to realise them. Under the conditions, they can merely aim to make their life plans 
subjectively rational. Someone’s subjectively rational plan is the plan that best realises their 
conception of the good in light of available information and cognitive limits on planning. In 
doing so, individuals make their conception of the good more determinate and adapt it to the 
means available to them. I will return to this distinction in §5. 
The third aspect of freedom is to be able to pursue a particular life plan. To be free, individual 
do not need to be successful in executing their life plans. Egalitarian liberals leave it to 
individuals to have a conception of the good and to plan their lives using the means that are 
available to them within political and economic institutions. For individuals to be able to 
pursue their life plan, the means for this cannot be merely available in the formal sense that 
there are no laws that prohibit using them. Given their cognitive capacities, reasonable effort, 
and manageable risks, individuals must be able to pursue a range of life plans. The demands 
of distributive justice concern whether institutional conditions do enough to help individuals 
                                                 
102 Rawls [1971] 1999a, p. 366. 
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in pursuing their conception of the good. To investigate those demands, I now turn to the 
institutional conditions that are crucial to making life plans in a capitalist society.  
3.1.2 Balance sheets and economic contracts 
A capitalist society assigns a crucial role to individuals in making financial decisions as part 
of their life plans. I will now describe these decisions in more detail using stylized balance 
sheets. A grasp of stylized balance sheets will not only be important for understanding budget 
constraints on life plans, but also for discussing financial institutions in §§4, 5, and 6. 
Balance sheets record the assets and liabilities of economic agents. They provide a clear way 
to represent the financial position of an economic agent and how this position changes over 
time. Making life plans requires keeping track of one’s balance sheet. Consider Figure 3.1, 
which represents the assets and liabilities of John. John works in a mid-level accounting 
position at a flower reseller. He hopes to be promoted to senior management but for now he is 
not very rich. John wants to buy a house. On the left-hand side of the balance sheet are John’s 
small savings and other belongings. The right-hand side of the balance sheet lists liabilities. 
Liabilities are legal obligations to make payments for or to someone now or in the future. 
John is currently taking evening classes in accounting, which he pays for using a loan.  









Figure 3.1 – Stylized balance sheet 
The balance sheet position of economic agents changes with every economic transaction. 
Following John Hicks, I will think of an economic transaction as an action that consists of 
three parts.103 First, the transaction is initiated by an implicit or explicit contract between the 
buyer and the seller. This contract places a legal obligation on the seller to provide some 
                                                 
103 Hicks 1989. 
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good or service to the buyer and a legal obligation on the buyer to pay. For this contract, both 
parties agree on a suitable means of payment. The transaction is completed when the seller 
provides the good or service and the buyer makes the payment. Accordingly, an economic 
transaction consists of (a) the contractual agreement, (b) delivery of the good or service, and 
(c) payment.  
To see how an economic transaction changes balance sheets, consider John again. In buying a 
house, John acquires a house and incurs an obligation to pay £200,000 to the real estate 
agency. Figure 3.2 represents the changes in liabilities and assets that result.  
John  Real estate agency 
House  Debt to real estate 
agency £200,000 
 House  
Claim on John  
£200,000 
 
Figure 3.2 – Delivery of the good and obligation to pay 
To pay for the house, John must transfer ownership of money to the real estate agency, as 
depicted in Figure 3.3. Payment completes the economic transaction by extinguishing John’s 
liability. 




Debt to real estate 
agency £200,000 





Figure 3.3 – Payment 
The three parts of the economic transaction can take place at different points in time. In a spot 
payment, e.g. buying a cup of coffee with cash, the contract, provision of the good, and 
payment all coincide. But it is also possible to provide a good before the payment takes place 
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or, as anyone familiar with internet shopping knows, to provide the good much later. A 
capitalist economy does not require that the buyer makes all payments before receiving a 
good, or receives all goods before making a payment.  
3.1.3 Liquidity and solvency 
Rather than requiring that payment and goods line up over time in a particular order, 
economic agents have a degree of freedom in how their revenues and expenditures are 
organised over time. But this freedom is not unlimited. I now explain how liquidity and 
solvency constraints determine permissible balance sheet positions.104 
A universal feature of capitalist societies is that liabilities are subject to more or less rigorous 
enforcement through the legal system. In this regard, a capitalist society is different from 
socialist economies, where, even if accounting of revenues and expenditures took place in 
quasi-monetary terms, formal bankruptcy would rarely result in the dissolution of firms.105 
Under capitalism, in contrast, inability to meet liabilities has more severe legal consequences. 
In the case of a firm, its directors lose control over the firm and it is either restructured or the 
remaining assets are sold off to pay creditors. In the case of individuals, a personal 
bankruptcy procedure is started. To avoid bankruptcy, the balance sheet position of economic 
agents needs to meet certain formal legal conditions. These conditions are what I will refer to 
as budget constraints. 
My aim here is not to interpret the legal meaning of the concepts of insolvency and 
illiquidity, but to explain the practical constraints that individuals face in making plans in 
light of the basic legal structure of a capitalist economy. 
The first budget constraint is the liquidity constraint. Liquidity constraints concern the way 
cash inflows and outflows line up over time. A liability has a maturity. This is the point in 
time at which the liability needs to be repaid. A life plan meets the liquidity constraint if it 
allows the individual to meet liabilities as they mature.  
                                                 
104 These concepts derive from Janos Kornai. See Kornai, Maskin & Roland 2003; Ellman 2014; Pistor 2013, 
2017. Meyer (forthcoming) introduces these concepts into the study of distributive justice. 
105 Ellman 2014. 
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Life plans can face liquidity constraints in two ways. First, individuals may want to buy 
something now, but lack the money for it. For John to acquire his house, he must be able to 
pay for it. But, since John does not have the money, he faces a liquidity constraint. If he could 
somehow convince the real estate agent to sell him the house, he would immediately default 
on his obligation to pay. Second, an individual may have money now, but only want to use it 
to make payments later. This also means that individuals face a liquidity constraint, although 
we are less used to considering it. Consider now Martha, who makes money in her work as a 
central banker, but does not want to spend all her income now. Rather, she dreams of using 
that money in her pension age to stay in the capital. Because she does not know now what she 
will need in the future, she wants to have money available at a later point in time. Although it 
is somewhat revisionary to think of the inability to save as a liquidity constraint, I believe that 
this is so merely because options for saving tend to be quite good compared to available 
options for credit. In a world of pervasive credit constraints but universal deposit insurance, 
we tend not to think of both constraints as on a par.106 But they are both intertemporal 
constraints on the use of money for payments. The term ‘liquidity constraint’ is equally 
appropriate for both. 
The second budget constraint is a solvency constraint. Solvency constraints concern the total 
expected cash inflows and outflows of an economic agent over its lifetime. An economic 
agent is solvent if its future cash inflows enable it to meet all its outstanding liabilities. If 
John were to buy a house of £1,000,000 and promise to pay in 5 years, he would not be 
illiquid until the debt matured. Still, John would most likely already be insolvent before then, 
since he would almost unavoidably default in those five years. While liquidity is a legal fact 
that is relatively easy to establish, the solvency of an economic agent is a theoretical notion 
that is subject to pervasive uncertainty. John might win the lottery and still be able to pay for 
his house. Liquidity, in contrast, can be established merely by considering the assets and 
liabilities of an economic agent in the present. 
3.1.4 Financial contracts 
In this section I explain how financial contracts allow individuals to realise life plans that are 
dependent on credit and saving. Financial contracts enable individuals to pursue credit-
                                                 
106 I discuss these topics in §3.  
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dependent and savings-dependent life plans. John needs £200,000 now, but will only earn 
that money much later. Martha, in contrast, has £200,000 saved now, but only plans to spend 
that money later. If Martha had to spend her money now, or if John needed to earn it now, 
neither could realise their life plan. But, if Martha lends to John, then both can make their 
expenditures when they need to. 
The simplest financial contract is a loan, and the same three-part sequence observed above 
can be applied to it as an economic transaction. The transaction is initiated through a contract 
between the borrower and the lender. This contract imposes a legal obligation on the lender to 
provide the borrower with money and a legal obligation on the borrower to repay that money 
(presumably with interest).  
The simple financial contract of a loan is a very inefficient way of providing credit. It is very 
unlikely that the borrowing needs of John and the saving needs of Martha line up. Moreover, 
it will be very difficult for Martha to decide whether John will be able to repay. Finally, by 
only lending to John, Martha will lose all her money if John defaults. If she would be willing 
to lend to John at all, then she will want a very high interest rate. Instead, it makes much 
more sense for John and Martha to rely on some form of financial intermediation (as depicted 
in Figure 3.4). A financial intermediary provides credit to one group of economic agents and 
offers options for saving to other economic agents.  
 Financial intermediary  
 
 Mortgage for John  
 £200,000 









 Money £200,000 
Savings £200,000 
 
  Figure 3.4 – Financial intermediation 
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Financial contracts greatly expand the credit- and savings-dependent life plans that are 
available to individuals. They allow John to buy a house and allow Martha to save for 
retirement. For this reason, access to options for credit and saving, as I will argue now, are 
crucial components of a just distribution of money.  
3.2 Fair intertemporal distribution 
Even though political philosophers tend not to rely on Rawls’ account of primary goods, they 
often follow him in assuming that in so far as a just distribution concerns money, it consists 
in a just distribution of income and wealth.107 Recent debates on economic inequality, the 
work of Thomas Piketty most prominently, also focuses on these two metrics.108 In this 
section I argue that this focus is inadequate for a capitalist economy in which individuals 
make life plans subject to budget constraints. I do this using a conception of egalitarian 
neutrality that is spelt out in terms of the Rawlsian original position (§3.2.1). I use this 
criterion to raise two objections. First, I argue in §3.2.2 that wealth should have no place in 
interpersonal comparison at all. Second, I argue in §3.2.3 that although income should have 
such a place, a narrow focus on income fails to meet the demand of egalitarian neutrality. 
Income is most valuable to individuals who spend their money as it is earned, but it is less 
valuable to those with credit- or savings-dependent life plans. To be sufficiently neutral, a 
distribution must also address the needs of John, who plans to spend money before he earns 
it, and the needs of Martha, who wants to save money to spend later. In §3.2.4 I argue that 
options for credit and saving serve to meet this demand. I conclude in §3.2.5 by arguing for 
thinking about entitlements to options for credit and saving as part of a just distribution of 
money, rather than as a right to financial inclusion.  
3.2.1 Egalitarian neutrality 
Egalitarian neutrality requires treating individuals as equals with regard to their ability to 
pursue a wide range of conceptions of the good. I have already discussed the idea of 
egalitarian neutrality in §§1.2 and 2.2. Here I will expand on this idea in terms of the 
                                                 
107 For references, see footnote 100. 
108 Piketty 2014. 
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Rawlsian idea of an original position, which will be used in the arguments of §§3.2.3-5 and 
3.3.3. 
Egalitarian neutrality concerns treating individuals with very different conceptions of what 
constitutes a good life as equals. Rawls suggests that such conceptions are closely tied to the 
deeper moral and religious views of individuals, but as I explained in §3.1.1, the core idea is 
much more basic. Some people want to work as an accountant, others want to have their own 
coffee bar. Some people want to have a lot of money when they retire, others do not. 
Everyone has ideas of how to live their life and, more fundamentally, ideas on what it means 
to live a life well. This is what it means to say that an individual has a conception of the good.  
There are different ways of determining whether institutions are sufficiently neutral between 
different conceptions of the good. Rawls proposes the thought experiment of the original 
position. This experiment asks what normative principles individuals would agree to if they 
were characterized by two features. First, all individuals have equal bargaining strength in 
that they cannot coerce, deceive or use other non-deliberative means of persuasion. Second, 
deliberation takes place behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. This means that the parties that 
deliberate do not know what life they will live in that society nor do they know their 
conception of the good life. As a consequence, they do not know the means that they will 
need to pursue that good, even if they do know the types of means human life generally 
requires. It is rational for them to evaluate the design of the basic structure in a way that 
assumes a wide range of possible conceptions of the good. Principles of justice are 
sufficiently neutral if they are acceptable to individuals who seek to rationally pursue their 
interests under these conditions.  
The original position is certainly not the only way of thinking about neutrality, but it is a 
compelling model that fits the general egalitarian and liberal values that I outlined in §1.2. 
For my purposes, I will assume that institutions must be neutral in the sense that they meet 
the standards spelt out in the original position. A fair distribution is one that individuals 
would accept if they had equal bargaining strength and would not give more weight to their 
own conception of the good.  
Rawls uses the device of the original position to evaluate the extent to which alternative 
metrics of justice are neutral between competing conceptions of the good. As discussed in 
§2.3.1, Rawls claims that individuals in the original position would agree on income and 
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wealth as primary goods as the metric in which to evaluate outcomes. His reason for singling 
out income and wealth, rather than the things people buy, is a concern for liberal neutrality. 
John wants to be an accountant. But others, who may have very similar income and wealth 
levels, have other plans. Consider Lydia, who wants to run a coffee bar. Her vision of the 
good life is very different from that of John. Liberal neutrality requires evaluating the means 
available to them as in some way equal. Income and wealth serve as primary goods because 
both John and Lydia can recognize their value without invoking their own conception of the 
good.  
I now turn to the question whether income and wealth are indeed appropriate metrics for the 
evaluation of outcomes.  
3.2.2 Wealth 
Although income and wealth meet Rawls’ criteria for primary goods, I argue that the ways in 
which money enables individuals to pursue their conception of the good is not captured 
adequately by wealth, nor by income considered in isolation. Rather, what matters is whether 
individuals have the money to make their life meet liquidity constraints. If John has the 
money, he can buy his house but otherwise not. To meet his budget constraints, he needs to 
own sufficient means of payment at the right point in time. But neither income nor wealth 
really capture how owning money enables individuals to meet budget constraints. Because 
these metrics do not capture this role only from a sufficiently temporal perspective, so I will 
argue, they do not meet the criterion of egalitarian neutrality. My focus in this section will be 
on wealth. The next section discusses income.  
To calculate someone’s wealth, both sides of the balance sheet need to be valued. Wealth is 
derived by taking all of the individual’s financial and non-financial assets (for example their 
house, their consumer goods, and any savings) and subtracting all their liabilities (for 
example their mortgage, consumer loans and bank overdrafts). In this sense, the wealth level 
of an individual is an accounting variable. As depicted in Figure 3.1, John has a negative net 
worth of £9,000. 
Wealth levels may seem to be an appropriate way to compare outcomes for the following 
three reasons. Wealth meets the criteria of a primary good in the sense that it is something 
which one would rather have more of than less. Moreover, figures on wealth inequality have 
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a prominent role in recent debates on economic inequality. They seem to perform their role 
sufficiently well in that context. Finally, savings and credit can be offset against each other to 
determine the personal wealth of an individual. Once we take wealth into account, it may 
seem that there is no need to further evaluate the options for saving and credit that individuals 
have access to. To own a house encumbered by a full mortgage does not make one rich. 
Rather, it may seem, what matters is the net monetary value of what individuals own.  
Once we think through what wealth really is, however, it will become clear that it is a faulty 
way of evaluating the distribution of money. I outline three objections to wealth as a metric.  
First, while it is of course nice to be wealthy, a narrow focus on wealth fails to provide a 
good indicator of what economic means individuals can actually use as part of their life plans 
at a given point in time. It cannot be assumed that with more wealth, individuals ‘can 
generally be assured of greater success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their 
ends, whatever these ends may be.’109 The reason for this is that an individual might hold a 
sizable part of wealth in assets that are illiquid. Crucially, this is a different notion of 
liquidity. In explaining liquidity constraints, I have talked about funding liquidity, which is a 
property of individuals. To be liquid, an individual must be able to meet payments when 
these are due. Market liquidity, in contrast, is a property of assets and concerns the cost of 
converting a given asset into money. A government bond is liquid because there is a market 
where it can be sold at its present value. Real estate is less liquid in that it can only be 
converted into money on short notice well below its value. To focus on wealth as a key 
metric of justice is to forget that overcoming liquidity constraints requires assets that are 
sufficiently (market) liquid. Conversely, someone with high debts may have low wealth but 
have extensive means of payment available to pursue life plans. Consider again John, who 
hopes to own a house by means of a full mortgage. Surely if John gets his mortgage, he will 
do better in some way than someone who has neither house nor mortgage.  
The second reason to reject wealth as an appropriate metric for a capitalist society is that 
wealth levels are not something which political institutions are in a good position to control. 
Here, I invoke my claim from §2.2.3 that a metric must be controllable. Political institutions 
can control income from labour, inheritance or otherwise through taxation and spending. 
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Similarly, a tax can be applied to wealth levels, but that is not the same as controlling wealth. 
Wealth is an accounting variable that results from the interaction of a wide range of different 
policy choices. Even if political institutions can in theory control absolute wealth levels, there 
are good reasons to doubt that they should. Effective control over absolute wealth levels is 
incompatible with the principle of legitimate expectations.110 Liberal egalitarians leave it to 
individuals to pursue their life plans while taking institutions as given. What individuals are 
entitled to is determined by the rules that govern institutions. The rules that govern these 
institutions are to have a degree of stability and predictability so that individual can oversee 
the outcomes of their plans. The wealth levels of individuals are a result of the many choices 
they make taking the institutions of the basic structure as given. For political institutions to 
seek to control absolute wealth levels would undermine the stability and predictability of the 
rules that govern the private sphere.111  
Third, even if it were possible to directly control wealth, there is often no good reason to do 
so. Identical levels of wealth may have a wide range of sources and uses. Both matter from 
the perspective of justice. Consider inherited wealth. Some think inheriting wealth is 
objectionable because it is income that does not reflect desert.112 Others believe that an estate 
tax is uniquely unfair because the deceased has already been taxed for it. From either 
perspective, the way in which individuals acquire wealth matters for whether it is fairly 
distributed and how to tax it. Other forms of wealth, for example wealth resulting from 
entrepreneurial risk, raise other, entirely distinct issues.  
Wealth can also be used in very different ways. It can be stored in an offshore bank account 
or invested in real estate, but wealth can also be held in a company or a charitable trust. 
Evaluating outcomes in terms of wealth does not adequately capture these relevant 
distinctions, which are crucial to existing practices of wealth taxation. In evaluating different 
options for saving, political institutions can recognize these moral distinctions, which are 
sufficiently objective and controllable to have a good claim to being taken into account. A 
                                                 
110 Rawls [1971] 1999a, pp. 273-277; 2001, pp. 72-74. For an interpretation, Hsieh 2000. 
111 I discuss the issue of legitimate expectations in more detail in my ‘Objective metrics and frustrated 
expectations’ (unpublished manuscript). 
112 Piketty 2014; Zucman et al 2015.  
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distribution that evaluates income and options for saving will capture these distinctions 
whereas one that focuses on wealth will not. 
To clarify, nothing I say here precludes that existing wealth inequalities are indicative of 
serious deficiencies of existing economic institutions. My argument concerns whether wealth 
is an adequate metric for evaluating the distribution of money, which I argue it is not.  
3.2.3 Income 
I now turn to income levels as a way of evaluating the distribution of money. I argue that 
income by itself is insufficiently neutral between individuals with different intertemporal 
spending requirements.  
Income provides individuals with access to means of payment at a given time. In the wide 
sense that I am interested in, income can include revenues generated from labour, but also 
capital gains and gifts in the forms of inheritance and other transfers. Income is distinct from 
savings in that it constitutes new revenues, rather than being saved from income earned in 
earlier periods. Income is distinct from credit in that it is acquired without incurring an 
offsetting liability. Through income, individuals acquire means of payment with no strings 
attached. 
The previous discussion goes some way to vindicate income as a metric for the distribution of 
money. The most prominent way in which an economy distributes money takes the form of 
income. There can be neither credit nor saving without income, while we can at least imagine 
income without credit and saving. Moreover, taken by itself, income can potentially meet all 
the demands that apply to the evaluation of outcomes.113 As income provides individuals with 
money, it is valuable for pursuing a wide range of competing conceptions of the good. 
Political institutions can also measure it in objective terms, as is crucial to any practice of 
taxation. Finally, there are different ways in which political institutions can regulate income. 
In political philosophy, authors often focus on measures of taxation and spending,114 with 
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some attention to ways in which the prior setup of institutions determines the income 
distribution (e.g. minimum wages).115 
Despite its obvious relevance for intersubjective comparison, income by itself does not meet 
the demand of neutrality. To be neutral, a way of evaluating outcomes must capture 
something that is valuable to individuals irrespective of their particular conception of the 
good. We should not interpret this criterion in a way that is too restrictive. Any evaluation of 
outcomes must be robust with regard to rare conceptions of the good, such as a rejection of 
well-being or a principled refusal to use money altogether. Still, where possible political 
institutions should not ignore the conceptions of the good of some at the expense of others.  
I will now argue that a narrow focus on income fails to meet this demand of neutrality 
because it is insufficiently neutral between the intertemporal spending requirements of 
different life plans.  
Intertemporal spending requirements can be of three kinds. First, there are what I will refer to 
as mere income-dependent life plans. Income-dependent life plans require spending all and 
only the money that an individual receives in any given month. Young professionals often 
have such life plans. Typically, they do not have particularly expensive future life plans, nor 
significant revenues from their professional activities. Poor households, too, have broadly 
income-dependent life plans as they need all their income to pay for everyday expenditures. 
Second, as explained in §3.1.4, there are credit-dependent life plans, which require spending 
money before it is earned as income. John and Lydia have such life plans. Their income is not 
enough to realise John’s plan to buy a house or Lydia’s plan to open a coffee bar. To pursue 
their vision of the future, they need credit. In this sense, their life plans depend not only on 
the income they earn but also on what they can spend beyond their monthly income. 
Finally, there are savings-dependent life plans. Savings-dependent life plans require saving 
money before it is spent. For Martha to be able to retire, what matters is not so much her 
income per se, but how much of it she can save for later. In fact, at least some of her income 
may not have any value to her if she cannot save it. 
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A narrow focus on income fails to address conceptions of the good that involve spending 
before income is received, or saving income to spend it at a later point in time. Income 
provides individuals with means of payment at a given time. It is then of most value to 
individuals who have income-dependent life plans. I will argue that a distribution that focuses 
narrowly on income fails to be sufficiently neutral between credit, saving and income-
dependent life plans.  
Using the device of the original position, I claim that individuals will not agree to principles 
that focus narrowly on income and thereby forego an adequate consideration of credit- and 
savings-dependent life plans.  
I think this is the case because three assumptions apply. I will refer to this specification of the 
original position as the capitalist original position. First, the parties in the original position 
know that they will live in a capitalist society, which means that their society involves the 
constraints on their life plans outlined in §3.1. They know that to pursue at least some 
potential life plans, they will not just need to meet a solvency constraint, but also a liquidity 
constraint. Second, they know that political institutions will often need to evaluate outcomes 
in terms of money (as argued in §2). It is these distributions that they are thinking about. 
Third, they do not know what sort of lives they will have. They know that it is possible that 
they will have conceptions of the good that involve credit- or savings-dependent life plans, 
but they are not sure that they will (as explained in §3.2.1, this is crucial to the setup of the 
original position). Under these circumstances, so I claim, the parties will refuse to accept a 
distribution of money understood solely in terms of income. Rather, they will prefer a way of 
distributing that does better in accommodating alternative intertemporal spending 
requirements.  
My argument does not depend on how one thinks of a fair distribution of income. In §2 I 
argued that money is an important metric for deciding whether societies live up to demands 
of distributive justice. Egalitarians will think differently about how to decide what a fair 
distribution of income consists in. Consider some examples. A strict egalitarian believes that 
all individuals are entitled to the same level of income.116 A sufficitarian believes that all 
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individuals should have a certain minimum income.117 Applying the Rawlsian difference 
principle to income means that the distribution of income should be to the greatest benefit of 
the least advantaged.118 Finally, a non-intrinsic egalitarian believes that a distribution of 
income should prevent a wide range of bad consequences of economic inequality.119  
Despite considerable differences, these egalitarian positions all put forward a prescriptive 
account of the distribution of money that is appropriate for a society of free and equal 
citizens. I have argued that if that account narrowly focuses on income, it is inadequate 
because it fails to consider conceptions of the good that involve credit- or savings-dependent 
life plans.  
3.2.4 Credit and saving 
I have rejected a narrow focus on income, but have not yet proposed an alternative. To this 
end, I will now argue that a distribution that takes account of options for credit and saving 
does better than one that focuses narrowly on income. For this to be the case such a 
distribution needs to meet two conditions. First, it must indeed do best in treating individuals 
as equals with regard to their intertemporal spending requirements. Second, the distribution 
must also meet the criteria of objectivity and controllability outlined in §2.  
A distribution of money will be fairer if it takes options for credit and saving into account. 
Options for saving are the means available to individuals to transfer the money they own to 
spend it at a later point in time. In any given period, individuals will have income and savings 
from previous periods. Their options for saving are the means available to them for providing 
themselves with money in future periods. Options for saving can take the form of a bank 
account, but also the purchase of a house, participation in the stock market or cash hidden 
under a mattress.  
Options for credit are the means available to individuals to spend money before they earn it. 
The feature that distinguishes credit from income is that individuals acquire an obligation to 
pay in the future. For every Pound spent on credit, individuals incur an obligation to repay the 
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same amount (and most likely interest), at a later point in time. Options for credit can take the 
form of a mortgage or some other form of financial contract. Equity can also have a role as 
credit. For firms, it may not matter very much whether someone lends money or buys shares 
to fund investments.  
To see that a distribution of money will be fairer if it takes options for credit and saving into 
account, consider again the capitalist original positions. First, the parties know that theirs will 
be a capitalist society where life plans are subject to liquidity constraints. Second, they think 
about a fair distribution in terms of a monetary metric. Third, they know that they may want 
to pursue credit- or savings-dependent life plans, but they do not know whether they will. My 
claim is that individuals who deliberate under these conditions will agree to a distribution that 
addresses both income and options for saving, over a mere distribution of income. Knowing 
that it is very well possible that they will have a conception of the good with credit- or 
savings-dependent life plans, they will recognise that a distribution without adequate options 
for credit and saving will potentially severely undermine their life plans.  
I now make two clarifications. First, this argument does not establish any determinate level of 
financial provisions to which individuals are entitled. Rather, it merely shows that individuals 
will want a distribution of money that takes account of options for credit and saving. As I 
argue in §3.2.5, the determination of actual options can only take place once more 
information becomes available about their society, and in particular its business cycle. 
Second, I have argued for options for credit and saving by considering the criterion of 
neutrality, but have not considered whether the metric I propose is sufficiently objective and 
controllable. I will therefore consider saving and credit in turn. 
Political institutions can evaluate the quality of options for saving in objective terms. The 
quality depends on three characteristics. First, the average expected return of options. As 
explained in §2.1, a capitalist economy relies on money as an independent unit of account in 
that entitlements and obligations are denominated in monetary, rather than real terms. Over 
time, savings can allow for buying more economic means. Savings can also lose value 
through inflation or financial losses. On some German bank accounts, for example, 
depositors currently pay negative interest rates. They pay for the privilege to store money. 
Second, risk. Even if different options for saving have the same average expected return, they 
may still be more or less risky. Keeping money in an inflation-corrected government bond 
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provides a very safe way of saving money, albeit at a lower return. Investing money in a 
business venture will be riskier, but also holds the promise of larger potential gains. Third, 
different options for saving can be more or less flexible in that liquid assets allow individuals 
to change their financial plans without incurring high costs.  
Political institutions can also control the quality of options for saving. Financial regulation, 
monetary policy and taxation can be used to influence the returns, risks and liquidity of 
options for saving. I discuss these means of control in more detail in §§4.3 and 6.2. 
The quality of credit, too, can be evaluated objectively. Political institutions can evaluate 
options for credit in terms of the availability of credit and interest rates paid on it. The credit 
that individuals have access to depends on risk assessment, which, certainly under capitalist 
coordination, may to varying degrees be based on subjective criteria. Still, it is possible to 
make an objective comparison of the chances of receiving credit for different social groups. 
Indeed, I will invoke such considerations in §3.3 as part of my objection against private 
provision of options for credit and saving. 
Political institutions can also control the options for credit that are available to individuals. 
Just like options for saving, they do this through financial regulation, monetary policy and 
taxation. Again, §§4.3 and 6.2 will discuss these means in more detail.  
3.2.5 Against rights-based approaches 
I have argued that adequate options for credit and saving should complement the distribution 
of income. Recently, philosophers of finance have argued for the stronger claim that there is a 
right to financial inclusion. I argue that such claims either unduly limit or unduly extend the 
entitlement to options for credit and saving.  
There are two ways to think about a right to financial inclusion. My argument supports the 
right in a weak sense. Social and political institutions should provide adequate options for 
credit and saving as part of ensuring a just distribution of money. In this sense, options for 
credit and saving are like income. Justice will prohibit some levels of income as too low, but 
what level this is will depend on many circumstances and is for political institutions to judge 
in the process of making economic policy. I would not formulate this claim by saying that 
there is a right to income and to options for credit and saving, but I do not deny that there are 
rights in this sense.  
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There is also a stronger claim, which holds that individuals are entitled to a determinate 
minimum level of financial provisions. This view holds that the entitlement is a right in the 
sense that there is some invariant level below which the quality of options for credit and 
saving cannot drop.120 I will now argue that this stronger claim is false.  
My argument invokes the original position to investigate what sort of entitlements should be 
considered in evaluating the distribution of money. Knowing that their society will involve 
economic contracts for access to economic means, the parties will ask how they want their 
access to these means to be evaluated. I argue that they will want outcomes to be evaluated 
not only in terms of income, but also in terms of options for credit and saving. On my 
account, it is crucial that these three entitlements are treated with equal concern. To be 
neutral between competing conceptions of the good, there must be no a priori reason to treat 
any of these intertemporal spending requirements as weightier. Treating entitlements to credit 
and saving as rights cannot mean treating them as weightier or less weighty than claims to 
income. I will now show that a right to financial inclusion is incompatible with an equal 
treatment of these three distribuenda.  
The reason that all three should be considered in relation is that the provision of options for 
credit and saving has systemic consequences. The decisions that individuals make over time 
in borrowing and spending will impact the interests of many others. Deciding on a fair 
distribution of money requires taking these systemic consequences into account. Doing so is 
incompatible with securing an invariant right to financial inclusion. I will now explain this 
objection in more detail by focusing on business cycles and monetary policy. 
In an economic upturn, all want to spend before they earn, which is unsustainable in the long 
run. At some point, prices start to rise, which can lead to self-enforcing spirals of inflation. 
Left unconstrained, the dynamics of unconstrained credit extension can also create periods of 
financial instability, which undermines the stability of domestic credit markets and the 
international balance of payments. Finally, credit provision will have consequences for the 
use of natural resources by inducing a higher level of GDP growth than is ecologically 
sustainable.  
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When the economy is in a downturn, individuals will want to save more. This, again, will 
have pervasive systemic consequences. Whether Lydia’s coffee bar will be a success depends 
in part on the level of spending in the economy. Just like Lydia’s credit extends the level of 
spending in the economy, the saving decisions of Martha cause spending to contract. Rather 
than going for drinks regularly, she might opt to stay home and save money. Martha’s 
decision to save may also lead her to refrain from replanting her garden. This will impact the 
flower reseller where John works. In this way, her decision to save will impact the income of 
John and Lydia. 
For these reasons, a capitalist economy needs monetary policy. By raising interest rates, 
central banks constrain the credit supply during an upturn. In a downturn, central banks seek 
to expand credit by lowering interest rates. This forces individuals to make riskier 
investments for the same level of returns. Monetary policy reduces the severity of business 
cycles but also impacts the quality of options for credit and saving that are available to 
individuals.  
In deciding how to use monetary policy, political institutions face the challenge of dealing 
with competing entitlements of individuals in a system with complex interdependencies. It is 
for this reason that conflicts of economic distribution are traditionally thought to be very 
different from conflicts between liberal and political rights.121 There is no invariant minimum 
level to which individuals are entitled irrespective of social circumstances. Instead, what 
options for credit and saving individuals are entitled to depends in part on the business cycle. 
A theory of entitlements to financial inclusion should be able to inform decisions on 
monetary policy. But taking the conflicting entitlements of individuals into account creates a 
dilemma for the rights-based approach to financial inclusion. To say that individuals have a 
right to credit or saving either unduly extends entitlements or unduly limits these 
entitlements.  
The entitlement is unduly extended if the right to credit and saving is thought to apply 
irrespective of macroeconomic conditions. In this way of thinking about the right to credit 
and saving, individuals have the right irrespective of how its exercise affects others. But, in 
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securing such a right, political institutions fail to account for the systemic consequences of 
borrowing and saving. Treating individuals as equals means that systemic consequences 
should be able to outweigh the interest that one individual has in such financial market 
transactions. To say that individuals have a right to a minimum level of credit or saving 
irrespectively precludes consideration of all relevant systemic consequences.  
This is not to say that monetary policy should be set without taking into account the 
entitlements of individuals to financial inclusion. The entitlement to credit and saving is 
unduly limited if these entitlements are simply sacrificed to achieve optimal systematic 
outcomes. In setting monetary policy, political institutions should take individual entitlements 
to credit and saving into account. This is true even if these claims are in the end outweighed 
by competing considerations.  
I will now illustrate both horns of the dilemma by discussing existing arguments for a right to 
credit. The account put forward by Kimberley Brownlee and Sofia Stemplowska makes the 
right to credit entirely unconditional. But this means that they do not consider the effects of a 
given level of credit provision on third-parties.122 These systemic consequences will be even 
more severe for their account as the right is not conditional on budget constraints.  
Marco Meyer’s account, which is in other respects close to my own, makes the right to credit 
conditional. 123 To say that individuals have a right to credit means that ‘some duty-holder has 
to provide the right-holder, under certain circumstances, with an opportunity to obtain 
credit.’124 In his account, the duty-holder is the state. The circumstance under which 
individuals have a right to credit that I focus on here is when an individual cannot pursue a 
life plan, but (i) would be able to do so if the individual were provided with credit and (ii) is 
able to repay that credit. But, this condition is ambiguous. Whether an individual can indeed 
repay the sum borrowed depends on interest rates. Thus, the question arises whether the right 
is determined taking monetary policy into account or not, which brings us back to the 
dilemma I have sketched. If the state decides on the content of this right independent of 
monetary policy, it gives more weight to the distribution of credit than to income and options 
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for saving. I have argued that this is unfair. But if the state takes monetary policy as a given, 
it faces the objection that it fails to take entitlements to credit into account. The right to credit 
only applies once we know monetary policy, but can no longer inform setting it in line with 
what distributive justice requires.  
The idea of a right to credit is sometimes ascribed to Muhammad Yunus, but, if this is indeed 
his view, the arguments he provides for giving the entitlement to credit a prior, overriding 
significance are solely instrumental.125 If a capitalist society cannot provide individuals with 
the means to escape extreme poverty or to education without ensuring that options for credit 
and saving are available for these purposes, this constitutes a ground for providing an 
invariant minimum level of financial inclusion. In such an account, however, the right to 
financial inclusion results from a prior right to the means of subsistence or education and 
does not involve any non-instrumental entitlement to finance at all.  
3.3 A capitalist financial system 
In §3.2 I argued that a just basic structure should realise a just distribution of options for 
credit and saving. I now connect these results to the central question of the dissertation, 
which concerns the authority over money. Under the hybrid monetary constitution, the 
provision of options for credit and saving is left largely to private authority. As I argue in this 
section private provision of options for credit and saving systematically privileges the already 
well-off. In §3.3.1 I discuss options for credit and in §3.3.2 options for saving. In §3.3.3 I use 
the original position one more time to argue against the advantage granted to the rich by 
private credit provision. The results of this section will be important for the argument in §6, 
where I draw on them for one of my five objections to unregulated private authority over 
money. 
3.3.1 Capitalist options for credit 
In this section I discuss the problem of credit constraints that is endemic to economies where 
credit provision is left to capitalist coordination. By taking out a loan, the borrower incurs a 
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legal duty to repay, but this duty is difficult to enforce.126 Once John receives his loan, he will 
have extensive discretion in what to do to repay it. John can fail his evening courses or leave 
his job. Now consider Lydia, who borrows money to open a coffee bar. Lydia can use her 
loan for a wide range of purposes, some of which might be ill-advised. If, as a consequence 
of their choices, John and Lydia do not have the means to repay the loan, they default. The 
lender, in short, faces asymmetric information concerning John’s and Lydia’s solvency. Lack 
of information will make it difficult for the financial intermediary to assign an adequate price 
to the risk of their loans. But this so-called information asymmetry also impacts John and 
Lydia, who might not be able to get a loan even if they themselves are justified in believing 
that they are actually solvent.  
The lender faces asymmetric information in at least two ways. First, the lender may not know 
the quality of the project for which the loan is sought. The lender will find it difficult to know 
whether Lydia is good at running a coffee bar and whether her business plan makes sense. 
The lender is in the business of granting loans, not the business of opening coffee bars. 
Lydia’s success does not only depend on her entrepreneurial skills, but also on her motivation 
to make use of these skills, which will generally be unknown.  
Second, the borrower cannot credibly commit to a low-risk strategy. Consider the case where, 
after receiving the loan, Lydia is free to choose between a high street bar, which involves 
higher risks but larger returns, and a downtown bar, with lower risks and returns. Lydia faces 
moral hazard in that she can take risks, while her lender bears the costs. If she cannot credibly 
commit to choosing the downtown bar, the lender will charge her the high-risk interest rate 
irrespective of her actual choice. 
These two forms of information asymmetry increase the interest rate that a lender will 
demand compared to rates when the lender has more information.127 But if interest rates for a 
project are high this makes successful repayment more difficult. High interest rates, in turn, 
give rise to a third problem of asymmetric information, namely adverse selection. Individuals 
with riskier projects will be willing to pay higher interest rates, while safer projects drop out 
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of the market. Taking adverse selection into consideration, lenders offer no credit even if 
borrowers are willing to accept higher interest rates. 
Although all prospective borrowers face these obstacles, those who have wealth will find it 
much easier to overcome them. One reason for this is that wealthy borrowers can provide 
collateral. Collateral is property of the borrower that is pledged to secure repayment of the 
loan. In the event of a default, the lender acquires the collateral. Putting up collateral allows 
borrowers to overcome credit constraints. Collateral from savings signals that borrowers 
believe in the quality of their project. Thereby borrowers can signal to the bank that the 
project is well thought-through. This also creates an incentive to repay and reduces the 
incentives for a high-risk, high-return strategy. Finally, collateral reduces the risk that the 
lender takes as the lender acquires the collateral in the event of default. 
In sum, private credit provision makes it easier for individuals with more wealth to borrow. 
Those individuals will also be more likely to receive credit and pay lower interest rates for 
projects of equal quality. If Martha were to have Lydia’s plan of opening a coffee bar, it 
would be much easier for her to get credit. Her projects need to be less good and she needs to 
put less work in convincing others of the risks she wants to take. From a social perspective, 
this means that riskier and less good projects acquire credit while the more promising projects 
of low-wealth individuals remain unfunded.  
These effects are well-documented in the empirical literature.128 Very low income individuals 
pay the highest interest rates and even low-income individuals are almost entirely excluded 
from business credit. Wealthier households find it much easier to pursue self-employment.129 
One study estimates that an inheritance of £5,000 makes women from similar family 
backgrounds three times as likely to be self-employed.130 Credit constraints are particularly 
pervasive in less-advanced economies, where a large part of small and medium-sized 
enterprises are not able to acquire credit at all.131 
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3.3.2 Capitalist options for saving 
I now turn to savings. The previous section already made clear that saving well is difficult. In 
any decision to invest money, the lender faces asymmetric information. First, accurately 
screening possible investments for their viability and expected returns is difficult. Second, 
borrowers will have an incentive to take high risks, which, if they materialise, will threaten to 
wipe out all the savings. Finally, those projects that will offer the best returns will also be 
those where the problems of screening and moral hazard are most severe.  
Savers have broadly two strategies of dealing with these informational problems. The first is 
the investment of effort and skill in screening. By knowing more about the borrower, 
economic conditions and the legal terms of contracts, lenders can improve the returns on 
individual investments. The second strategy is diversification. By investing money in 
different projects, the saver can reduce the volatility of investments.  
The costs of these two strategies do not rise proportionally with the sum of money invested. 
Screening any given project has a fixed cost in that it does not become more expensive to 
acquire information about any given project if the sum invested is larger. Diversification is 
costly because it involves entering into a lot of contracts, but these costs are again not 
proportional to the sum invested. Drafting a contract may require an expensive lawyer, but 
the cost of legal services does not go up proportionally with the sum invested. The same 
contract can be used multiple times for different investments. For these reasons, investing in 
risky projects becomes cheaper as the sum invested goes up. Because risky projects have 
higher returns, high wealth creates a higher return on investment.  
As a consequence of these dynamics, the effective rate of return on wealth increases with 
wealth levels.132 Figure 3.5 provides an overview of the different assets in which French 
households in different percentiles of the wealth distribution held their savings in 2012.133 In 
so far as very low-wealth households have any savings, these are largely held in deposits and 
as cash. In an inflationary environment, the net return on such assets is often negative. For 
low-wealth households, savings are largely used to buy a primary residence, which is funded 
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with a mortgage that is paid down over time. This form of saving is not without risk.134 
Consider John, who spends a part of his income to pay down his mortgage of £200,000 on a 
house worth 230,000. After 5 years, he has paid back £30,000. If the recession now reduces 
the value of his house by 15%, all his savings are wiped out. Those who have paid down their 
mortgage do not face this risk and lose at most 15% of their savings. The most profitable 
options for saving are only available to the very richest. Over the period between 1980 and 
2010, for example, universities with an endowment higher than $1 billion had an average 
return of 8.8% net of inflation.135 While universities with an endowment below $100 million 
only earned an average 6.2% return in the same period, these returns are still much higher 
than those available to average citizens.136 
 
3.3.3 Fairness 
I will now argue that capitalist coordination fails to realise a fair distribution of options for 
credit and saving because it makes the quality of options for credit and saving dependent on 
wealth levels. Consider the capitalist original position one last time. First, the parties know 
that to pursue at least some potential life plans they need to meet a liquidity constraint. 
Second, they know that political institutions will often evaluate outcomes in terms of money, 
which, as I just argued, should involve an evaluation of income, options for credit and options 
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for saving. Third, they do not know what the intertemporal spending requirements of their life 
plan will be. For the present argument, I will emphasise a further condition that follows from 
the design of the original position, which is that the parties do not know what their wealth 
level will be. I claim that under these conditions, individuals will prefer a capitalist economy 
where options for credit and saving are independent of wealth levels or perhaps even better 
for those with less wealth. 
There are three reasons for a wealth-independent provision of options for credit and saving. 
First, the parties in the original position have a crucial direct interest in options for credit and 
saving, as §3.1 described. The ability to allocate money over time dramatically extends the 
life plans that will be available with a given level of income. Therefore, even if the parties 
accept some economic inequalities, for example, because they are to everyone’s benefit, they 
will still want access to finances that is independent of their wealth level. Second, wealth- 
dependent distributions also conflict with the indirect interest that the parties have in the 
quality of projects that others pursue. It blocks those with low wealth from pursuing 
otherwise economically viable business ventures, which reduces the quality of the average 
project. Third, privileging borrowing and lending by the wealthy will have aggregate effects 
over time on economic distributions. Even moderate levels of wealth greatly increase self-
employed, and therefore the ability of individuals to generate top incomes. Because high 
wealth levels grow faster than low wealth levels, even a moderately skewed distribution of 
income can result in massive inequalities over time.  
I conclude that parties in the original position will have good reason to object to a wealth-
dependent distribution of options for credit and saving. But as I have shown, unregulated 
capitalist provision of these options leads to a wealth-dependent provision. Therefore, the 
parties have a reason to reject capitalist provision. 
This objection is not decisive. It may very well be that at least some private authority is 
crucial to realising an efficient use of resources. Just as income inequalities are often justified 
with recourse to capitalist incentives, so too there may be reasons to favour inequalities in 




In §3.1 I showed that the intertemporal constraints on the availability of money is a crucial 
constraint on life planning in a capitalist society. In §3.2 I used this observation to argue that 
a just distribution of money should not consider wealth, but rather available options for credit 
and saving. In §3.3 I argued that capitalist provision of options for credit and saving is 
objectionable from a perspective of distributive justice because it systematically privileges 
the wealthy. 
Although this latter claim is not new, it acquires a very different meaning in light of my 
argument in §3.2. Under capitalist coordination, money, whether income or options for credit 
and saving, tends to flow towards the top of the wealth distribution. This is not unfair because 
it contributes to inequalities in wealth. Rather, unequal access to options for credit and saving 
is in and of itself unfair. An unequal distribution of wealth is objectionable, in part because it 
gives rise to an unfair distribution of these options. 
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4 The monetary constitution 
The famous banker Meyer Amschel Rothschild is supposed to have said ‘Give me control of 
a nation's money supply and I care not who makes its laws’.137 While it is undeniable that 
authority over money is a considerable source of social power, it is equally a power that is 
itself the product of the law. Just like the forms of legislative, executive and judicial power 
that are more typically the subject of political philosophy, there exists a set of laws and 
conventions that create and define the authority over money. This chapter will describe that 
structure, which I refer to as a ‘monetary constitution’.  
As I argue in this chapter, capitalist societies today feature what I refer to as a hybrid of 
public and private authority over money. For socialists and full reserve bankers, the authority 
over money should be treated entirely as matter of public authority. For free bankers, the 
authority over money should be left to private authority. Capitalist societies today do not 
conform to either ideal. Rather, the supply of money to the economy takes place through a 
hierarchical order of money creation. At the top of this hierarchy stands a public settlement 
asset that is issued by the central bank. Below it, private financial institutions, banks, issue 
different forms of credit money. I explain the sense in which this system is hierarchical in 
terms of an asymmetric relation of dependence. The ability of private banks to issue money 
depends on their access to credit from the central bank, whereas the converse does not hold.  
A better understanding of monetary constitutions will be crucial for the argument in the next 
three chapters. In §5 I will invoke my account of private money creation in explaining how it 
causes financial instability. In §6 I will outline five objections to private authority over 
money and explore whether these objections should lead us to abolish private money 
creation. In §7 I turn to a discussion of the central bank and its independent role in exercising 
public authority over money. Before any of these discussions can be had, though, I have to 
describe in more detail that existing capitalist societies indeed feature both private and public 
authority over money. This is the aim of the present chapter.  
                                                 




In §4.1 I explain this chapter’s aim of developing an ideal-typical account of the hybrid 
monetary constitution. My conception of the relevant roles, norms and rules is much wider 
than other existing usages of the term monetary constitution, which I argue are too narrow. I 
then explain the aim of the chapter in developing an ideal-typical account of its rules that is 
meant to fit a wide range of contemporary and historical institutions. 
In §§4.2 and 4.3 I develop that account. In §4.2 I contrast private and public forms of 
monetary authority and explain how these forms of authority are related within a hybrid 
monetary constitution. I extend the work of Perry Mehrling and Katharina Pistor by arguing 
that the hierarchy of money should be understood in terms of asymmetrical relations of 
dependence between different forms of monetary authority.138 Although it is uncontroversial 
that the central bank creates money, it is controversial whether private banks can do the same. 
To defend the claim that existing capitalist economies have a hybrid monetary constitution, I 
argue in §4.3 that banks do have considerable discretion to create private credit money. They 
create money in the act of extending credit, although, as a consequence of the monetary 
hierarchy, they are subject to capitalist budget constraints imposed by the central bank and 
banking regulation.  
An essential, if not the essential, feature of hybrid monetary arrangements is that public 
authority over money is limited to issuing the settlement asset. Placing the authority over 
money entirely in public hands would require a dramatic reform of the financial system. 
Abolition of private money creation would be the end of the hybrid monetary constitution. In 
§6 I explore whether this is a desirable goal. 
4.1 The constitution and money 
In this section I explain the aim of the chapter in developing an ideal-typical account of the 
hybrid monetary constitution. In §4.1.1 I review existing uses of the term ‘constitution’. In 
§4.1.2 I discuss the sense in which I claim that there is a constitution that governs the 
authority over money. In §4.1.3 I explain the distinction between public and private monetary 
authority. In §4.1.4 I draw on Max Weber’s conception of an ideal-type to explain my aim in 
putting forward an account of the hybrid monetary constitution. 
                                                 




Constitutionalism is the idea that the exercise of political authority should be constrained by 
laws and conventions, which make up a constitution.139  
The term ‘constitution’ is sometimes taken to refer solely to a written text called ‘The 
Constitution’. But the written constitutional text places only few constraints on the exercise 
of political authority even, for example, in the US and India, which have some of the most 
extensive texts. Many of the rules that govern political institutions do not feature explicitly in 
the written document. And of course, some countries, such as Israel and the UK, do not have 
such a written text. 
Legal scholars, therefore, tend to have a much wider conception of what is and what is not 
part of the constitution. In their wider sense, a constitution defines the rights and obligations 
of public officials and institutions. Following Arthur Venn Dicey, the constitution does not 
just consist of written legal rules, but also of constitutional conventions. A constitutional 
convention is 
a non legal rule which imposes an obligation on those bound by convention, breach or 
violation of which will give rise to legitimate criticism; and that criticism will 
generally take the form of an accusation of ‘unconstitutional conduct’.140 
A constitution, then, consists of both the laws and the conventions that govern the exercise of 
political authority. 
While this wider notion of constitution is closer to my use of the term, it is still incomplete 
since it narrowly focuses on the constraints that apply to the government. An important role 
of a constitution is to delimit the space within which public decisions are made. 
Constitutionalism is not just a doctrine concerning the role of the government. It also informs 
the ideal of a private sphere which is not subject to permissible government interference. For 
example, freedom of speech does not only prohibit the government from censoring the press. 
It also leaves the authority over what can and cannot be said to private individuals. In other 
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words, the constitution determines where the public ends and the private begins. In thinking 
about a monetary constitution, we should therefore focus not only on its role in constraining 
public money creation, but also on its role in enabling and constraining private money 
creation. A monetary constitution consists of the laws and conventions that govern the 
relation between public and private authority. It is in this wide sense that I will use the term 
‘monetary constitution’. 
4.1.2 Monetary constitution 
As I will use the term, a monetary constitution governs (i) how authority over the provision 
of money is distributed; (ii) which actions are permissible and which are required from those 
who hold monetary authority; and (iii) how different actors are to exercise their authority. It 
consists of laws and conventions that govern the public authority over money and delimits the 
space that is left to private authority.141  
This conception is wider than that of libertarian authors who also use the term. In the works 
of James Buchanan and Milton Friedman, for example, the term monetary constitution refers 
to rules that govern public authority over the provision of money.142 Friedman talks of the 
need for ‘a monetary constitution, which takes the form of rules establishing and limiting the 
central bank as to the powers that it is given, its reserve requirements, and so on’.143 
Normative debates concerning central banking also tend to focus on the monetary 
constitution understood in this narrow sense. They concern the nitty-gritty of legal rules that 
govern the central bank itself.  
Although central bank mandates are an important part of the monetary constitution, it should 
not be reduced to such mandates. First, this would ignore non-legal constitutional 
conventions, which are crucial to decision-making by central bankers. As I discuss in §7.1.2, 
mandates of independent central banks are often vague and leave crucial questions open. 
These unwritten rules of monetary policy determine what counts as proper use of the money 
                                                 
141 Christine Desan uses the concept of a monetary constitution once in passing (2014, p.15), but her theoretical 
perspective is close to the view put forward here in its emphasis on the complex interrelation of private and 
public authority over money.  
142 Essays collected in Yeager 1962; Weintraub 1983; D’Amico 2007. 
143 Friedman 1962, p. 225. 
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supply and what does not. Second, central bank mandates tend to focus on monetary policy, 
but this is only one thing that central banks do. In fact, setting monetary policy is probably 
not the most important role of the central bank. Even if it turned out that setting interest rates 
had no effect on macroeconomic performance, the central bank would remain crucial for its 
role of providing a currency. But even this role should not capture too much of our attention. 
Existing debates on the legal concept of a monetary constitution tend to focus too narrowly 
on defining the rules that apply to the central bank. This focus reflects the mistaken idea that 
all money is issued by the central bank and omits the role of private money creation.144  
The monetary constitution is not written down in a document, nor do the relevant provisions 
tend to be part of the written constitutions narrowly understood. The European Treaties, for 
example, only sketch the role of private financial institutions in a very general sense. Article 
119 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union states that the European Central 
Bank ‘shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free 
competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources’.145 The Statutes of the ECB 
further specify that its monetary policy is to be implemented through operations in financial 
markets, unless a two-third majority of the Governing Council of the ECB decides 
otherwise.146 But what exactly those principles are and under what conditions a central bank 
can extend its operations is not written down. Still, there are unwritten rules, which are often 
formulated in the language of economic theory. If a central bank were to violate these rules, it 
would give rise to criticism. Such criticisms will not always consist in charges of the central 
bank being unconstitutional per se, but they do come with grave moral condemnation. 
Consider the case of Quantitative Easing (or QE), for which central banks bought a large 
volume of sovereign bonds. Although the mandates of central banks such as the Fed and the 
ECB explicitly license trading in a wide range of financial market securities, including 
sovereign bonds, there was considerable debate over whether QE was printing money to fund 
government expenditures.147 Such so-called ‘monetary financing’ is widely seen as an abuse 
                                                 
144 I defend this claim in §3.  
145 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, article 127. 
146 Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, article 18 and 20. I discuss the ECB mandate in more 
detail in van ‘t Klooster forthcoming a. 
147 Federal Reserve Act, article 13; Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, article 18.  
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of central bank powers.148 In §4.3 below, I will refer to constitutional conventions in order to 
explain in what sense private financial institutions are subject to capitalist budget constraints.  
4.1.3 The public and the private 
In this section I explain in what sense the monetary constitution of existing capitalist societies 
is hybrid. As discussed in §1.1.2, the monetary constitution delineates a sphere of monetary 
authority that is subject to public authority from a sphere that is not. In the sphere of public 
monetary authority, (i) decisions are made by political institutions; (ii) with the aim of 
treating all citizens fairly; and (iii) justified in terms of a conception of justice. The main 
public actor in this sphere is the central bank. The monetary constitution also delineates a 
sphere of monetary authority within which decisions over the provision of money are left in 
private hands. 
Not all monetary constitutions involve both forms of authority. In a public monetary 
constitution, the authority over money is entirely under public authority. Socialist economies 
are examples of this but proposals for full reserve banking, the topic of §6, also involve 
public monetary constitutions. In a purely private monetary constitution, as proposed by 
libertarian free bankers, the authority over money is entirely in private hands.149 Existing 
capitalist societies, however, have what I refer to as ‘hybrid’ monetary constitutions, in the 
sense that they allow for both private and public authority over the provision of money.150  
The way in which the private and the public are interrelated in different historical capitalist 
societies has some strikingly invariant features.151 The central bank issues a form of public 
money, but most of the money used for private economic transactions is issued by the private 
banking system. The central bank does not, save in exceptional circumstances, provide credit 
                                                 
148 But see recently Blyth and Lonergan 2014; Turner 2015.  
149 Mises 1912; Hayek 1976; Sechrest 2008. 
150 Ingham 2004, pp. 124f speaks of hybridity in describing the role of central bank money and private credit 
money in existing capitalist economies. Mehrling (2013b) claims that the central bank is itself a hybrid 
institution in that it banker to both the government and the banking system. Pistor (2013, p. 322) uses the term 
‘hybridity’ to refer to role of both public institutions in the governance and regulation of financial markets 
generally. The main claim of this chapter is narrower in that it concerns hybridity of the authority over money. 
151 Thornton [1802] 1965; Braudel 1982; Ingham 2004; Arnon 2010; Desan 2014. 
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to the economy directly. Instead, money creation for the real economy is a prerogative of 
private banks, which seek profit within the confines set by public regulation and monetary 
policy.  
4.1.4 Ideal-types 
Before political philosophers can develop normative principles for money, they need an 
adequate descriptive account of the authority over money. As I noted in §1, contemporary 
political philosophy currently lacks such an account.  
To address this gap in the literature, this chapter develops an ideal-typical account of the 
hybrid monetary constitution. Following Max Weber, an ideal-type is a description of a type 
of historical phenomenon. It does not describe historical phenomena in all their detail but 
focuses on certain crucial features that they share. The resulting ideal-type is thus abstracted; 
it does not incorporate those features that not all instances of the type share, nor does it reflect 
the shared features that are less important. In this sense, it is, as Weber puts it, ‘a utopia 
which has been arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality’.152 
Weber gives as an example the neoclassical conception of the economic agent. 
While I claim that the ideal-type that I develop fits existing capitalist economies, I will not 
discuss the situation in individual countries in detail. For example, I claim that the provision 
of money to citizens, firms and other institutions is largely left to private authority. To 
achieve more descriptive accuracy, I would need to say more about the relevant exceptions. 
For example, in the US, before the Dodd-Franks Act, section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act allowed for lending ‘in unusual and exigent circumstances’ to any ‘individual, 
partnership, or corporation […] unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other 
banking institutions’. I will not explore these kinds of historical variation here.  
The previous three chapters provide a normative framework identifying the crucial features of 
the monetary constitution. According to Weber, researchers determine which features to 
include in an ideal-type drawing solely on their personal values. He believes that, since such 
values cannot be left out of the scientific process, scientists should openly avow the values 
that inform their work. Although I think it is indeed important to acknowledge the role of 
                                                 
152 Weber [1904] 1949, p. 90. 
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values, the features I focus on are those that should be of interest to contemporary political 
philosophers more generally. I will describe the relation between the private and the public 
spheres, as well as the ways in which different forms of monetary authority impact the 
distribution of income, credit and savings. These features are crucial for anyone who is 
interested in how existing capitalist democracies realise, or fail to realise, distributive justice. 
4.2 Monetary authority 
The relationship between the central bank and the banking system is hierarchical in the sense 
that central banks have a form of authority over the banking system. In issuing credit money 
in the form of bank deposits, private banks become dependent on the central bank for credit. 
The central bank decides under what conditions it provides such credit, which gives it a 
special form of authority over the banking system. 
In this section I explain how public and private authority are interrelated in the hybrid 
monetary constitution. I first explain what I mean by monetary authority (§4.2.1). I then 
explain the idea of a hierarchy between the settlement asset, which is issued by the central 
bank, and different forms of credit money, issued by private financial institutions (§4.2.2). In 
§4.2.3 I explain in what sense monetary authority is ordered in a hierarchy. 
4.2.1 What is monetary authority? 
Every economic agent has authority over money in the general sense that they can make 
payments. Firms and individuals provide money to others by spending it. They can also lend 
money or save via a financial intermediary, thereby creating an economic incentive for 
financial institutions to provide more credit. These abilities all constitute important sources of 
social power—the social power that results from the authority to decide over the use of 
money. When I talk about authority over money, however, I mean something more specific, 
namely the ability to issue money.  
Although the authority over the use of money is diffuse, the same is not true for the ability to 
issue money. Every Dollar or Euro that is spent is created at some point by a financial 
institution, either the central bank, a private bank or what is known as a shadow bank. In 
existing capitalist societies, the conditions under which an institution is permitted to issue 
money are governed by strict rules. 
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In §1.1.2 I characterised the ability to issue money as having formal and effective aspects. 
The formal aspect concerns whether it is legally permissible to issue money, while 
effectiveness concerns whether the asset that an institution issues actually serves as money. 
The monetary constitution does not only govern formal monetary authority. It also has a 
crucial role in determining which institutions have effective monetary authority. 
My definition of money follows that of John Hick, who focuses on its role in an economic 
transaction.153 For an asset to function as money, economic agents must, for legal reasons or 
out of expediency, treat it as a means of payment for goods and services. I will now make this 
idea more precise. An asset functions as money if and only if economic agents satisfy the 
following two conditions. First, private economic agents denominate their economic contracts 
in the currency of the asset. Second, they accept the asset issued by the institution as a means 
of payment for debts denominated in that currency.154  
On the hicksian account, whether a given agent has the effective ability to issue money 
depends on what other economic agents use to make payments. This contradicts Hyman 
Minsky’s oft-cited claim that ‘everyone can create money, the problem is to get it 
accepted’.155 Rather, it takes the opposite to be true. An asset functions as money, in so far as 
economic agents accept it to make payments. In other words, a failure to get other economic 
agents to use an asset as a means of payment simply means a failure to issue money. This, on 
Hick’s account, is a conceptual truth about money.  
Chartalists claim that the ability to issue money is dependent on the ability of the state to 
impose taxes. From an empirical perspective, it is indeed true that the ability to issue money 
is often closely intertwined with taxation.156 But the Chartalist claim is false if it is taken to 
mean that there can be no money without public tax collection.157 In a capitalist economy, 
whether a given asset functions as money is not entirely under the control of any single agent, 
                                                 
153 Hicks 1987; §3.1.2. Also, Bell 2001.  
154 On the relation between money and trust, ECB 2010, p. 47f. I discuss the topic of trust in more detail in van ‘t 
Klooster forthcoming b.  
155 Minsky [1986] 2008, p. 228. 
156 E.g. Desan 2014. 
157 Mehrling 2000. 
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not even the state.158 Rather, whether an asset is money depends on whether economic agents 
use it as a means of payment in economic transactions. States can force economic agents to 
pay their taxes with a certain asset, but for other transactions, it is largely up to economic 
agents to agree on the means of payment. Economic agents will generally only enter into 
economic contracts denominated in a given currency if they expect to (a) have that form of 
money available to meet future liabilities and (b) value receiving payments with that form of 
money in the future. Neither can be under complete control of the state. 
In sum, the monetary constitution defines the legal rules that govern monetary authority, but 
it is only one of the factors that condition the effective ability of financial institutions to issue 
money. In §4.3 below I explore the constraints that banks face in more detail. 
4.2.2 Central bank and credit money 
Although the central bank and private banks both have a form of monetary authority, their 
roles in the financial system are very different.159 In this section I characterize these 
differences in terms of the form of money that they issue. I also explain that, despite being 
issued by different institutions, both central bank money and private credit money are means 
of payment for liabilities denominated in the same currency.  
By entering into economic and financial contracts, economic agents incur obligations to make 
payments. To meet these obligations, they need to transfer ownership of money. The transfer 
of ownership fulfils the obligation to pay. Within a currency, a wide range of assets is used as 
a means of payment. These assets are all money that can be used to meet at least some 
liabilities denominated in the relevant currency, but they can be very different in other 
respects. The most important distinction is that between central bank money, which serves as 
the settlement asset, and credit money, which does not.  
                                                 
158 Knapp ([1905] 2003) is famous for the claim that money originates in the ability of the state to impose 
obligations to pay taxes on citizens. More recently, Wray 1998; Douglas 2016.  
159 On the relation between central bank and credit money: Minsky [1986] 2008; Moore 1988; Wray 1998; Bell 
2001; Graziani 2003; Ingham 2004; Bank of England 2014; Lavoie 2014; Douglas 2016. I discuss financial 
intermediation and fractional reserve theories in §3. 
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Every currency has one institution that issues the settlement asset. The money that this 
institution creates determines which asset can serve as a means of payment for that currency. 
The money issued by other financial institutions can provide its owner with a means of 
payment that is to some extent functionally equivalent to the settlement asset, but is not itself 
the settlement asset. An asset is functionally equivalent if its owner can use it to make 
payments denominated in the currency. To successfully issue money in a currency, an 
institution must either issue the settlement asset or ensure that the money it issues remains 
functionally equivalent to the settlement asset.  
In the hybrid monetary constitution, the central bank issues the settlement asset. Central bank 
money can take the form of cash or central bank deposits. Neither has a particularly 
prominent role in everyday economic transactions. To settle a payment in cash (coins and 
bank notes), individuals merely need to hand over the money physically. Although cash is the 
most tangible form of money, it is not the most important means of payment.160 Indeed, it is 
controversial whether central banks should continue to issue cash at all.161 
Although the central bank deposit is the defining asset for the currency, it is not often 
discussed and individuals cannot own it. Central banks provide the deposits they issue only to 
a limited number of counterparties. As a rule, the counterparties will be private banks and 
other financial institutions. There will be one or more government accounts operated by the 
Treasury, and, particularly for core currencies, accounts for foreign governments and 
international organisations. The provision of money to citizens, firms and other institutions is 
left largely to various private financial institutions. 
In a well-functioning payment system, economic agents can use credit money to make 
payments.162 It does not matter whether they own cash issued by the central bank, or a bank 
deposit, issued by a private bank. Instead of direct settlement with the issuer of the settlement 
asset, a payment system coordinates settlement through interlocking payment intermediaries. 
In this way, a well-functioning payment system makes credit money functionally equivalent 
to central bank money. 
                                                 
160 Bank of England 2014. 
161 Recently, Rogoff 2014. Pope et al (2002) find pathogenic bacterial contamination on 94% of one-dollar bills.  
162 On payment systems, BIS 2003 and ECB 2010. 
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To settle payments denominated in the currency, banks have deposits at the central bank. 
They use these deposits to settle payments between citizens, firms, and other payment 
intermediaries. Consider Amartya who buys a coffee at Lydia’s coffee bar for £3.10. Lydia 
has a bank account at Bank L and Amartya has a bank account at Bank A. Their banks 
process and settle the payment for them using their accounts with the central bank. Bank A 
deducts £3.10 from Amartya’s account, and pays £3.10 to Bank L. Bank L now has £3.10 in 
central bank money and credits Lydia with £3.10 (Figure 4.1). 
 Amartya  Lydia 
Deposit Bank A 
£3.10 
  




















 Central Bank  
 
 Deposit Bank A  
£3.10 




Figure 4.1 – Bank payment 
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For retail customers like Lydia and Amartya, it does not matter that they do not have deposits 
at the central bank. Credit money issued by their banks is all they need to make payments. In 
this sense, their bank accounts are functionally equivalent to the settlement asset.  
Real world payments are processed in a much more complex structure than the simple 
transaction described in Figure 4.1. Central bank deposits serve as a means of payment 
amongst banks and clearing houses in a more fine-grained tapestry of connected systems for 
processing and settling payments between financial institutions.163 No bank will settle a 
payment of £3.10 at the central bank. Central bank real-time settlement systems such as 
TARGET2 in the Eurozone, CHIPS in the UK, and FEDWIRE in the US are expensive and 
are only used for urgent and large-value transactions. For small payments, a clearing house 
processes payments between different counterparties throughout the day and settlement takes 
place at the end of the day. Such designated-time net settlement is the norm for retail 
payments and international payments. These systems use one or a few daily transfers via a 
large-value payment system to settle net balances. Existing monetary constitutions feature 
both privately and publicly-owned payment systems. Privately owned payment systems 
operate within the context of a public large-value payment system. For payments between 
such private payment systems, however, settlement takes place with central bank deposits.164 
The crucial point is that in a well-functioning payment system, credit money is functionally 
equivalent to the central bank money. It is this functional equivalence that allows banks to 
create money.  
4.2.3 The hierarchy of money 
Monetary theorists describe the relationship between different forms of money as 
hierarchical.165 The hierarchy at issue is not primarily a relation of commands from the 
central bank to the banking system. Rather, it is a hierarchy that arises out of financial 
contracts and market prices. I will first describe the hierarchy between the central bank and 
                                                 
163 Idem. 
164 Idem. 
165 Foley 1987; Bell 2001; Mehrling 2013a; Pistor 2013; 2017. 
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private financial institutions with a banking license. I then extend the discussion to the 
shadow banking system and international monetary relations. 
The payment system looks very different from the perspective of different parties. Lydia and 
Amartya treat their deposits as money because they are functionally equivalent to the 
settlement asset. They can use it to meet payments denominated in the currency and they do 
not need anything else to be able to do so. Because Amartya can assume that his bank has 
enough money in its deposit at the central bank to make payments, his own bank deposit is 
functionally equivalent to a deposit at the central bank. Amartya makes plans involving the 
money issued by Bank A because, as explained in §4.2.1, he can use its deposits to meet 
future liabilities and values receiving payments on that account. In this sense, Amartya uses 
his deposit as a means of payment because he trusts it.  
From the perspective of Bank A, however, deposits are a form of credit. When Amartya 
decides to make a payment, the bank needs to repay the credit by using central bank deposits 
to settle the payment. It is for this reason that Amartya holds a bank account in the first place. 
If the bank cannot guarantee functional equivalence, customers will start to withdraw 
deposits from the bank. Banks can only issue money in so far as the assets they issue remain 
convertible into central bank deposits. By contrast, a central bank’s ability to effectively issue 
money does not depend on convertibility into any form of credit money for the assets that it 
issues to serve as a means of payment.  
Monetary theorists use the term ‘hierarchy of money’ to describe this asymmetry between 
different types of money-issuing institutions. The term is used in at least six ways. Where an 
institution fits into the hierarchy can depend on (i) the ability of institutions to access central 
bank credit;166 (ii) the legal status of the money that institutions issue;167 (iii) the legal 
obligations that issuers of money make to their customers;168 (iv) the likelihood that 
institutions will receive an emergency loan during a crisis;169 (v) the ability of that institution 
                                                 
166 Pistor 2017, 188. 
167 Mehrling 2013a, p. 1. 
168 Foley 1987; Mehrling 2013a, p. 2. 
169 Pistor 2013a, p. 321; Pistor 2017, p. 187. 
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to decide whether other institutions receive an emergency loan during a crisis;170 and lastly 
(vi) the likelihood that money issued by institutions will retain its nominal value during a 
crisis.171  
I use the term ‘hierarchy of money’ to refer to the relation of dependency that holds between 
the effective ability of institutions to issue money.172 Central banks and private banks both 
have a formal right to issue a form of money that is denominated in the relevant currency. 
The central bank also has an almost unconstrained effective ability to issue money in the 
currency. Only in a situation of hyperinflation or extensive capital flight will economic agents 
stop accepting its money as a means of payment. The effective ability of private banks to 
issue money denominated in the same currency, by contrast, depends structurally on their 
ability to provide their customers with, and settle payments using, central bank money.  
This effective ability of private banks to issue money can depend on access to central bank 
credit, as definition (i) claims, if this is the institution that provides it with the asset to which 
its money is to be functionally equivalent. Their effective ability also depends on the legal 
status of the institution and the legal obligations that it is allowed to make (as definition ii and 
iii claim). My account incorporates these conditions but is more general.  
The provision of the settlement asset gives the central bank authority over the banking 
system. This authority does not derive primarily from the ability to impose legal obligations 
on its counterparties. Rather, by issuing credit money, banks impose on themselves legal 
obligations to conduct payments. In issuing money beyond their holdings of central bank 
deposits, private banks become dependent on the central bank for liquidity support. If 
customers decide to use their deposits for payments or withdraw their deposits in cash, 
private banks need central bank credit to meet their outstanding liabilities.  
The central bank has monetary authority over the banking system in the sense that it decides 
the conditions under which it provides its money to private banks. Its monetary authority 
                                                 
170 Pistor 2013a, p. 321 
171 Pistor 2013a, p. 320. 
172 My account of monetary hierarchy is similar to Bell (2001) but does not endorse the Chartalist assumption 
that informs it. 
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conditions the effective ability of private banks to create money. This type of dependence is 
what I refer to as a hierarchy of money.  
The monetary authority of the central bank qua provider of the settlement asset has two 
importantly different dimensions. The first concerns the interest rates at which the banking 
system can acquire deposits. This interest rate is crucial to monetary policy since it has a 
pervasive influence on the price of credit in the currency. Second, the central bank decides on 
the collateral that banks need to put up to acquire deposits. As I will explain in §4.3, 
collateral requirements impose liquidity constraints on the banking system.  
The way in which the central bank imposes interest rates and collateral requirements depends 
on its monetary policy framework. There are roughly two ways for banks to acquire deposits. 
First, banks can ask for credit from the central bank. Central bank credit is secured through 
low-risk assets that serve as collateral for the loan. If a counterparty goes bankrupt, the 
central bank acquires ownership of the asset that serves as collateral. 
Second, banks can sell a low-risk asset to the central bank. In a sale and repurchase 
agreement (or ‘repo’), the bank sells a financial asset to the central bank with a contractual 
obligation of repurchasing it at an agreed-on price. For the duration of the contract, the 
financial institution owns a central bank deposit, while the central bank owns the asset. The 
difference between the purchase price and the repurchase price is the repo rate. In effect, the 
financial institution borrows money in this transaction and the repo rate functions as an 
interest rate.  
Banks that issue credit money beyond their holdings of the settlement asset become 
dependent on liquidity support from the central bank. This makes their ability to issue money 
dependent on the central bank. How much money a bank can issue depends on central bank 
interest rates and the collateral requirements for deposits. The hierarchical nature of this 
relationship is most vivid during a banking crisis. A bank that loses access to central bank 
credit, as happened to Lehman Brothers in 2008, will default. But, against accounts of the 
hierarchy (iv), (v), and (vi), positions in the hierarchy of money are also crucial during stable 
financial conditions. Interest rates and collateral requirements always have pervasive impact 




So far, I have focused on the relation between the central bank and private banks, but there 
are at least two further hierarchies of money. Although these hierarchies are less important 
for §§5, 6 and 7, I include the following discussion as part of my aim in this chapter of 
outlining the subject matter of monetary authority in its entirety.  
First, there is the hierarchical structure of the shadow banking system.173 Shadow money is a 
money-like substitute for deposits issued by institutions outside the licensed banking system. 
Shadow money is distinctly money-like in that it is denominated in a currency and its issuer 
offers the service of converting it into other forms of credit money. The issuers of these assets 
also often offer payment services, thereby making shadow money functionally equivalent to 
the settlement asset.  
In contrast to bank deposits, shadow money is issued by institutions that do not have a 
banking license and lack direct access to traditional forms of central bank credit. In a legal 
sense, they are not banks, although they fulfil a very similar economic function. They issue 
liquid deposit-like assets, which they fund with illiquid investments. For example, in 2010, 
large firms held $3.5 trillion in cash, which if deposited in a bank, would not be subject to 
deposit insurance (which is capped at $100,000 in the US and €100,000 in Europe). Instead, 
these funds are held in complex financial constructions that seek to replicate the combination 
of liquidity and safety offered by normal bank deposits.  
Where they are dependent on credit from the licensed banking system, shadows banks occupy 
a position in the hierarchy of money that is subordinate to regular banks. The Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008 led to a bank run on shadow banks. Since then, policy 
makers around the world have worked to integrate various forms of shadow banking into the 
more regulated banking system.174 For example, after establishing the Overnight Reverse 
Repurchase Agreement Facility in 2014, the Federal Reserve now provides liquidity support 
to non-bank financial institutions.175 The shadow banks thereby move up in the hierarchy of 
money to a position equal (or close to) the position of licensed banks. In the following, when 
I talk of private banks, I am referring only to regular licensed banks.  
                                                 
173 Poszar et al 2010; McMillan 2014; Ricks 2016. 
174 Stafford 2017. 
175 Frost et al 2015. 
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The relation between different international currencies comprises the third hierarchy.176 A 
central bank faces no budget constraint for its currency, as it can always simply print the 
money it needs to make payments denominated in that currency.177 But, within international 
currency markets, central banks are to some extent dependent on the conditions under which 
other central banks provide their money. This is particularly the case for central banks of 
periphery currencies, which operate under tight limitations set by the international monetary 
system. As a rule, periphery central banks have an (implicit or explicit) exchange rate target, 
or ‘peg’, whereby they commit themselves to keeping the value of their currencies stable. If 
the central bank fails to maintain this peg, the currency appreciates, which disrupts trade, or 
devalues, which can bring about a balance of payment crisis and IMF surveillance. The 
periphery central banks, then, are in a position resembling that of a private bank, since their 
money functions as a means of payment in part through perceived functional equivalence to a 
form of money higher up the hierarchy. In other words, their effective ability to issue money 
depends on decisions made by core central banks. I will briefly touch on shadow money in 
my discussion of the Global Financial Crisis in the next chapter, but not say much about the 
global dimension of monetary justice. 
4.3 Private money creation 
The main claim of this chapter is that the monetary constitution of existing capitalist societies 
is a hybrid of both private and public monetary authority. While it is uncontroversial that 
central banks issue money, there is considerable debate about whether private financial 
institutions can do the same. Are private banks, unlike other private financial institutions, 
able to create money? I argue that they can, but that, in contrast to the central bank, their 
effective ability to issue money is subject to capitalist budget constraints imposed by the 
central bank and banking regulation. In the previous section, I have focused on the relation 
between private and public monetary authority. I now turn to describing the constraints that 
private banks face in issuing money in more detail. This more detailed account will prepare 
the ground for the normative discussion in §§5 and 6, where I ask to what extent banks 
should retain private authority over money.  
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As I show, the hybrid monetary constitution assigns a crucial role to public officials in 
ensuring that banks remain subject to capitalist budget constraints, even if these constraints 
are applied with far more discretion than the application of insolvency law to other firms.178 
Rather than thinking of budget constraints as spelt out in a law that governs the banking 
sector, their role in the monetary constitution is one of a constitutional convention. The idea 
that banking must be made subject to budget constraints, just like other firms, is an ideal that 
informs the exercise of political authority over the hybrid monetary constitution. The failure 
of political institutions to impose budget constraints gives rise to criticism, which is not 
unlike the accusation of unconstitutional conduct used in other political contexts.  
In §4.3.1 I explain that banks have monetary authority in the sense that they can issue money 
in the act of providing credit but face capitalist budget constraints in doing so. Even if they do 
not need to borrow before they can lend out, banks face liquidity constraints because of 
central bank settlement (§4.3.2), and solvency constraints because of capital requirements and 
other forms of banking regulation (§4.3.3). 
4.3.1 Creating money 
In this section I explain in more detail what it means to say that private banks create money in 
the act of granting loans. This means that they have monetary authority, in contrast to other 
financial institutions. I then discuss authors who have denied that banks are special because 
they create money. 
Economic textbooks sometimes suggest that banks first need to collect deposits issued by the 
central bank from customers before being able to lend to others. In this view, banks do not 
create money themselves, but rather attract deposits prior to lending.179 As I shall now 
explain, this account of banking is simply false.180 Banks create money in the act of granting 
loans. 
                                                 
178 Pistor argues that the application of the rule of law is flexible in the sense that there is a high ‘probability that 
ex ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future’ (1993, p. 320). My point here is that 
budget constraints are subject to discretion as a matter of law.  
179 E.g., Samuelson 1948 and, according to Werner 2014b, all fifteen later editions of the same textbook. 
180 See Moore 1988; McLeay 2014; Werner 2014a. 
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If all goes well, bank deposits are functionally equivalent to the settlement asset. Banks can 
create money, since they can decide to provide their customers with deposits. Creating money 
requires nothing beyond merely going into debt with a customer. Credit money is created 
through financial transactions in the same way as central bank money. In theory, a customer 
could sell an asset to the bank, for example in a repo transaction. Alternatively, a money-
creating transaction occurs when the bank provides a loan. By providing its customers with 
its own deposits, the bank can lend out money without borrowing funds. The bank creates the 
money it needs in the act of granting the loan.  
Consider a bank loan to Lydia to open her coffee bar (Figure 4.2). To this end, Bank L enters 
into a financial contract with Lydia for £20,000. The contract imposes an obligation on Bank 
L to provide a deposit to Lydia, giving her an obligation to repay the loan with interest (*) at 
maturity. Bank L can meet its obligation to provide Lydia with £20,000 merely by creating a 
deposit. Bank L does not need to have any central bank money to fulfil this legal obligation. 
Bank L  Lydia 
Loan to Lydia  
£20,000 * 
Deposit Lydia  
£20,000 
 Deposit Bank L  
£20,000 
Debt to Bank L  
£20,000 * 
Figure 4.2 – Money creation by private bank 
Whereas banks issue their own money, other financial institutions do not. Non-bank financial 
institutions need to borrow before they can lend. They lend out money held in a private 
deposit at a third party and need to collect funds before they can provide borrowers with 
money. They differ from banks in that they cannot create money in the act of providing 
credit. In this sense, they do not have monetary authority, in contrast to banks.  
The view that banks do not create money is therefore simply false. But, there is a more 
sophisticated objection to the claim that banks create money, which, even if false, monetary 
economists do not always adequately address.181 A famous exponent of this objection is 
                                                 
181 For some egregious cases of misrepresentation, see Werner 2014b. Also Keen 2012. 
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James Tobin.182 He holds that while private banks indeed do create money, this ability is only 
of peripheral interest to understanding their business model, which is not different from other 
financial institutions. Both engage in financial intermediation, that is, the activity of 
providing credit to one group of economic agents that is funded by the savings of other 
economic agents. Accordingly, both face the same budget constraints. Banks, like other 
firms, are subject to liquidity and solvency constraints. They must have assets that are valued 
more than their liabilities and they must be able to meet payment obligations when these 
come due.  
Tobin does not deny banks have some important advantages. Deposit insurance and central 
bank credit make funding for banks cheaper than it would otherwise be. In return, banks are 
subject to stricter regulation. But, for Tobin, this does not fundamentally change the 
economic regularities that explain decisions made by both bank and non-bank financial 
institutions. In his argument, a customer does not take out a loan merely to hold it as a deposit 
at the same bank. Rather, customers borrow to make payments. Once they do this, the bank is 
in the same position as the investor. The bank too needs to fund the loans it grants through 
borrowing. Both need to find funds to make assets and liabilities match up over time in line 
with their liquidity constraints. The crucial point, for Tobin, is that an institution does not 
need to be a bank to provide credit and, in principle, being a bank does not make that more 
profitable.  
In sum, Tobin does not strictly speaking deny that banks have monetary authority, only that 
this is not a significant fact. He claims, rather, that the constraints that banks face in issuing 
credit and providing deposits are broadly the same as those of any other financial institution. 
To explain why this view is at best partially correct, I now turn to a more detailed discussion 
of whether banks face budget constraints in the same way as other financial institutions. 
4.3.2 Bank liquidity constraints 
I will now explain in what sense private money creation is subject to liquidity constraints. 
This is a somewhat technical issue, but the moral is relatively simple: Depositors provide 
                                                 
182 Tobin 1954; Tobin & Brainard 1963. This is also (more or less) the view recently put forward by Krugman 
(2012) and Rowe (2012) against Keen (2012). For an overview of their debate, see Unlearning Economics 2012. 
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banks with a constant source of funds. If their deposits run out, a bank can also fund itself via 
money markets, but its effective ability to do so is determined by the central bank’s collateral 
policy. Banks face liquidity constraints, but not the same constraints as their non-bank 
competitors. 
Private banks certainly face formal liquidity constraints. They are subject to insolvency laws 
and therefore need to make sure that they can meet their liabilities when these come due. 
When banks issue credit money, they issue a deposit to their customers, which customers will 
most likely use to make expenditures or withdrawals in the form of cash. To process 
payments to customers of other banks, a bank needs sufficient central bank deposits to settle 
payments for its customers. Consequently, a bank that issues a loan will need to find someone 
to fund that loan. In this sense, it might seem that banks do not have a magic tree from which 
to fund their portfolios. But, in a different sense, they do.  
In the act of granting loans, the banking system creates the funds it needs to meet liquidity 
constraints. Consider the loan granted to Lydia for her coffee bar. Although money flows out 
of Lydia’s deposit, customers of Bank L will deposit cash and receive payments on their 
accounts. These inflows of money will in part offset the outflows of money resulting from 
customers like Lydia who withdraw cash or make payments. Bank J, for example, issues an 
educational credit of £20,000 to John. When John spends his deposit, some of that money 
will end up at Bank L, thereby offsetting the liquidity outflows resulting from the credit 
transfer to Lydia. The liquidity inflows of Bank J and Bank L are dependent on the rate at 
which the other bank issues credit. If Bank L issues a large volume of credit, money will flow 
out to Bank J and vice versa. If both banks create roughly the same amount of money, the 
expenditures of some of their customers will tend to be offset by payments received from 
customers of other banks. To keep their level of deposit stable, banks merely need to make 
sure that liquidity inflows and outflows match up over time. Or, as Keynes formulates this 
point:  
[T]here is no limit to the amount of bank money, which banks can create provided 
that they move forward in step. […] Every movement forward by an individual bank 
116 
 
weakens it, but every such step by one of its neighbour banks strengthens it; so that if 
all move forward together, no one is weakened on balance […].183 
Liquidity constraints do not obtain at the aggregate level, since money creation provides the 
banking system with the means to meet its obligations to pay. In this sense, the banking 
system as a whole has a magic tree from which to fund its portfolio. The question is what this 
means for the constraints that individual banks face. 
I will now explain that, much more so than in Keynes’ day, individual banks do have access 
to that tree through wholesale money markets. While the need for central bank settlement 
imposes a liquidity constraint on banks, the central bank also acts to ensure that individual 
banks have the funds they need. On the payment day, some banks will receive net inflows on 
their central bank deposit, others will have net outflows, resulting in a central bank overdraft. 
The central bank ensures that a bank with net cash outflows can, as a rule, borrow deposits 
through either interbank or central bank credit. 
To this end, the central bank oversees and participates in wholesale money markets. 
Wholesale money markets are markets where large financial institutions lend and borrow 
money for very short, mostly overnight, maturities.184 Wholesale money markets involve 
private contracts between financial institutions, but the central bank tightly controls prices 
and volumes traded in those markets. When private parties do not provide credit, the central 
bank intervenes by providing its own credit.  
As discussed in §4.2.3, banks can borrow deposits from the central bank, but as a rule only if 
no interbank credit is available. Instead, the central bank sets market conditions to incentivise 
banks with net inflows to lend their surplus deposits to banks with net outflows. Because 
central banks charge relatively high interest rates on their credit, banks with negative net 
inflows are incentivised to borrow deposits from banks with positive inflows. Because central 
banks pay only a very low (or even negative) interest on their deposits, banks with positive 
net inflows are incentivised to lend out deposits to banks with overdrafts. By setting the 
interest rates on central bank deposits low and interest on central bank credit somewhat 
                                                 
183 Keynes [1930] 2012, p. 23. 
184 I explain the concept of maturity in §3.1.3. 
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higher, the central bank creates price incentives for banks to lend to each other at an interest 
rate determined by the central bank.185 If interbank lending dries up, as it did after the 2007-8 
crisis, the central bank acts as a ‘lender of last resort’ to provide more credit to banks 
directly.186  
Although banks can fund their loans in wholesale markets, the extent to which they can do so 
is determined by what securities they can put up as collateral.187 Just like the central bank 
credit and repo transactions described in §4.2.3, interbank credit is today, as a rule, secured 
by collateral. To fund its portfolio in wholesale money markets, a bank needs to own 
financial assets that potential lenders deem sufficiently secure. As a rule, the amount that a 
bank will be able to borrow on any given asset is less than the market value of the asset at the 
time the loan is granted. How much less depends on the ‘haircut’ on the asset, which is the 
reduction of the market value of an asset that is pledged as collateral for the purposes of 
determining how much credit is extended against that collateral. To calculate how much any 
given bank can pledge as collateral, its assets need to be corrected for the average haircut on 
these assets.  
Collateral eligibility determines what part of their portfolio banks can fund in wholesale 
markets. If the central bank and other counterparties only accept a very narrow set of assets, 
or haircuts are high, banks are forced to place strict limits on credit. Their access to the magic 
tree is limited. By contrast, if lenders were to accept every asset as collateral and impose no 
haircuts, banks would be entirely unconstrained in their provision of credit.  
The following should give the reader a broad idea of the actual liquidity constraints that 
banks face. Banks individually decide the collateral that their counterparties need to acquire 
interbank loans and this information is not publicly available. But in the Eurozone, banks use 
their best assets to secure interbank lending and comparatively lower quality assets for central 
bank credit.188 Thus the limits on central bank credit provide a good indicator of the limits 
                                                 
185 On the history of monetary policy implementation, Bindseil 2004; 2014. 
186 Bagehot 1873; Bordo, 1990; Bindseil 2014. I explain the concept of a lender of last resort in more detail in 
§5.1.2. 
187 Chailloux et al 2008; BIS 2013; Bindseil 2014; Nyborg 2017. 
188 Nyborg 2017. 
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that banks face in acquiring interbank credit. In 2012, the total value of assets held by banks 
was €32 trillion, which banks could pledge for €5 trillion in central bank credit.189 
Accordingly, the average bank can fund less than 16% of its assets in wholesale money 
markets. If customers were to withdraw more than €5 trillion in cash, the banking system 
would not be able to pay out. The central bank would either need to expand its collateral 
requirements or banks would start to go bust.  
In normal circumstances, then, banks have ample access to the deposits they need to meet 
their payment obligations. But individual banks must still monitor their liquidity, since the 
average bank can on average only fund 15% of its assets via interbank and central bank 
credit. The extent to which individual banks face liquidity constraints depends, then, on the 
collateral requirements set by the central bank. 
4.3.3 Bank solvency constraints 
I now explain in what sense banks face solvency constraints. I argue that it is very rare for 
governments to allow a bank to go insolvent, but that banking regulation, when effectively 
implemented, serves to constrain private money creation in line with capitalist budget 
constraints. 
Tobin claims that banks are subject to solvency constraints like any other financial institution 
in that they need to make a profit to stay in business. Being able to create money does not 
allow banks to simply create their own profits. Banks issue money in the act of granting a 
loan, which, in competitive markets, is constrained by market conditions. I now explain how 
market competition and profits constrain the ability of banks to create money.  
The volume of money that banks can create depends on the costs and revenues of the 
financial products that they offer. Banks face various costs for attracting and holding 
deposits. They must process and settle payments for their customers and pay interest into 
their accounts. Banks, either individually or collectively, cannot just decide their costs of 
funding. If banks offer deposits at interest rates markedly lower than other banks or non-bank 
competitors, customers will start shifting funds away. The same holds true for their revenues. 
Banks make revenues from their assets in the form of interest payments, but lose money 
                                                 
189 Bindseil 2014, pp. 108-112. 
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when borrowers default. In competitive markets, banks cannot simply raise the prices of their 
products to make more profit, for two reasons. First, competition between banks keeps 
interest rates on similar financial products close to each other. Second, competition also 
causes profit rates for financial products to gravitate around the general rate of profit in the 
economy. If a product is particularly profitable, new competitors will move into the 
market.190 In so far as financial markets are competitive in this way, banks must weigh the 
revenues they generate from interest against the potential costs of default. If they fail to make 
a profit from their operations, financial institutions will either limit credit provision or they 
will go out of business. Market competition imposes an economic constraint on the ability of 
banks to issue money.  
Even if the volume of money that banks can create depends on costs and revenues, the 
financial crisis made it clear that governments are reluctant to let banks go bankrupt. Due to 
their critical role in the payment system, banks comprise a crucial part of the economic 
infrastructure. For this reason, governments rarely allow banks to go bankrupt, which 
suggests that in practice banks face no solvency constraint. 
Yet, even if banks are unlikely to default, it does not follow that they face no solvency 
constraints. Although the large banks do not run a high risk of bankruptcy, they do face what 
I will call ‘pseudo-solvency constraints’ due to their regulatory framework. These constraints 
are not enforced through bankruptcy procedures, but they are similar to solvency constraints, 
since they are designed to ensure that banks’ assets are worth more than their liabilities.  
The most traditional form of pseudo-solvency constraint is a required level of bank capital. 
The bank capital ratio is the percentage of funding that comes from the beneficiary owners of 
the bank (‘bank equity’). If the bank makes losses, its beneficiary owners lose their capital 
before the bank becomes insolvent. The Basel III regulation extends capital requirements to 
include the wider concept of Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC).191 As part of TLAC, 
for example, banks now fund part of their portfolios with convertible bonds (‘CoCos’), which 
are bonds that regulators can turn into bank capital. While TLAC involves more than just a 
                                                 
190 Shaikh 2016.  
191 BIS 2011; 2016. 
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bank capital ratio, its aim is similar in that it requires banks to meet certain solvency 
constraints.  
The systemic importance of banks in a capitalist economy, then, not only affects the liquidity 
constraints that they face, but also their solvency constraints. Even if these constraints are not 
as hard as those faced by other firms, they are evidently present. Just as the central bank 
imposes liquidity constraints on banks through its collateral framework, the regulatory 
framework set by governments imposes solvency constraints on banks.  
Because central bank deposits and bank capital are costly, banks have an incentive to go to 
the limits of their budget constraints, and sometimes beyond. To this end, new financial 
products and other ways of skirting regulations are invented. It is, therefore, far from obvious 
that the state is always able to adequately impose budget constraints. Rather, a banking 
system that is subject to budget constraints is a normative ideal that political institutions may 
realise to different degrees. The status of these constraints is that of a constitutional 
convention rather than being a strict legal rule.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the monetary constitution of existing capitalist societies is a 
hybrid of public and private authority over the money supply. In the ideal-typical form 
outlined in this chapter, the hybrid constitution has five defining features: As a monetary 
constitution for a capitalist economy, (i) economic contracts involve an obligation to pay 
money and (ii) financial plans are subject to liquidity and solvency constraints. The hybrid 
monetary constitution is distinct from free banking, since (iii) obligations to pay should be 
settled with a public settlement asset, thereby creating a hierarchy of money. The hybrid 
monetary constitution does assign a crucial role to private authority over money in that (iv) 
most money is created by private banks, (v) which the state seeks to subject to budget 
constraints.  
Neither a purely private nor a purely public monetary constitution would have an institution 
quite like a central bank. The central bank is the state as it is involved in the provision of a 




5 Financial instability 
Before the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008, economists referred to their times as 
that of a ‘Great Moderation’, believing that the economy had entered a new era of financial 
and macroeconomic stability.192 Private financial institutions issued new financial assets in 
the context of increasingly loose regulation. In the words of one central banker, ‘everything 
was simple, tidy and cosy’, but, as he ominously continues, today ‘many certainties have 
gone’.193 The 2007-8 Crisis transformed thinking about financial markets. In the ensuing 
decade, banking regulation saw its most substantial tightening since the 1946 Bretton Woods 
Agreement.  
Effective reform requires an adequate diagnosis of the problem. In §3 I introduced a first 
objection to unregulated private money creation, which is that it privileges the wealthy. 
Banking reform has done little to address this problem. In this chapter, I turn to the objection 
that has been driving banking reform instead, which is that private money creation 
destabilises the financial system. I discuss how private money creation leads to financial 
instability and develop a new account of why it is objectionable from the perspective of 
distributive justice.  
That financial instability is objectionable does not follow from the liberal egalitarian 
conception of justice. The liberal egalitarian leaves it to individuals to develop life plans 
assuming institutions as given. When taking out a mortgage for a house, a loan for a business 
venture or even by putting money in a bank, citizens make their life plans vulnerable to new 
threats. They may fail to repay their mortgages, thereby losing their homes. They might fail 
in their business ventures, thereby losing their firms. Even the bank could fail or 
cybercriminals run off with their deposit. Liberal egalitarians allow individual to take risks in 
the face of an uncertain future and reap the benefits, as well as suffer the consequence if 
things go wrong. In a capitalist society, such incentives also have a crucial role in realising 
efficient economic outcomes. Why, then, should capitalist societies treat the risks that 
materialise in a crisis as an issue of justice?  
                                                 
192 Stock & Watson 2002. 
193 Borio 2014, p. 191. 
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This chapter answers that question by outlining two objections. First, financial instability 
interferes with the ability of political institutions to realise a fair distribution of income, 
options for credit and options for saving. Second, financial instability compromises the 
epistemic positions from which individuals make their life plans. Although individuals are 
responsible for using the information that is available in making their life plans, just 
institutions should secure fair epistemic positions for each individual.  
While the first objection is formulated by restating ideas that I have outlined in §§2 and 3, the 
second objection makes an independent contribution to my aim of theorising justice in a 
capitalist society. In thinking about the role of assumptions in life planning, I address a long-
standing gap in theories that rely on resources, primary goods or other objective metrics in 
comparing distributive shares.194 Such theories focus on the means that are available to 
individuals in making their life plans rather than the extent to which life plans can be pursued 
successfully. These metrics thereby omits any consideration of the epistemic conditions of 
life planning. Although Rawls recognises the issue, he addresses it in terms of legitimate 
expectations, which are expectations regarding rules that govern the basic structure. For 
Rawls, ‘there is no prior and independent idea of what we may legitimately expect, or of what 
we are entitled to, that the basic structure is designed to fulfil.’195 But, as I explain here, this 
fails to consider distributive issues concerning the quality of expectations that individuals 
should be able to form in the context of the rules that govern the basic structure.196 Luck 
egalitarians address the issue by distinguishing risk that individuals voluntarily choose to take 
from those that are involuntary.197 I will argue in this chapter that such an approach is 
incompatible with the pervasive uncertainty that characterizes existing capitalist societies. 
Relying on capitalist coordination for an economy, specifically where it concerns financial 
contracts, raises distributive issues that any adequate theory must address. I show that private 
monetary authority comes with benefits for some but can also undermine the epistemic 
                                                 
194 I discuss this gap and the solution I propose here in more detail in my ‘Objective metrics and frustrated 
expectations’ (unpublished manuscript). 
195 Rawls 2001, p. 72. 
196 Buchanan 1974; Brown 2011; 2012 put forward an account of legitimate expectations that focuses on 
expectations raised by government policies. Expectations in capitalist economies are often not of this sort.  
197 Dworkin 1981b. 
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positions of others. A consideration of epistemic positions should therefore at least in some 
cases inform what distributions are just. A financial system that is prone to financial stability 
is one such case. 
The chapter is structured as follows: In §5.1 I describe financial instability as a cyclical 
pattern of credit-driven booms and busts. Growing debt levels lead to a financial market 
panic, which the economy needs years to recover from. I also explain the features of a hybrid 
monetary constitution that contribute to financial instability.  
In §5.2 I discuss the views of Anderson, who draws on Friedrich Hayek, and Aaron James. I 
show that these authors all fail to find the right balance between the private and the public 
sphere.  
In §5.3 I draw on the discussion of distributive justice in the first three chapters to outline my 
account of why a liberal egalitarian should object to financial instability.  
5.1 Hybridity and instability 
Without strict regulation, the hybrid monetary constitution is geared towards excessive levels 
of debt and thereby to crises. Particularly grim examples of this tendency are the Global 
Financial Crisis of 2007-8 as well as the resulting Eurozone Crisis of 2010-12. These events 
unfolded according to a pattern that had repeatedly been observed and was well understood 
long before 2007. 
I will first outline how a banking system determines the level of credit available in the 
economy (§5.1.1). I draw on the work of Charles Kindleberger and Hyman Minsky to discuss 
the dynamics of a banking crisis (§5.1.2).  
5.1.1 Bank credit 
The hybrid monetary constitution provides banks with a constant source of funding for the 
provision of credit. The deposits created in the act of lending provide the banking system 
with its own source of funding. Banks lose deposits when their customers spend money, but 
they also attract deposits when customers make payments. If more money goes out than 
comes in, banks can fund their loans in wholesale money markets provided they can put up 
sufficient collateral.  
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Banks decide what loans to grant based on what they expect to be profitable. As I explained 
in §4.3, banks fund themselves by holding the deposits of customers. They raise revenues 
from loans in the form of interest payments, but lose money when debtors default. Credit 
provision is only profitable for a bank if it generates more revenues than the cost of its 
operations and the interest it pays on funding. A bank that systematically loses money will 
start to come up against its (pseudo-)solvency constraints: Regulation will force the bank to 
raise more capital or go out of business. Credit provision is therefore fundamentally 
constrained by perceived profitability. 
The volume of credit is not just in the hands of banks, however. It also depends on the 
willingness of bank customers to take out loans. Taking out a loan extends the financial plans 
that are available to individuals and firms, but also entails risks. For individuals, the choice to 
take out credit will be based primarily on their expected future income and the life plans 
which they pursue in light of their conception of the good. For firms, the choice to take out 
credit will be based primarily on what investments they consider profitable. After taking out a 
loan, an economic agent must service their debt by making interest payments and repaying 
the sum lent (‘principal’) when it matures. An agent’s failure to meet liabilities will result in 
an insolvency procedure.  
A capitalist economy gives individuals and firms extensive discretion over how to manage 
their debt levels. Hyman Minsky distinguishes different income-debt ratios for economic 
agents.198 Hedge-financed agents can fulfil all their liabilities through the cash flow that their 
operations generate. Speculative-financed agents can pay the daily costs of operation and 
interest payments from their cash flow, but not the principal of their debts. When the 
principal of the debt is due, they need to renew the debt with the creditor (i.e. roll over the 
debt). Ponzi-financed agents can pay neither their daily costs nor the principal. Such agents 
need to sell assets or borrow more money to meet their liabilities.  
Before entering into a financial contract, the borrower needs to decide what risks they are 
willing to take and the bank needs to assess risks and set interest rates accordingly. Creditors 
and debtors will disagree over what level of debt is sustainable. There are no clear rules for 
determining whether an economic agent can repay its debts in the future. An innovative small 
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firm can run for years on a negative cash flow, constantly needing to attract new equity 
before it can begin to make profits. By contrast, mortgages for the full value of a house can 
still place individuals at high financial risk. In the face of the overwhelming complexity of a 
capitalist economy, it is difficult to determine the future income of economic agents. The 
result is that neither the borrower nor the creditor knows what level of debt is sustainable.  
As I explained in §§3 and 4, the profit-motive incentivizes individual banks to get risk 
assessment right.199 If default risk is perceived to be high, interest rates go up and banks 
contract credit. If the risk of default is perceived to be low, more credit is extended and 
competition between banks serves to drive down interest rates. In theory, then, capitalist 
competition incentivizes banks to provide credit to economic agents in line with their budget 
constraints.200  
5.1.2 Manias, panics, and crashes 
Here I outline an account of financial instability, drawing on the work of Kindleberger and 
Minsky.201 Left to its own dynamics, unregulated private money creation drives the economy 
from a mania of growing debt levels to a financial market panic and then ultimately to a crash 
in which all seek to pay down their debts. 
Credit cycles result in part from the crucial role of expectations in a capitalist society. 
Because the coordination of the economy is left to countless private decisions, developments 
in a capitalist economy become impossible to predict. Economic agents have limited 
information concerning their future. Individuals are unable to know all possible outcomes of 
their actions and, even if they do, make a good estimate of how likely these outcomes are.202 
Their income of economic agents is also closely interdependent. Given these circumstances, 
the level of optimism about the future in a capitalist society is a driving force behind the level 
of economic activity. Optimism influences both the future plans that appear feasible to agents 
and the revenues they receive in pursuing these plans. Due to pervasive uncertainty, 
expectations are highly unstable and subject to sudden shifts when economic circumstances 
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change. The hybrid monetary constitution enforces these tendencies through cyclical changes 
to the level of credit provision. 
Hyman Minsky proposes an account of the dynamic properties of a capitalist economy which 
is dependent on private credit provision. In such an economy, expectations are a crucial 
driver of the decision to borrow and lend. If the economic outlook is good, economic agents 
will be more willing to borrow and financial institutions will be more willing to lend. If the 
outlook turns sour, credit becomes scarce and economic agents try to pay down their debts.  
Minsky’s claim is that periods of stability, in which credit provision picks up, cause periods 
of economic depression in which credit is contracted. During periods of stability, economic 
agents take on more debt because both they and banks perceive higher debt levels to be 
sustainable. As debt increases, instability builds. For increasing numbers of firms and 
individuals, revenues will be insufficient to meet outstanding liabilities if economic 
circumstances deteriorate. During a Minsky moment, a panic crashes the economy, thereby 
uprooting economic activity far beyond the banking system. This leads to a longer period of 
credit contraction that lasts until the credit cycle starts anew. 
Charles Kindleberger draws on Minsky’s ideas to show that, going back to the 17th-century 
Dutch Tulpenmanie (tulip mania) at least, unconstrained private credit has driven economies 
through manias, panics, and crashes. I will now describe these three phases in more detail. 
The credit cycle starts with a mania. A period of high economic growth and generally 
favourable economic circumstances precedes the crisis. The conditions create an optimistic 
atmosphere, which has two immediate consequences. First, the increased profitability of 
investments leads households and firms to take out more credit. Second, financial institutions 
become more optimistic about the creditworthiness of their customers. Risk-assessment 
becomes less thorough.203 More credit means increased consumption and investment, which 
increases the level of economic activity. Increased economic output, in turn, enforces 
optimism about future revenues and so more credit is provided. The mania picks up speed 
when a positive economic outlook leads firms to invest and hire more workers, and 
individuals take out more debt.  
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The banking system plays a central role in the development of a crisis, since the general 
optimistic atmosphere greatly expands credit provision.204 Most importantly, more credit is 
issued using existing forms of money. For private households, by far the largest source of 
credit comes from mortgages.205 In the run-up to the 2007-8 Crisis, for instance, houses and 
mortgages were seen as safe and profitable investments. Due to permissive central bank 
credit and capital requirements on mortgage portfolios, the banking system faced almost no 
liquidity or solvency constraints on its ability to issue mortgages. But when individual 
consumers are able to borrow more money, they can pay more for houses, thereby driving up 
prices. In the period between 1997 and 2006, house prices increased by 125% in the US, 
175% in Spain and 260% in Ireland.206  
A second way in which the banking system spurs on the mania is that new, riskier forms of 
money and money-like financial instruments appear.207 As I discussed in §4, the pre-2008 
financial system saw the rapid expansion of a shadow banking sector.208 Outside the narrow 
circle of commercial banks with direct access to central bank credit, financial institutions 
offered various forms of purely private money such as private repos and shares in money 
market funds backed by private bills and other assets.209 The mania encourages economic 
agents to hold forms of money lower in the hierarchy.  
Market competition puts pressure on individual financial institutions to take more risks. If the 
bank perceives risks to be too high, it will lose market share to competitors, while a bank that 
takes more risks can expand its market share. In the optimistic atmosphere of the mania, 
individual banks face market pressure to expand their credit provision. 
Crucially, expectations do not adjust gradually, but do so in a sudden and difficult-to-control 
process. When this happens, the ‘Minsky moment’, the mania turns into panic. In the run-up 
to a panic, banks and other financial institutions slowly become more pessimistic. Suddenly, 
a single high-profile event, such as the Lehman Brother bankruptcy in October 2008 or the 
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revelation of the Greek deficit in 2009, makes financial institutions much less willing to hold 
certain forms of debt. Because all try to sell their assets at the same time, a self-enforcing 
dynamic is set into motion. Sell-offs lead to lower asset prices, which in turn forces financial 
institutions to sell more assets. As a result, banks are no longer willing to lend to each other 
in wholesale markets. 
The banking crisis infects the wider economy. Financial institutions review their loans and 
some firms, particularly those with speculative or Ponzi finance structures, go bankrupt. 
Economic agents seek to deleverage and shift their asset portfolios from risky long-term 
investment to more safe and liquid assets. As everyone tries to offload debt and move to safe, 
publicly guaranteed forms of money, the financial system enters a self-enforcing downward 
spiral.  
The government and the central bank intervene to offset the worst impacts of a banking crisis. 
From the nineteenth century, central banks have intervened in financial markets as lenders of 
last resort to offset a panic.210 While private financial institutions sell their assets and cut off 
credit, the central bank steps in to provide credit in exchange for collateral that would be 
considered safe in normal circumstances. In this way, the central bank uses its position in the 
hierarchy of money to loosen liquidity constraints. Governments loosen solvency constraints 
through bank bailouts and other forms of direct financial support.  
Developments in the banking system, then, have a decisive role in enforcing the positive 
impact of a boom and spurring on the mania, as well as the panic and depression that result. 
While financial crises are possible in any capitalist economy, private money creation 
contributes significantly to unsustainable debt levels and to the violent collapse of financial 
activity during the panic.  
5.2 Market risk 
In the context of a capitalist basic structure, it is up to individuals to reflect on risks and make 
their own choices about which risks to take. Financial instability is just one of the many risks 
that individuals face in making life plans. Why, then, should the effects of financial 
instability, particularly those that result from voluntary choices, be singled out? To decide 
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when the effects of financial instability are unfair, a theory of distributive justice must decide 
where private authority in financial markets should end and where public authority should 
start. I show that existing accounts draw the line in the wrong place.  
I review three broadly liberal egalitarian accounts of financial instability. In §5.2.1 I discuss 
the works of Hayek and Anderson, who argue for an almost unconstrained role of personal 
responsibility in financial markets. I argue that their focus on legal consent and on income 
and wealth ignores crucial institutional conditions of life planning in a capitalist society. In 
§5.2.2 I discuss the ideas of James, who likens financial instability to a dangerous bio-agent. I 
argue that his account fails to adequately address the role of life choices in the financial risks 
that individuals face. 
5.2.1 Laissez-faire 
Hayek and Anderson argue that political institutions have no responsibility to ensure that 
financial markets create fair outcomes for individuals. Rather, a capitalist economy is one 
that incentivizes individuals to take risks in the face of an uncertain future. For private risk-
taking to realise efficient outcomes, individuals must bear the consequences of the risks they 
take. I will now explain in what sense their views are liberal egalitarian and how this leads 
them to argue against regulation of financial markets.  
Both authors present their accounts as broadly liberal egalitarian. Even if Hayek polemicizes 
against what he refers to as the ‘mirage of social justice’, he does not take his objections to 
apply to the Rawlsian conception.211 In fact, Hayek praised A Theory of Justice, as he 
understood it, claiming that  
the differences between us seemed more verbal than substantial. Though the first 
impression of readers may be different, Rawls' statement which I quote later in this 
volume (p. 100) seems to me to show that we agree on what is to me the essential 
point. Indeed, as I indicate in a note to that passage, it appears to me that Rawls has 
been widely misunderstood on this central issue. 212 
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This essential point, outlined in the passage that Hayek refers to, is the idea of imperfect 
procedural justice. As I explained in §1, liberal egalitarians demand that institutions treat 
individuals as equals. But as liberals, they also leave it to individuals to make their own plans 
assuming these institutions as given. Institutions ensure fair procedures and a fair distribution 
of outcomes, thereby realising imperfect procedural justice.213 
Hayek argues that political institutions should assign a particularly large role to private 
authority as this is crucial for realising an efficient coordination of exchange and production. 
Hayek is particularly sceptical that any moralized notion of voluntary choice can have a 
prominent role in evaluating the outcomes of the market process.214 As explained in §2, 
capitalist coordination allows individuals to take risks in the face of an uncertain future and 
reap the benefits, as well as suffer the consequences if things go wrong.215 It is thereby meant 
to incentivize economic agents to correctly anticipate the future. For a capitalist economy to 
prevent individuals from taking risks is to undermine its own functioning.  
Hayek has a strikingly optimistic view of capitalist financial markets. This becomes clear 
when we turn to his proposal for a purely private monetary constitution.216 For Hayek, the 
central bank as the issuer of the settlement asset should be replaced by a larger number of 
competing private financial institutions. The currencies that they issue are to be bought and 
sold in money markets. Just like a central bank that has an exchange rate target, financial 
institutions would need to make a credible commitment to the value of their currency 
expressed in other currencies and to its purchasing power. It is left to individual customers to 
weigh the risks of different banks and thereby force providers of credit and savings to use 
their best judgment in weighing risks and rewards. This entirely private financial system, so 
Hayek claims, will incentivize prudent risk-taking and efficient outcomes. 
In December 2007, just as the financial crisis picks up steam, Anderson draws on the work of 
Hayek to extend her relational account of liberal egalitarianism to financial markets.217 She 
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restates Hayek’s worries about efficiency. She also adds two further objections to financial 
regulation. First, she invokes a consideration of liberal neutrality. Questions of personal 
responsibility have a role to play in criminal law, she argues, but are entirely out of place 
where distributive justice is concerned. Liberal freedom, she argues, requires allowing 
individuals to make their life plans based on what they perceive to be acceptable risks. What 
risks individuals want to take should be treated as part of their respective conceptions of the 
good. She also argues that to interfere in the choices that individuals make would be 
paternalistic. The state should not pass judgment on whether individual choices are 
sufficiently prudent. For better or worse, it should be up to individuals to make mistakes. 
We share an interest in letting people act on their own judgments of how to use their 
knowledge and what risks to take. We do not share an interest in having individuals 
make market choices according to social judgments of the most prudent choice that 
can be reasonably expected of them. […] Any attempt to set standards of deserving 
conduct for different individuals or groups would […] attract moralizing busybodies 
to whatever agency was empowered to set such standards.218 
As already discussed in §1.1.3, Anderson invokes financial instability as a welcome means of 
redistribution.219 As she argues: 
While the most advantaged may find it distressing to be subject to market risks that 
threaten to reduce them to merely middling status, there is no public interest in 
securing them against such risks.220 
For Anderson, justice requires an appropriate minimum level of income and wealth, a 
maximum at the top, and measures to ensure that most individuals tend to be somewhere in 
the middle.221 Political institutions should not intervene in financial markets if income and 
wealth stay within these bounds. Political institutions should therefore only seek to prevent 
financial instability where this would help to ensure that these outcome constraints are met. 
But, it is difficult to see that regulating financial instability can be justified in this way. 
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Financial markets determine what individuals can do with their levels of income and wealth, 
but it is entirely possible to realise a preferred allocation of income and wealth without 
securing financial stability.  
Anderson and Hayek are correct when they argue that a capitalist economy cannot ensure that 
individual outcomes are based on moral desert. As I explained in §2.1, the ability of political 
institutions to ensure that outcomes of capitalist coordination are fair is limited. A capitalist 
economy leaves coordination of the economy to private authority. As a consequence, political 
institutions often cannot effectively control outcomes or even know everything that happens 
in the economy. Different individuals can do exactly the same thing, but one person might 
lose out while another benefits. This may be unfair from a moral perspective, but it does not 
necessarily make the outcomes unjust. Recognizing these limitations, the liberal egalitarian 
focus on institutions constrains public involvement in financial markets. It is up to individuals 
to make their life plans within the context of the rules that govern the private sphere.222 
Still, Anderson and Hayek condone a harsh treatment of individuals in financial markets. For 
them, there is no objection of justice to a financial system that routinely wipes out the 
pension savings of the well-to-do. Those with middle-class incomes have no claims to 
protection unless they drop into poverty. Anderson and Hayek’s considerations of economic 
justice, then, most prominently concern very low-wealth individuals, but their claims are 
more or less independent of conditions in financial markets.  
Does this rejection of financial market regulation follow from the liberal egalitarian 
conception of justice? Not really. The liberal egalitarian recognizes a crucial role for demands 
of distributive justice in realising both fair outcomes and fair procedures. It is an open 
question how strict these demands should be. Whether the liberal egalitarian should endorse 
regulation of financial markets depends on the specifics of their principles of justice. Hayek 
and Anderson assign no role to financial markets, because they think about outcomes 
narrowly in terms of income and wealth. They also do not recognize any role for fair 
procedures in generating outcomes beyond a legal notion of consent. Their specific view 




precludes them from finding any objection to credit cycles, but such complacency does not 
follow from a foundational commitment to freedom and equality.  
For a liberal egalitarian, the crucial question is whether financial institutions succeed in 
treating individuals as equals with regard to their ability to pursue a particular conception of 
the good. But life planning in a capitalist society generally involves more than Anderson and 
Hayek suppose, as §§2 and 3 have already shown. First, to pursue their conception of the 
good, individuals should not just be able to buy individual goods and services, they should 
also be able to make life plans in which revenues and expenditures line up in the right way 
over time. This requires making life plans and having the information to do so. The fairness 
of institutions should be evaluated taking this dimension into account. Second, the success of 
life plans depends on the quality of options for credit and saving that are available to 
individuals. In focusing on income and wealth, Anderson and Hayek fail to consider the issue 
of intertemporal fairness. Treating individuals as equals requires taking the institutional 
conditions of life planning seriously. 
In §5.3 I will show that taking these dimensions into account allows us to see what is 
objectionable about financial instability. This will complete my argument for the claim that 
Anderson and Hayek have a much too narrow conception of the role of political institutions 
in financial markets.  
5.2.2 Biohazards 
James compares unregulated financial markets to a new, powerful but highly dangerous bio-
agent. 223 In good times, the bio-agent contributes to economic prosperity, but from time to 
time it breaks loose. When this happens, the bio-agent makes large parts of the population 
unemployed, it raises public debt, and the government reduces its expenditures, in some cases 
leading to a decade of lost economic growth. Its contagious effects reach across borders. 
While for decades the bio-agent was under control, deregulation has led to increased use and 
thereby increasingly common outbreaks. James concludes, I think correctly, that there would 
be good reasons to ban the new bio-agent.  
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James is right to claim that unregulated financial markets are in at least some ways similar to 
a dangerous bio-agent. Consider the following overview of the direct and indirect social costs 
of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008. The direct costs are those of the panic itself. 
The costs of the bailouts are subject to considerable debate.224 Between October 2008 and 
October 2012, EU member states provided a total of €1.6 trillion (12.8% of annual GDP) in 
state aid to the European banking sector.225 But, on reflection, the bailouts did not cost €1.6 
trillion. The largest part of the costs went to state guarantees (€ 1.1 trillion), which were 
either spent on valuable financial assets or used for offering guarantees that went unused.226 
Even if the costs for countries like Ireland (25% of GDP) and Greece (14% of GDP) were 
dramatic, recent estimates put the average cost of financial assistance measures in the EU at 
4.8% and 5.1% of annual GDP.227 In the US, aid to the banking sector as part of the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program of $700 billion is now estimated to be as low as $34.5 billion (or, 
0.2% of GDP).228  
The direct costs of the 2007-8 Crisis were high and their distribution was particularly unfair. 
Governments were forced to act as they did because of the systemic consequences of the 
crisis. The shareholders and managements of the institutions that received support had 
benefited most from risks taken in the run-up to the crisis but walked away from the costs. 
This goes against the liberal demand that risks are born by those who take them. It is 
obviously unfair when this principle does not apply to some of the most lucrative firms in the 
capitalist private sphere. 
The most sizable costs of a banking crisis, though, are not those of the panic, but of the 
resulting depression. Just as the increase of credit leads to an expansion of employment and 
output, the contraction of credit leads to a long and deep contraction of economic activity. 
Economic agents become pessimistic about the expected revenues from economic activities. 
Financial institutions are less willing to provide credit. Firms have difficulty rolling over 
existing financial obligations, leading them to lower investments and fire employees, and 
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firms that would have been fine otherwise go out of business. House prices may drop to 
levels far below the original purchasing price. As a consequence, households need to 
substantially lower their expenditures on consumption, thereby further depressing economic 
activity. For these reasons, recessions after a banking crisis are longer and more severe than 
recessions that are not triggered by a banking crisis. These recessions last an average of five 
years as opposed to two without a banking crisis, causing much more severe damage to the 
economy.229 Ten years after the panic, GDP remains fifteen percent below its previous 
trend.230 In the first four years post-panic, employment drops dramatically and can take a 
decade to recover.231 In the three years after a banking crisis, government debt rises on 
average by 86%, mostly caused by the fiscal costs of the recession.232  
Drawing on the bio-agent analogy, James argues for prohibiting international financial flows 
and returning to the strict regulation of the 1950s and 60s. By making regulation sufficiently 
tight, political institutions should ensure financial stability and thereby prevent the huge costs 
of financial crises. James’ argument articulates an intuitive response to the phenomenon of 
financial crises. The costs are so severe that a society that regularly exposes itself to them 
must be doing something wrong. The simplicity of his account raises the question whether we 
really need yet another account of financial instability. 
The reason why I think we do is that James’ account does not tell us very much about what 
reforms are needed. He points to the Bretton Woods system of the 1950s and 60s as a 
blueprint but this is not a model that we can simply copy today. The system emerged in 
specific historical circumstances, at a time when gold was still the basis of the monetary 
system. It is also unclear whether its design could ever be made sufficiently robust. Indeed, it 
was subject to constant erosion from regulatory arbitrage.233 But even if Bretton Woods 
worked in the 1960s, the world economy, in particular the financial system, has changed 
dramatically since. Then, a small elite ran the banking sector and provided business credit to 
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a small circle of acquaintances, friends, and often, family members.234 Today, large universal 
banks span the globe and the focus of their business model is the provision of mortgages.235 
To determine what reforms are needed, a liberal egalitarian needs to say more about the 
proper relationship between the public and the private spheres. In making their economic 
decisions, individuals make choices that expose them to risks, such as house prices going 
down, but also to benefits, such as when house prices go up. Whether individuals are 
vulnerable to financial instability depends crucially on their choices. Working as a civil 
servant with a long-term contract and saving money in the bank will make life plans more or 
less robust to financial circumstances. If the life plans of individuals are vulnerable to 
financial instability, this is at least in part due to their own choices. James’ account does not 
come with a normative account of the relation between private and public authority. Nor does 
it have anything to say about the role of life choices in the financial risk that individuals face. 
In deciding what financial contracts individuals are allowed access to, there are distributive 
choices to be made. Faced with the risks of financial instability, political institutions can 
either prevent individuals from entering into contracts, offset losses when these materialise, 
or decide to expose individuals to the risks they take. Following Hayek, opponents of 
regulation have argued that reform should aim to levy the costs of financial instability 
directly on those who voluntarily expose themselves to such risks. This is meant to 
incentivize economic agents to do better in deciding where to invest, thereby preventing 
future crises. There is a wide range of reforms that would reduce financial instability, but 
which to choose depends on what outcomes are fair to individuals. I now turn to outlining an 
account of financial instability that can meet these demands.  
5.3 Fair risk 
In this section I propose a new account of financial instability that focuses on its impact on 
individual life planning. I argue that financial instability is objectionable for two reasons. 
First, it hinders the ability of political institutions to realise a fair distribution of income, 
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credit, and savings. Second, financial instability undermines the epistemic position of 
individuals in making life plans. 
In §5.3.1 I explain in what sense financial instability undermines a fair distribution of 
income, credit, and savings. I then turn to the role of voluntary choice in life plans. In §5.3.2 I 
introduce the concept of an optimal life plan and show that whether or not individuals can 
adequately plan their lives is crucially determined by the design of institutions. In §5.3.3 I 
argue for treating epistemic positions as a matter of distributive justice. In §5.3.4 I explain 
why financial instability is objectionable in terms of its impact on the epistemic position of 
individuals. I end by contrasting my account with a luck egalitarian account put forward by 
John Linarelli.  
5.3.1 Financial instability and a fair distribution 
Financial instability has a wide range of consequences for individuals. To decide when such 
consequences raise an issue of distributive justice, consider again how Rawls understands the 
relation between private and public authority. In his account, the role of political institutions 
ends when the major social and political institutions meet demands of distributive justice. In 
this sense, the demands of justice determine a ‘social division of responsibility’.236 As Rawls 
formulates this idea,  
society, the citizens as a collective body, accepts the responsibility for maintaining the 
equal basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair share of 
the other primary goods for everyone within this framework, while citizens (as 
individuals) and associations accept the responsibility for revising and adjusting their 
ends and aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect, given their 
present and foreseeable situation.237 
Collective responsibility entails organising the private sphere so that procedures and 
outcomes are fair. The question we should ask is whether a financial system which is prone to 
financial instability meets these standards.  
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In this section I will focus on outcomes. The distributive effects of financial instability are 
often mediated by the design of various political and social institutions. It may therefore not 
always be clear that preventing financial instability is the best way to realise fair outcomes. In 
some cases, as Anderson is right to stress, losses in financial markets can contribute to 
realising a more equal distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, there are good reasons against 
complacency concerning financial instability. The panic and the crash that follows it 
undermine a fair distribution of income, credit, and savings. 
First, concerning income. Even if political institutions have policy tools to offset unfair 
distributive outcomes, their ability to do so is limited. Because banking crises have a wide 
range of distributive effects, political institutions will not be able to offset all. Second, a 
banking crisis impacts the lives of some citizens more deeply than the lives of others. While 
households and firms try to pay down debt, demand in the economy is low, the effects of 
which are different between sectors.238 Third, a banking crisis can force governments to 
reduce expenditures or, at least, create the political circumstances for enacting such 
policies.239 Financial instability thereby undermines the ability of political institutions to 
secure just outcomes. The effects of cutbacks tend to fall disproportionately on those who are 
dependent on public provision of education, healthcare and other public services. These 
consequences are not in any obvious way related to prior choices of individuals. In fact, those 
who are vulnerable are often far removed from the financial sector where the crisis originates. 
The impact of banking crises in advanced economies is not limited to national borders, but 
also affects trading partners including those in developing countries.240  
Second, options for credit and savings, which, as I have argued in §3, are a constitutive part of 
any fair distribution of money. It is unavoidable that financial instability impacts options for 
savings and credit. In a capitalist economy, money tends to flow towards the top of the wealth 
distribution and banking crises exacerbate these tendencies. First, the effects of a banking crisis 
on real estate prices impact those with middle incomes, who often keep an important part of 
their savings in real estate. Consider again the unlucky John who has paid down 15% of his 
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mortgage of £200,000 on a house worth £200,000.241 If the recession now reduces the value of 
his house by 15%, all his savings will be wiped out. Stocks and bonds, which are mostly owned 
by high-wealth individuals, recover relatively quickly. A banking crisis also leads to a reduced 
availability of options for credit. This contraction again disproportionately affects those with 
low income and limited collateral.242  
Financial instability also strikes at those who are quite well-off. It is these effects that Anderson 
describes as contributing to rather than undermining justice. But such a perspective fails to 
articulate a sense in which even the rich will have reason to complain when they lose money 
through unforeseeable systemic events. An egalitarian should not simply disregard such 
objections. Even if the redistributions thereby enacted are valued for contributing to a more 
equal distribution of economic means, an adequate understanding of the moral issues requires 
recognizing that redistribution through financial crises is less fair than redistribution through a 
well-functioning tax system. Articulating the issues at stake requires consideration of how 
distributive outcomes come about. This is the topic to which I now turn. 
5.3.2 Subjective and objective life plans 
Financial instability undermines the epistemic position from which individuals make their life 
plans. To explain the idea of an epistemic position, I will now extend the conception of a 
rational life plan that I introduced in §3. 
Liberal egalitarians hold that it is up to individuals to make their life plans while taking 
institutions as given. In §3.1.1 I briefly touched on the concept of a subjectively rational life 
plan, which is the plan that does best in realising an individual’s conception of the good with 
the information that they have access to and their cognitive limitations in using that 
information. Subjectively rational life plans determine what individuals can reasonably be 
expected to achieve given societal institutions as they are. An objectively rational life plan, in 
contrast, is the plan that an individual would decide on under conditions of perfect 
information and in the absence of cognitive limitations. As Rawls, following Sidgwick, 
formulates this idea:  





It is the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which 
the agent reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry 
out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his 
more fundamental desires.243 
The objectively rational life plan is not a perfect life plan. A perfect life plan would not just 
involve knowing all the risks one faces before pursuing the plan (ex-ante). It would also 
involve knowing which risks will materialise (ex-post). The notion of an objectively rational 
life plan should be understood in terms of ex-ante risks. A job in the flower industry will be 
less risky than being an entrepreneur. If, ex-post, either life plan fails, it can still have been 
objectively rational to take that risk.  
But even the Olympian standard of objective rationality is very difficult for anyone to meet. 
Therefore, I will focus on what I refer to as an optimal life plan. If particular plans 
approximate the ideal of objective rationality sufficiently, there will be no relevant difference 
between the subjectively and the objectively rational life plan. This is the case when the 
constitutive assumptions in a subjectively rational life plan are objectively rational.  
To explain how a subjectively rational life plan can be optimal without being objectively 
rational, I will now introduce the idea of a constitutive assumption. Constitutive assumptions 
are expectations underlying a life plan such that if they turn out to be false, an individual 
perceives a life plan as having failed. Consider Lydia and her plan to open a coffee bar. She 
may have expectations regarding the type of coffee she will sell, the colour of the interior of 
her shop or even her take-home pay. If these expectations are not entirely met, she can still 
feel that her plan of opening a coffee bar is successful. But, other expectations, such as the 
minimum level of monthly revenues she will generate, are constitutive of her life plan. If her 
monthly revenues are much lower than she expects, her bar will go out of business. Taking 
that risk is up to her in making a subjectively rational life plan, but she cannot entirely control 
whether her life plan is optimal. If, given available information and her epistemic limitations 
in thinking about monthly revenues, Lydia would still have taken that risk, then her life plan 
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is optimal. An optimal life plan is a subjectively rational life plan whose constitutive 
assumptions are objectively rational. 
The idea of an optimal life plan is formulated at a high level of abstraction, but I believe it is 
also intuitive. The reader will be able to think of their own examples of plans they would not 
have made had they been given better information or had better skills to process available 
information. If these mistakes result directly from faulty institutional choices, this raises 
issues of distributive justice, or so I will now argue. 
5.3.3 Epistemic positions and distribution 
Epistemic positions should be thought of as a crucial component of fair procedures for two 
reasons.  
The first reason is that an individual’s epistemic position is to some extent involuntary. The 
subjectively rational life plan is a result of the information that individuals have access to and 
their cognitive abilities to process that information. Individuals can to some extent influence 
both. They can seek to ensure that they have enough information. They can also train 
themselves to be better at using that information. Where individuals can indeed be expected 
to do so, the consequences of choices are a matter of personal responsibility. But, once 
individuals have done all that can be expected, their life plans may still be far from optimal. 
In this case, their subjectively rational life plan is not optimal in that they would have made 
better plans given a different set of social and political institutions. 
The second reason to include consideration of epistemic positions is an analogy. Distributive 
justice concerns the extent to which individuals are able to pursue their conception of the 
good. In §2 I have argued that money is an appropriate metric of justice, since it is an 
important means for (almost) any rational life plan in a capitalist society. The epistemic 
position of individuals can also be thought of as a means for pursuing a conception of the 
good. Just as individuals need money for realising their conception of the good, they also 
need to be able to make plans. A weak epistemic position hinders individuals from pursuing 
their conception of the good just as lack of money does. The epistemic position of individuals 
is part of the way in which the basic structure determines the options that are open to them, 
and how likely their life plans are to succeed given their cognitive capacities and reasonable 
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effort. Thus the epistemic position of individuals in the context of the basic structure stands in 
need of justification to citizens just as much as the distribution of money.  
This second reason raises an important question. Is it possible to evaluate the epistemic 
positions generated by the basic structure in a way that fits the requirements of democratic 
justification outlined in §2?244 This question is particularly pressing because, as I have 
explained, in a capitalist economy the future is fundamentally uncertain. It is in part this very 
uncertainty that creates the need for capitalist coordination in the first place.245 How can 
democratic societies decide on what assumptions are well-founded if the future is unknown?  
I will now argue, against Anderson, that even in a capitalist economy, intersubjective 
comparison of epistemic positions can be sufficiently neutral, objective and controllable. 
First, neutrality. In weighing risks, individuals evaluate the possible outcomes of pursuing a 
plan given their estimate of the likelihood of certain outcomes. To evaluate whether it makes 
sense for individuals to take certain risks given the information they have is to evaluate their 
life choices, which liberal neutrality precludes. This worry, however, assumes that political 
institutions need to evaluate whether it makes sense for someone to take a risk to evaluate 
their epistemic position. To compare epistemic positions, however, one need only assume 
that it is valuable for individuals to understand the risks they face given their life plans. To 
know the risks that come with one’s assumptions is valuable for pursuing a conception of the 
good—irrespective of what that particular conception is. Up to the point where an individual 
is in an epistemic position to make an optimal life plan, a better epistemic position is 
something that makes every individual better off.  
Second, objectivity. To be objective, there should be limited disagreement over the way in 
which outcomes are measured. Epistemic positions are not easily measured and this may 
explain in part why philosophers tend not to include them in their accounts of distributive 
justice. The concept of an optimal life plan is counterfactual: It depends on what individuals 
would have done in more favourable epistemic circumstances. Moreover, the notion of a 
subjectively rational life plan that informs it is moralised: What is subjectively rational 
depends on what individuals can be expected to know rather than what they actually know. 
                                                 




Even if it will be highly debatable to what extent an epistemic position is optimal, a focus on 
the basic structure will offset at least some worries about objectivity. To defend the claim that 
institutions undermine the epistemic position of individuals, the evidence must be strong. The 
evidence, however, does not need to concern particular individuals and the choices that they 
would have made with more information. Rather, the evidence must merely show that the 
basic structure has properties that make non-optimal epistemic positions more likely. This, by 
itself, would raise an objection of justice. I will argue that this is indeed the case for financial 
instability. 
Third, controllability. For epistemic positions to feature in the evaluation of the basic 
structure, they must be something that political institutions can effectively control. Again, the 
decentralised coordination of a capitalist economy limits direct control over the epistemic 
conditions in which individuals sign contracts. Political institutions themselves have only 
limited information about economic circumstances. Also, their information about what 
individuals know, let alone what they would have done with more information, will be even 
more limited. Again, moving the focus to the basic structure takes away some of these 
worries. The basic structure does not need to ensure that life plans are optimal. The liberal 
egalitarian leaves it to individuals to ensure that life plans are subjectively rational. The basic 
structure need merely be such that the relevant information about risks is available to 
individuals and can be drawn on when they make their plans. What matters is whether 
epistemic positions will be undermined by the design of social and political institutions, even 
if it is not clear where or when or whose. This is something that political institutions can at 
least sometimes do. 
5.3.4 Epistemic position and financial instability 
So, in what way does financial instability undermine the epistemic position of individuals and 
how does this raise an issue of distributive justice?  
The institutional conditions that determine whether subjectively rational life plans are optimal 
are part of the basic structure. If a hybrid monetary constitution creates benefits for some 
while undermining the ability of others to make optimal life plans, this raises an objection of 
justice. The question is whether financial instability raises such an objection that can be 
formulated while meeting the demands of neutrality, objectivity and controllability. I now 
argue that this is the case.  
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The core of the Minsky hypothesis is that before banking crises, societal risk perceptions are 
too optimistic. The reason that individuals take on high debt levels is that they and the 
banking system perceive these debt levels to be sustainable given the economic environment. 
In the period preceding a banking crisis, there is a shift in what counts as a subjectively 
rational life plan. This makes it less likely that life plans are optimal. 
Consider two ways in which what life plans individuals consider prudent shifts. First, the 
information on risks that is available to average individuals becomes less adequate. Risk 
builds up in new financial products and less regulated corners of the financial system. 
Although some hedge fund managers foresaw the crash of the subprime mortgage market, 
many in the financial sector (including regulators) did not.246 Where even finance 
professionals are not able to acquire the relevant information, it is difficult to see how 
ordinary citizens could. Second, individuals become too willing to rely on available 
information. Individuals face cognitive constraints in making their financial plans. Therefore, 
good life planning requires deciding what information to assume as given and what to 
question. In a period of financial stability, information regarding financial risks is 
increasingly perceived to be reliable. Stability takes away reasons for investing energy in 
gathering information before taking out financial products. The incentive to develop financial 
literacy and exercise vigilance where it concerns providers of financial services goes down. 
In sum, financial instability undermines epistemic positions by making the risks of financial 
events that invalidate constitutive assumptions appear smaller than they are.  
Through its focus on the basic structure, my account meets the demands of neutrality, 
objectivity and controllability. Financial instability is unfair because it undermines epistemic 
positions, the value of which is not dependent on any particular conception of the good. It is 
possible to think about the effects of financial instability on a systemic level without 
considering individual cases on which there will be more room for disagreement. For the 
reasons that I have already outlined, the fact that financial instability undermines the 
epistemic position of at least some individuals is beyond reasonable doubt. Finally, financial 
instability is something that political institutions can control. The design of the basic structure 
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impacts the likelihood of financial instability and these structures are under the control of 
political institutions. 
Compare my account of financial instability to an alternative account put forward by John 
Linarelli, which also assigns an important role to choice. For Linarelli, financial instability 
produces unfair outcomes since individuals do not freely choose to take the risk of systematic 
financial shocks.247 In formulating his account, Linarelli draws on the work of Ronald 
Dworkin to make a distinction between two kinds of outcomes produced by financial 
contracts. Outcomes are cases of option luck if they result from  
how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out—whether someone gains or loses 
through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined.248  
Dworkin contrasts option luck with brute luck, which is ‘a matter of how risks fall out that 
are not in that sense deliberate gambles’.249 According to the luck egalitarian principle, bad 
outcomes are just when they are a matter of option luck but not if they are a matter of brute 
luck. For Linarelli, the effects of financial instability are unfair because they are not freely 
chosen and therefore a matter of brute luck. Consider two objections to this account. 
First, even under normal circumstances, financial markets will rarely generate cases of option 
luck. As explained in §5.1.2, rather than facing conscious gambles, individuals in financial 
markets face strong uncertainty. In opening coffee bars, taking out mortgages, saving for their 
pensions, individuals in a capitalist society lack a probability distribution for future outcomes.  
Second, the luck egalitarian principle does not meet the demands of objectivity and 
controllability. If political institutions were to approximate the luck egalitarian principle, they 
would need to engage in the sort of impossible micromanaging of individual choices against 
which Anderson and Hayek warn. As I argued in §2.1, where such micromanagement is 
possible, political institutions can simply achieve efficient coordination through centralized 
coordination. But, a planned economy would not have financial instability to begin with. My 
                                                 
247 Linarelli 2017. 




account fits the general conditions of a capitalist economy, while articulating the deficiency 
of one with insufficiently regulated private money creation.  
5.4 Conclusion 
I have explained why financial instability is objectionable from a perspective of distributive 
justice. Financial markets need regulation that prevents the cyclical patterns of manias, panics 
and crashes that are endemic to societies with unregulated private money creation. Capitalist 
societies need such regulation to realise a just distribution of money and to secure adequate 
epistemic positions for individuals to make their life plans. But how far should such 
regulation go and what does it imply for the future of the hybrid monetary constitution? To 
what extent should political institutions leave money creation to private authority? This is the 




6 Incremental abolition 
In his The Public and its Problems, John Dewey captures the problem of reforming the 
monetary constitution well. Dewey agrees in spirit with those socialists who are ‘justly 
impatient with the present economic regime’ and say that ‘industry should be taken out of 
private hands’. For Dewey, economic activity should serve the common good rather than the 
interest of ‘financiers and stockbrokers’. But he also adds a caveat, asking whether those who 
say this  
have asked themselves into whose hands industry is to pass? Into those of the public? 
But, alas, the public has not hands except those of individual human beings. The 
essential problem is that of transforming the action of such hands so that it will be 
animated by regard for social ends. There is no magic by which this result can be 
accomplished.250 
Political institutions, Dewey emphasizes, are fallible too. They do not have superhuman 
powers in gathering knowledge, nor are public officials free from private considerations. It 
cannot simply be assumed that the common good will be better served just because a decision 
is made by a political institution. In the final two chapters, I take up the question that Dewey 
raises in exploring the role of political institutions in governing the financial markets of a 
capitalist economy. In §7, I turn to the topic of delegation and the role of unelected officials 
at the central bank in financial market governance. In this chapter, I discuss the reform of 
existing financial markets and the uncertainty that political institutions face in pursuing such 
reforms. I consider a range of objections to the existing banking system. These objections 
lead me to ask whether money creation by private banks should be prohibited, as argued by 
proponents of so-called Full Reserve Banking, or whether it should merely be better 
regulated. Rather than endorsing either position, I explore how political institutions should 
deal with uncertainty regarding the potential benefits and costs of reform proposal. I do three 
things.  
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First, I conclude my argument for the claim that there are five distinct objections to 
unregulated private authority over money. In §3 I argued that capitalist coordination of credit 
and saving privileges the wealthy. In §5 I argued that by leaving money creation to the 
banking system, economies become vulnerable to Minskyan credit cycles of mania, panic and 
depression. I restate these objections and argue that unregulated private money creation also 
exacerbates business cycles, enforces the status quo of unsustainable levels of natural 
resource use, and leads to an undemocratic centralisation of political power.  
Second, I explore what shape reform should take. I start with the first order question of what 
reform proposal does best in addressing the five objections that I have outlined. Existing Full 
Reserve Banking (FRB) proposals leave crucial questions unanswered and, in light of their 
radical nature, are difficult to evaluate. They promise to solve the problem of financial 
instability, but they raise their own objections and nobody knows whether these can be easily 
overcome. For now, political institutions should not yet decide for or against banking. I then 
turn to the second-order question of what political representation should consist in when there 
is uncertainty about the most effective path of reform. Invoking the spirit of Dewey, I argue 
that the solution will not be found through passive inquiry. Instead, political institutions, by 
which I mean national governments, central banks and international institutions like the Basel 
Committee and the Financial Stability Board, should embark on a project of experimental 
reform. Rather than aiming for one pre-determined conception of the optimal end-state, 
reform should itself create an epistemic basis for judging what direction reform should take.  
Third, I propose a programme for incremental abolition of banking as the best way forward. 
Incremental abolition is a social experiment that involves a stepwise reduction of the private 
authority over money. In this way, the programme explores different ways of regulating the 
authority over money. By moving in incremental steps, the programme generates an adequate 
epistemic basis for decision-making while moving the existing financial system onto a fairer, 
and more stable, sustainable path.  
The chapter is structured as follows. In §6.1 I state five objections to unregulated private 
money creation. In §6.2 I review existing FRB proposals and point out that there is no clear-
cut case for or against abolition of private money creation. In §6.3 I argue that in responding 
to this, political representation requires experiments to create an epistemic basis for judging 
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what constitutes improvement. In §6.4 I outline my case for incremental abolition of private 
money creation. 
6.1 The case against private money creation 
I will now outline five major objections to unregulated private money creation. 251 By private, 
I mean that the decision to issue money is left in part to the private authority of individual 
financial institutions. By unregulated, I mean that their decisions are largely left to the 
discretion of profit-seeking financial institutions with further rules in place to ensure that 
money is created with an aim of realising socially beneficial outcomes. Without such further 
rules, I will now argue, private money increases business cycles (§6.1.1) and creates financial 
instability (§6.1.2). As I explain in §6.1.3, private money creation is also closely implicated 
in current unsustainable levels of natural resource use. It also contributes to an unfair 
distribution of income, options for credit and saving (§6.1.4). Finally, there is an objection 
from the perspective of political equality to the political power that is concentrated in a large 
banking sector (§6.1.5). 
6.1.1 Macroeconomic stability 
Business cycles are cyclical variations of economic output and employment. Under a hybrid 
monetary constitution, the banking system expands the volume of credit during economic 
upturns and contracts it during downturns, thereby greatly exacerbating business cycles. As 
explained in §5.1, the volume of credit issued by banks is itself sensitive to economic 
dynamics. During periods of economic growth, individuals and firms take out more credit, 
since they themselves and the banking system are more confident in their ability to repay. 
This increases expenditures, thereby further stimulating economic activity. Conversely, in a 
downturn, the banking sector will be more pessimistic in its assessment of the ability of 
borrowers to repay credit. Central banks are expected to offset these effects by setting interest 
rates, but in practice they have only limited control over private money creation.  
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6.1.2 Financial stability 
Where macroeconomic stability consists in fluctuations in real economic activity, financial 
instability is a matter of financial contracts and the ability of economic agents to repay them.  
In §5 I described financial instability in terms of manias, panics and crashes.252 According to 
the Minsky hypothesis, a period of stability gives rise to overly optimistic estimates of the 
debt levels that economic agents can sustain. As a consequence, an increasingly large group 
of individuals and firms take on debt levels that they cannot repay. During a Minsky moment, 
risk perceptions suddenly turn more pessimistic, thereby causing a financial panic, in which 
banks face bank runs and investors flee from financial markets. The banking sector plays a 
crucial role in all three phases of financial instability. It enforces the positive impact of a 
boom and thereby spurs on the mania and exacerbates the panic that results. In the crash, the 
contraction of credit makes the economic downturn that follows much more severe.  
6.1.3 Ecological sustainability 
The global economy is currently using an unsustainable level of natural resources. Hybrid 
monetary constitutions preserve that status quo. For this reason, calls for the abolition of 
private money creation are particularly prominent among ecological economists.253 
To get a sense of the challenge ahead, consider CO2 emissions.254 During the 10,000 years 
before the Industrial Revolution, atmospheric CO2 concentrations hovered around 280 parts 
per million, but currently exceed 400 parts per million. To keep global warming below 2 
degrees above pre-industrial levels, as agreed in the Paris climate agreement, CO2 
concentrations cannot exceed 450 parts per million.255 To achieve this, the world economy 
cannot emit more than 800 billion tons of CO2, which will be reached in less than twenty 
years at current emission rates. A sustainable level of CO2 emission would require emissions 
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to drop to 4 billion tons CO2 per annum around 2050.256 CO2 emission would need to drop by 
4.9% per year in the intervening period for that target to be met.257 
To achieve a sustainable level of CO2 emissions with a growing population and increasing 
income levels, the world economy has to reduce carbon intensity in production dramatically. 
In the period between 1990 and 2007, carbon intensity dropped by 0.7% per year. Still, CO2 
emissions grew 2% per year as the effects of this improvement were more than offset by the 
growth of the world economy. In the coming decades, carbon intensity should drop by 7% 
per year to meet the IPCC’s emission targets, with population and economic output 
continuing to grow at their current pace. 258  
Projections of this sort have led ecological economists to champion a shift towards a low 
growth or even steady-state economy. Ecological economists disagree over whether a steady-
state economy could be capitalist and whether it could involve private money creation at all. I 
cannot do justice to the complexity of these debates here. Nor can I discuss the role of money 
in either the move to a low growth economy or capitalist industrial transition. Rather, my 
claim here is that unregulated private money creation is a clear obstacle to both reducing 
output growth and implementing industrial transition.  
First, growth. Although firms could in theory make profits without expanding production, 
low growth means that repaying loans with interest becomes increasingly difficult for 
individual firms. Since commercial banks create money to make profits, positive interest rates 
are a crucial feature of a hybrid monetary constitution. Ecological economists worry that for 
banks and firms to make profits while households save, economic output needs to increase.259  
Second, transition to a low-carbon economy. If economic growth remains stable, making the 
economy sustainable requires a radical shift to production with a lower carbon-intensity. 
Meeting the IPCC targets requires an investment during the next 15 years of $90 trillion in 
sustainable infrastructure assets such as transport systems, energy systems, water and 
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sanitation, and telecommunications.260 Ecological economists argue that making the required 
shift in investment requires extensive investment.261 But banks currently do not play a 
meaningful role in this transition.262 A recent overview of lending by 37 major commercial 
banks shows that they provided $290 billion in funding to fossil fuel companies over a three-
year period.263 In 2012, emissions resulting from the Royal Bank of Scotland’s loans to fossil 
fuel companies and projects were up to 1,200 times the emissions from its own operations 
(e.g. offices and business travel).264 If credit provision is guided solely by the profit motive, it 
only tracks ecological sustainability in so far as regulation reduces the profitability of carbon-
intense industrial sectors. In this way, private credit provision is geared at keeping 
unsustainable industries alive until regulation shifts. Any sudden shift away from these 
industries will also threaten the stability of the banking sector, thereby creating one more 
obstacle to an already very challenging transition.265 I conclude that unregulated private 
authority over money hinders the world economy in making the required ecological 
transition.  
6.1.4 Economic equality 
The growth of the financial sector is commonly regarded as a driver of economic inequality. I 
will now explain how the existing organisation of the financial system obstructs a more 
equitable distribution of income, options for credit and options for saving. 
In §3.3 I argued that private provision of options for credit and saving systematically favours 
the wealthy. In using wealth as collateral, the wealthy are more likely to receive credit and 
the interest rates they pay will be lower. Because the costs of screening and diversification do 
not rise in proportion to the sum of money invested, the rich also have access to better options 
for credit. This is unfair, because it hinders the less wealthy in pursuing credit-dependent and 
savings-dependent life plans. Moreover, unequal access to credit and saving has undesirable 
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negative effects on the quality of economic projects that are funded. It also exacerbates other 
economic inequalities generated by capitalist coordination.  
I now extend these considerations by bringing in income. Private money creation made the 
dramatic growth of the financial sector after 1980 possible. Before the 1980s, the education 
levels and wages of financial sector employees were roughly comparable to those of 
employees in other industries. But since then the proportion of highly skilled employees in 
the financial sector has increased sharply. Moreover, financial firms now pay skilled 
employees significantly more than employees with similar profiles in other sectors.266 
Expansion of the financial sector goes hand in hand with higher revenues for shareholders. 
Because wealth in stocks is concentrated in higher income households, associated dividends 
and capital gains go mostly to top income shares.267  
For these reasons, countries with a larger financial sector tend to have a more unequal 
distribution of income. The income generated by employees of the financial sector does not 
‘trickle down’, nor does a larger financial sector translate into more jobs or production per se. 
In high-income economies, a larger financial sector actually reduces technological 
innovation. Comparative studies of industries with different R&D levels suggest that an 
important cause is the shift of highly-skilled employees into finance: ‘Finance literally bids 
rocket scientists away from the satellite industry’.268 
6.1.5 Political equality 
The banking sector of existing capitalist societies tends to consist of a small number of 
powerful firms. This raises an objection from the perspective of political equality.  
The previous objections focused on the relationship between private money creation and 
liberal freedom. But liberal egalitarians do not just object to economic inequalities. Treating 
citizens as free and equal also involves political freedom. In this section I am interested in the 
ideal of political equality. For a liberal egalitarian, political equality should go beyond a 
merely formal prohibition of laws that hinder certain groups of citizens from taking up 
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positions of power.269 Ideally, citizens should have roughly equal opportunities to influence 
political decisions.  
Although, political and economic equality are distinct, economic inequality easily gives rise 
to political inequality. Consider first the connection between political equality and wealth. In 
his argument against welfare state capitalism, Rawls argues that it  
permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property (productive assets 
and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and much of political life 
rests in few hands.270 
Instead of concentrating ownership of capital in the hands of a few citizens, a just capitalist 
society must have institutions to ensure wide dispersal of wealth:  
[I]nstitutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens generally, and not 
only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperating members 
of society on a footing of equality.271 
This argument against welfare state capitalism is not strong. Indeed, even sympathetic readers 
question whether welfare state capitalism is indeed incompatible with an equal opportunity to 
exercise political power.272 As Martin O’Neill argues, it is unclear how political equality 
would be threatened in a version of welfare state capitalism with effective ‘campaign finance 
reform, public funding of political parties, public provision of forums for political debate, and 
other measures’.273  
There are, nonetheless, other ways in which economic power gives rise to political power. 
Existing capitalist societies do not only feature large wealth inequalities. They also have 
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ownership and control of firms concentrated in the hands of an economic elite within which 
the banking sector has a central role.274 
Charles Lindblom distinguishes two sources of political power of private firms.275 The first is 
their ability to shape political opinion, which banks are hesitant to use. Instead, they can rely 
on their structural power in the economy. To achieve economic policy goals, governments 
need the cooperation of the private sector, which in turn provides the private sector with 
influence over politics. Banks have structural power as a result of their discretion over credit 
provision. Moreover, because they are dependent on banks for credit and underwriting of 
bonds, all large firms have a close relation to one or more banks. Not only does the banking 
sector of existing capitalist societies have pervasive structural power, it also tends to be 
dominated by a relatively small number of large banks. In the Eurozone, the five largest 
banks in a particular country on average make up 48% of the banking sector as measured by 
assets, while market concentration in the US is 45%.276 In countries such as Greece, the 
Netherlands, and Malta, the five largest banks make up over 80% of the domestic banking 
sector.277  
6.2 Reform 
I have outlined five distinct objections to unregulated private money creation. These 
objections have led a wide range of authors to argue for fundamental reform of the existing 
banking system. But saying that there are objections to the status quo is not the same as 
proposing a better alternative. In this section I discuss a radical reform proposal that has 
received wide support. Full Reserve Banking (FRB) involves the abolition of private money 
creation entirely. Like universal basic income, it is a radical reform proposal that has both 
left-wing and right-wing adherents. Classic FRB proposals leave credit provision entirely to 
private non-bank financial institutions. Public FRB proposals supplement private credit 
through public money creation. I will argue against Classic FRB but also show that there is 
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no clear-cut case either for or against reforming the monetary constitution in line with Public 
FRB proposals. 
In §6.2.1 I explain the main characteristics of FRB. I then turn to a critical examination by 
discussing whether FRB proposals are feasible (§6.2.2). I also discuss potential advantages 
and disadvantages of Classic FRB (§6.2.3) and Public FRB (§6.2.4). In §6.2.5 I discuss what 
I take to be the weightiest objection against FRB, which is that merely regulating rather than 
entirely abolishing private money creation might also achieve the same goals. 
6.2.1 An alternative to hybridity 
As explained in §4, in the act of granting credit, banks create money, which is held in bank 
deposits until its owners use it to repay a loan. The deposits created in issuing credit allow the 
banking system to fund its loans. The bank represented in Figure 6.1 funds its portfolio of 
long-maturity illiquid credit almost entirely with debt. It owns some central bank deposits for 
transaction purposes, but will seek to minimize its holdings in favour of higher-yielding 
assets. It is up to banks to decide what volume of credit-provision will be profitable and issue 
deposits accordingly. 
 Bank  
 
Central bank deposit 
(2%) 
Credit to households 
and firm (98%) 
Deposits and debt (99.2%) 
Equity (0.08%) 
Figure 6.1 – Fractional Reserve Banking 
Full reserve bankers believe that the business of issuing credit and that of providing means of 
payment are to be kept entirely separate.278 There are different ways in which this might be 
done. A classic proposal is the so-called Chicago Plan from the 1930s.279 This proposal, 
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which was supported by prominent economists such as Irving Fisher, Milton Friedman and 
Frank Knight, would require banks to hold central bank deposits for the full value of their 
outstanding liabilities. From the perspective of liquidity constraints discussed in §4.3, this 
would mean that they face a 100% reserve requirement (See Figure 6.2). To issue credit, 
financial institutions must either hold central bank reserves or use their own capital. The 
position is known as Full Reserve Banking because banks would, figuratively speaking, have 
the money to back the credit money in their vaults. Rather than issuing new money, their 
economic role would be limited to providing payment services.280 Because there would be no 
banks as they exist today, Full Reserve Banking is something of a misnomer. No private 
financial institution would be allowed to give out credit by issuing money. In this sense, FRB 
abolishes banking. 
 Payment intermediary  
 




Deposits and debt (99.2%) 
Equity (0.08%) 
 
Figure 6.2 – Full Reserve Banking 
FRB does not mean the end of private credit provision entirely. Rather, financial institutions 
can provide credit by borrowing money from others or putting up capital provided by its 
owners. Those who entrust their savings to such an institution take risks. In contrast to the 
existing banking system where customers of banks are protected by deposit insurance, 
customers lose their money when a credit-providing financial institution defaults. Proponents 
of FRB hope that the need for regulation of financial markets will be limited. The central 
bank circulates a very limited amount of money that is to serve as a means of payment. 
Otherwise, there is no direct political involvement in the form of deposits insurance, central 
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bank credit or prudential regulation. I now turn to a critical evaluation of the proposed 
advantages and disadvantages of FRB.  
6.2.2 Implementing FRB 
A somewhat technical but serious objection to the FRB proposal concerns its feasibility. The 
core of the proposal is a neat distinction between money, which is provided by payment 
intermediaries, and credit, which is not. There is no obvious way to draw the line and 
effectively enforce the boundary.281  
From an accounting perspective, the deposit issued by commercial banks is a very short-term 
loan of a customer to the bank. It is functionally equivalent to the settlement asset because it 
has a very short maturity. The customer can decide to discontinue the loan at any point in 
time and to ask either for payment in cash or for the bank to settle the payment. To abolish 
banking, laws must prohibit financial institutions from funding their asset portfolio by issuing 
deposits which are functionally equivalent in this sense.282  
Realising FRB requires a lot more regulation than merely raising reserve requirements to 
100%. The regulation should concern financial transactions, not types of institutions. If rules 
only apply to commercial banks, market competition will drive financial institutions to 
provide shadow banking services. History shows that these unregulated banking practices 
acquire systemic importance so that governments and central banks are reluctantly forced to 
intervene in the event of a crisis.283 Even if funding loans with credit is effectively prohibited, 
both equity and insurance contracts can be used to devise deposit-like financial contracts. 
Properly enforcing a 100% reserve requirement requires strict regulation of all these different 
types of financial transactions.  
Therefore, even if FRB is possible, it is debatable whether such a policy would be the most 
desirable way to deal with financial instability. I will now distinguish two versions of the 
proposal.  
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6.2.3 Classic FRB 
Classic FRB proposals leave private credit provision entirely to those who decide to allocate 
some of their savings to riskier loans.284 Under both Classic and Public FRB, private financial 
institutions provide credit with funds that they borrow from creditors or that is put up by their 
owners. Classic FRB is distinct from Public FRB in that it does not supplement private credit 
with public credit. As a consequence, the level of credit is, even more than in the current 
system, dependent on private decisions to allocate savings to credit provision. If lenders make 
losses, only those who voluntarily decide to take risks will face losses in the event of a crisis. 
Drawing on §6.1 of this chapter, I distinguish three arguments in favour of Classic FRB. 
First, macroeconomic stability. Under FRB, the financial system can no longer simply issue 
the money needed for extending more credit. Rather, financial institutions need to attract 
depositors prior to granting loans. Customers will also be more reluctant to provide that 
money, since risks are passed on to depositors. Therefore, at least in theory, financial 
institutions are more constrained in the volume of credit they can issue. This removes the 
peaks from business cycles.  
Second, financial stability. Proponents of FRB argue that because individual savers will now 
have a real risk of losing money, credit provision will be more prudent. The mania will not 
get under way since behind every decision to provide credit stands someone taking risk with 
their own money. FRB also helps prevent and ameliorate panics. Financial institutions no 
longer risk a bank run, since they always have the required cash on hand. There can also be 
no contagious fire sales and other systemic consequences of individual defaults. In this way, 
FRB promises to ensure that a panic does not occur and, if it does, that it does not require 
public intervention.  
Third, ecological sustainability. FRB reduces the overall level of credit available in the 
economy and removes the incentives for output growth that result from private money 
creation. Therefore, it is thought to be a particularly suitable model for banking in a 
sustainable steady-state economy.  
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While Classic FRB protects societies against banking crises and other ills associated with 
unconstrained private money creation, there are four important objections to it. First, there is 
a concern regarding the conception of risk-taking. In Classic FRB, credit-providing 
institutions are to pass on all the risks to their customers. If individuals save more of their 
money in this way, they will face more risk. But, as I argued in §5, individuals should not be 
exposed to risks while in an inadequate epistemic position. High-risk credit should only be 
provided with considerable warning signs, if not actively discouraged.  
Warning individuals against risky options for saving, however, will exacerbate the second 
problem. Even if some individuals are willing to take risks, the aggregate levels of credit 
available under Classic FRB may be much lower.285 In a hybrid monetary constitution, 
provision of credit is in the hands of a banking system that extends credit guided by the profit 
motive. Financial institutions fund credit through deposits held by customers for payment 
purposes. In Classic Full Reserve Banking, financial institutions can only fund credit from 
savings that individuals allocate to risk-taking. It is likely that less credit will be available, 
although it is difficult to say just how much. Low levels of credit may be desirable from the 
perspective of ecological sustainability, but this would also reduce overall demand in the 
economy, and thereby employment and economic output. In a pessimistic prognosis, the 
institution of FRB would cause a chronic state of economic depression. 
A third objection to Classic FRB is that credit provision would not necessarily be more 
reliable or less cyclical. Rather than making private credit dependent on perceived 
profitability, FRB makes it dependent on the willingness of individuals to risk their private 
savings. That willingness, however, is also vulnerable to economic sentiment.  
Finally, by leaving credit provision still largely in private hands, the ecological benefits of 
this Classic FRB are questionable. If it has any ecological benefits, these result from the 
overall reduction of economic output. Remaining economic activity need not have a lower 
carbon intensity. 
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6.2.4 Public FRB 
Consider now Public FRB proposals. These proposals are distinct from Classic FRB in 
supplementing private credit provision with public credit.286 Like Classic FRB, Public FRB 
assigns authority to issue money entirely to public authority. In Classic FRB, this means that 
all credit comes from non-bank private financial institutions. The Public FRB proposal does 
not prohibit private provision of credit. Like Classic FRB, individuals are free to make risky 
investments as they see fit. But, in contrast to Classic FRB, the state steps in when private 
credit becomes too scarce. 
In Public FRB, all money creation is subject to public authority. A public institution would 
decide on the purposes for which money is used. The British think-tank Positive Money, for 
example, proposes the institution of a public Money Creation Committee. This committee is 
to decide on money creation with an eye to maintaining macroeconomic stability. The newly 
created money would be used for government expenditures as well as for business credit.287  
The crucial feature of Public FRB is that the profit motive would not guide the public 
provision of credit. Instead, credit provision would be public in the sense that it is (i) decided 
in the context of political institutions; (ii) where the goal is to ensure outcomes that are fair to 
all individuals concerned; and therefore (iii) decisions are to be justified in terms of a 
conception of justice.288 Credit provision would be a public decision, just as the provision of 
education and healthcare often is.  
The Public FRB proposal seems to go some way in addressing the objections to Classic FRB. 
Public institutions can do more to realise fair options for credit and saving than both classic 
FRB and hybridity. Because public institutions do not face market competition, they would 
not be forced to lower credit standards during a mania. Public institutions are, of course, not 
entirely immune to fads and manias, but they would not have the specific incentives that 
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caused recent banking crises.289 Public credit provision can direct investment to more 
ecologically sustainable options and ensure more economic distributions. 
Public provision of credit is, of course, feasible but it is currently an open question whether 
Public FRB would work well and what its economic costs would be. Competitive financial 
markets incentivise individual financial institutions to do risk assessment well.290 A system of 
public credit provision would potentially face the problems of central coordination already 
discussed in §2. Bureaucratic incentives and the inability to collect information may reduce 
economic efficiency. If credit is systematically misallocated, this will be unfair to individuals 
who are thereby denied possible life plans. Credit misallocation will also reduce the ability 
and willingness of entrepreneurs to use their situated knowledge to realise an efficient use of 
resources. Instead, they could be tempted to focus their energy on lobbying public credit 
providers. Moreover, a small public elite might centralise power, just like the 1950s banking 
elites of the Bretton Woods era. In Dewey’s words cited in the introduction, there is no magic 
way to bring about that the hands of the public are animated by social ends. 
My aim here is not to argue decisively against or in favour of Public FRB. The crucial 
observation to make is that at this point in time we do not know whether extensive public 
control over credit provision would work.  
6.2.5 Regulated Hybridity 
Even if there are no knock-down objections to either Classic or Public FRB, we should still 
ask whether less far-reaching measures can achieve the same goals. In this section I explore 
what I call Regulated Hybridity, which retains private credit provision, but uses banking 
regulation and other legislative means to secure the public interest.  
Before the Global Financial Crisis, microprudential regulation and monetary policy were 
widely held to provide sufficient public control over the banking system. The Basel I and 
Based II agreements assigned a crucial role to capital requirements for imposing solvency 
constraints on banks. If banks made losses, capital requirements were there to ensure that 
costs would go to their owners. Monetary policy served to influence the aggregate volume of 
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credit, as it does to this day. As explained in §4.3, the central bank sets interest rates in 
interbank markets and can thereby influence the volume of credit that banks can profitably 
extend. Through collateral eligibility, the central bank can loosen and tighten the liquidity 
constraints that banks face.  
Today, few believe that microprudential regulation and monetary policy provide sufficient 
public control. Microprudential regulation has proven insufficient for economic stability. The 
crisis also showed that monetary policy is a comparatively crude tool for macroeconomic 
stabilisation. Its use in dampening credit causes unemployment and depressions.291 Its use in 
stimulating the credit provision causes asset price inflation and increases wealth inequality.292 
The use of monetary policy as a means of macroeconomic stabilisation thereby contributes to 
economic inequality.293 Because monetary policy targets aggregate levels of employment and 
output, it is insensitive to considerations of ecological sustainability and the availability of 
options for credit and saving.  
Though pre-crisis control of the banking sector has proven to be inadequate, there are 
considerable alternatives available to abolition of banking. Banking regulation has already 
been greatly expanded. Basel III enforces solvency constraints more strictly and also seeks to 
prevent systemic consequences of bank failures. Financial institutions, in particular those 
with systemic importance for the wider financial system, are now subject to extensive 
reporting requirements. The requirements of Basel III and national standards are meant to 
combine solvency constraints on banks with measures to limit systemic effects if an 
institution defaults. Systemically important financial institutions are required to develop 
detailed resolution plans, which are regularly reviewed by regulators.294 Finally, different 
measures have been taken to make counterparty exposure of financial institutions more 
transparent.  
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Still, critics argue that existing measures have not gone far enough.295 Within the wide range 
of views presented at the 2016 Bank of England conference ‘Financial Reform’, no presenter 
thought that existing regulation had gone far enough.296 The crucial question here, however, 
is not whether existing regulation is already enough, but whether regulation of private money 
creation is sufficient to meet the objections raised in §6.1. 
To improve existing regulation, existing tools can be used more effectively and new tools can 
be added to the toolbox. Capital requirements can be increased substantially beyond their 
current level. Switzerland has imposed a capital requirement of 19% on its two largest 
banks.297 In the early twentieth century, capital requirements were often 25% or higher, while 
the early 19th century also saw 40% or 50% equity.298 Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, for 
example, have argued for capital requirements of at least 20%.299 Under the header of 
macroprudential tools, central banks are currently experimenting with various new ways of 
steering bank credit.300 More ambitious regulation could simply prohibit the issuance of 
certain kinds of financial assets, irrespective of the capital held to secure it.301  
Ecological sustainability and economic equality can also be pursued through regulation and 
policy. Political institutions can steer credit directly as well as indirectly through subsidies 
and taxes. Central banks can place more detailed conditions on access to central bank credit. 
Political institutions can improve the ecological sustainability of investments and the quality 
of options for credit and saving through regulation and subsidies. A hybrid monetary 
constitution can even accept a modest role for public provision of credit. Where the market 
fails to provide a certain good or realise a fair distribution, fiscal policy can step in. All this 
does not require the abolition of the private banking system.  
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Again, my aim here is not to argue for any particular proposal. Rather, I aim to highlight the 
wide range of tools in the public toolbox available within a hybrid monetary constitution that 
remain unused. For now, proponents of FRB have yet to make the case that Regulated 
Hybridity cannot address the objections to unregulated money creation. Equally, proponents 
of Regulated Hybridity have yet to make the case that it is an attractive alternative to Public 
FRB. 
6.3 Social knowledge 
It is time to take stock. So far, I have highlighted deficiencies of the hybrid constitution and 
outlined proposals for reform, but emphasised that no option is clearly superior. Both 
Regulated Hybridity and Public FRB promise to address the objections to unregulated money 
creation outlined in §6.1. Rather than arguing for any of these options, §6.4 will propose a 
political programme for social experiment in reform. I will refer to this programme as 
incremental abolition. Before this, I take a step back and ask what to make of lack of 
knowledge from a normative perspective. How can political institutions meet the demand of 
public justification in the face of pervasive uncertainty? A prominent theme in democratic 
theory is the epistemic role of democratic systems. Democratic institutions, so philosophers 
argue, are particularly effective in dealing with deliberation and decision-making on societal 
problems on which there is widespread disagreement.302 In this section I extend these 
discussions by discussing inquiry and experimentation as forms of political representation 
that are adequate for dealing with uncertainty. In facing the task of regulating capitalist 
institutions, political institutions often lack evidence regarding the best policy proposal. I 
argue that in these circumstances a crucial role goes to political institutions in generating the 
evidence needed through policy experiments.  
In §6.3.1 I review the existing gaps in social knowledge on the way in which banking 
regulation will impact economic outcomes. In §6.3.2 I discuss the potential for extending our 
knowledge through ensuring that a wide range of perspectives and historical information on 
the design of financial systems is available. In §6.3.3 I discuss the potential for political 
institutions to generate the evidence they need through experimentation. 
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6.3.1 The unknown 
The experience of the Global Financial Crisis has made it clear that significant reform of the 
banking sector is needed. As private money creation is at the core of the build-up of 
unsustainable credit levels, it is here that we should seek the solution. But it is fair to say that 
there is no agreement on how to go about this. Proponents of alternative proposals do not 
primarily disagree over the moral evaluation of alternative outcomes, but simply disagree on 
the facts. Both bad and good outcomes might result from all three proposals (see Figure 6.3 
for an overview of §6.2).  
 
 
Bad outcomes Good outcomes 
Regulated Hybridity Financial and macroeconomic 
instability; ecological collapse; 
pervasive economic inequality.  
Efficient and fair credit provision, 
financial and macroeconomic 
stability, economic and political 
equality, meeting IPCC targets. 
Classic FRB Insufficient fair options for credit 
and saving; pervasive economic 
inequality. 
Prudent credit and fair distribution 
of losses; financial and 
macroeconomic stability. 
Public FRB Pervasive unfair and inefficient 
credit provision. 
Efficient and fair credit provision, 
financial and macroeconomic 
stability, economic and political 
equality, meeting IPCC targets. 
Figure 6.3 – Good and bad outcomes of banking reform 
An important obstacle to agreement is what I refer to as ‘wild’ counterfactuals. In response to 
empirical arguments that are based on the existing hybrid monetary constitution, proponents 
of reform can almost always argue that considerations would not hold in a thoroughly 
reformed system. Such counterfactual claims are wild because they assume that economic 
agents would make fundamentally different decisions in an imagined social order. It is 
difficult to see what sort of evidence an interlocutor can produce to counter such claims. 
Because no recent historical precedent exists, empirical evidence cannot settle the issue. 
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Accordingly, the debate gets stuck in speculation over the functioning of an entirely different 
social order.  
There is a paucity of evidence and a wide range of proposals that one can reasonably favour. 
We do not know whether the profit motive is the best way to incentivise fair credit 
assessment. Nor can we say what fads and manias public institutions might be subject to. It is 
simply unclear whether a largely public provision of credit can effectively supplant the 
multifarious individual commercial decisions taken by the current banking system. Even if all 
were to agree on the relevant demands of distributive justice, there would still be pervasive 
disagreement over how to realise them.  
6.3.2 Political representation 
As explained in §1.2, the political institutions that currently govern the design of the 
monetary constitution do not recognisably fit the system of representative government. 
Instead, decisions are not only made by national governments but also by central banks and 
international institutions such as the Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board. 
Therefore, I use the general term ‘political institution’ to refer to institutions that represent 
citizens in designing the institutions and rules that govern the authority over money. It is up 
to political institutions to ensure that the monetary constitution meets the relevant demands of 
distributive justice. The question I now turn to is what this role entails when the epistemic 
basis for deciding what to do is inadequate. In these circumstances, so I argue, political 
representation requires creating a better epistemic basis for political justification.  
The notion of ‘representation’ is often taken to suggest that to do political representation well 
is to reflect certain facts adequately. Most accounts of political representation indeed make 
such an assumption.303 On the conception of the representative as a trustee, to represent is to 
act in accordance with the view of the representative on what justice requires in light of the 
available evidence. On the conception of representation as delegation, the representative acts 
in accordance with what their constituents believe that justice requires in light of the available 
evidence. In either case, representation is reflective in that it takes the available evidence as 
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given. To fail to represent adequately is to be insufficiently open to information that is 
available in the wider democratic system in which governments are embedded.  
Reflective conceptions of representation are inadequate for circumstances where evidence 
about what justice requires is inconclusive. There are two arguments for this, which track the 
two arguments for the demand of democratic justification defended in §2.2. The first derives 
directly from the collective responsibility of citizens to realise just institutions. As I argued, 
deliberation and justification are important means of political decision-making. If information 
regarding the effects of alternative policies is inadequate, neither the government itself nor 
those to whom it is accountable can evaluate to what extent the policies contribute to fair 
economic institutions.  
A second argument derives from the ideal of political equality, which requires that citizens 
receive an adequate justification for political decisions. Citizens do not need to agree with a 
given decision, but the justification for it should explain why one option should be chosen 
over the alternatives. If the epistemic basis for deliberation is inadequate, however, 
reasonable doubts remain that the justification is not able to address.  
If it is simply unclear what reform is required, the responsibility of political institutions 
cannot be limited to reflecting the available evidence in their decisions. They should also 
ensure that they are in an epistemic position to adequately design the major social and 
political institutions.  
6.3.3 Inquiry and experimentation 
Lack of evidence should not be accepted where substantial societal interests are at stake. If a 
society lacks the information to address a given problem adequately, political institutions 
must act to make that information available. I now turn to discussing two ways in which 
political institutions can improve the epistemic basis of deliberation over the monetary 
constitution: inquiry into and experimentation with alternative options.  
One way of ensuring a better epistemic basis for political justification is inquiry, that is, the 
collection and systematisation of available evidence on alternative policy measures. Statistics 
agencies have a crucial role in this, as do various forms of deliberation in speech and writing. 
Inquiry is more than the passive reception of information. It also involves acting to ensure 
that available information is collected and debated. As a form of political representation, 
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inquiry should ensure that information reflects competing interests and conceptions of justice. 
Applied to the monetary constitution, inquiry requires ensuring that a wide range of 
perspectives and historical information on the design of financial systems is available. 
Even if political institutions could do more to acquire information, there are limits to what 
can be discovered through collecting and debating available evidence. Although participants 
in financial markets can be influenced by regulation and market operations, the effects of 
such interventions are difficult to predict.304 Participants in financial markets do not just obey 
rules, they also adapt their behaviour so as to avoid their effects.305 Even if policies are 
known to work for some time, the circumstances in which they do can easily change. The 
post-crisis era has seen wide-ranging debates on the future of the financial system. It has 
perhaps been the defining political topic of the decade, so it is hard to argue that current lack 
of knowledge is a result of inadequate inquiry. If truly compelling evidence were available 
regarding the best way to reform the monetary constitution, surely someone would have 
found it by now.  
To overcome the limits of inquiry and discover the best way of living together, experiments 
are needed. Experiments are trials in different ways of living, whose outcome is subject to 
critical examination. Experiments generate the evidence that is needed to decide on complex 
policy issues such as the design of the monetary constitution. 
Only political institutions are in a position to experiment with alternative options for reform. 
Political authority allows for intervention in the financial systems with the aim of finding out 
what works. If there is knowledge that societies can only learn from social experiments, it is 
up to political institutions to generate that information.  
6.4 Incremental abolition 
I now turn to a positive proposal for reform of the monetary constitution. I argue that political 
institutions should move to a gradual extension of public authority over money creation. The 
hypothetical endpoint of this reform proposal is the end of banking, but the decision to 
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abolish must be preceded by careful deliberation on the evidence generated while moving in 
that direction.  
In this section I outline the programme for incremental abolition (§6.4.1), argue in its favour 
(§6.4.2), and address objections (§6.4.3).  
6.4.1 The programme 
In face of pervasive uncertainty concerning the design of the monetary constitution, a social 
experiment is needed. Incremental abolition is such an experiment. It is a social experiment 
of stepwise abolition of private authority over money. Its goal is to explore different ways of 
regulating the authority over money.  
Incremental abolition is an experiment that will move the banking sector in consecutive steps 
towards a form of Public FRB. Once Public FRB is achieved, the hybrid monetary 
constitution will be replaced by a 100% reserve system for private money creation. In this 
sense, the target of incremental abolition is Public FRB. 
But realising Public FRB is not the goal of the programme. Rather, its overarching goal is to 
reform the monetary constitution so as to address the objections outlined in §6.1 of this 
chapter. Because doing this well requires more information, the more immediate goal of 
incremental abolition is to generate that evidence. Through stepwise abolition, the experiment 
generates the evidence needed to decide between alternative proposals.  
Because its goal is to generate evidence, Public FRB is not the first step in the programme 
nor is it necessarily the endpoint. Rather, incremental abolition moves to Public FRB via 
Classic FRB and Regulated Hybridity. The information gathered along the way is to inform 
decision-making on whether to progress toward full abolition.  
First, the move via Classic FRB. The core of the Classic FRB proposal is to bar financial 
institutions from using bank deposits to fund risky forms of credit. Under classic FRB, 
institutions that issue credit money must meet a 100% reserve requirement. This means that 
financial institutions hold a deposit with the central bank for each deposit that they issue. 
Reserve requirements are currently close to 0% and can be increased incrementally. By 
requiring banks to hold reserves against deposits, which carry low interest rates, the central 
bank imposes an implicit tax on using deposits for bank funding. As it becomes increasingly 
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expensive for banks to fund risky assets through deposits, risk-taking will move to 
institutions that do not offer payment services and are exempt from reserve requirements. 
Customers have to choose between keeping their money in the bank, where they pay for 
payment services, or voluntarily taking more credit risk. As I argued in §6.1.3, the provision 
of risky options for saving should be accompanied with considerable warning signs, if not 
actively discouraged. Where credit provision under increasingly strict regulation leads to a 
reduction of private credit, public provision of credit can gradually step in. 
Second, the move via Regulated Hybridity. Regulating hybridity increases public authority 
over money, while leaving the final decision to issue credit to private financial institutions. In 
§6.2.5 I reviewed a range of ways to regulate private money creation. Incremental abolition 
of banking takes the form of experimenting with gradual extension of the public control over 
money. The existing Basel III reforms can be seen in this light as the first, hesitant steps 
towards banking abolition. The post-crisis circumstances have seen an extension of public 
control over money in different directions. I will focus here on capital requirements. As 
explained in §4, the bank capital ratio is the percentage of funding that comes from the 
owners of the bank.306 By slowly increasing the capital requirements of banks, risks are 
gradually moved to their owners. Implicit subsidies for ‘too big to fail’ institutions disappear 
and the cost of capital goes up. This, according to opponents of capital requirements, will 
reduce the provision of credit. Again, if increased capital requirements lead to a reduction of 
private credit it can be replaced by public provision.  
These two paths to banking abolition are compatible. Both reduce the attractiveness of 
funding risky assets through deposits. The Classic FRB path leads to the creation of pure 
payment intermediaries and it allows customers to face losses associated with risky credit-
provision. Regulated Hybridity imposes risks on the owners of the bank. When these steps 
lead to a reduction of credit provision, credit provision under public control can gradually 
take over. 
It is too soon to say what a world of extensive public control over the money supply will look 
like. Although Public FRB is the target of incremental abolition, it is like a wish to become a 
professional ballet dancer or rockstar. These outcomes may appear to be very desirable to 




achieve, but pursuing them requires years of dedication, and many will be sceptical whether it 
is even possible. The path towards that target, however, is valuable in itself and brings one to 
new places where one would not otherwise have been. If at some point the prospects of fame 
become very grim and the costs of continuing rise, it is time to give up on the dream.  
As an experimental process, incremental abolition should be pursued under the guidance of 
political institutions. New information gathered from attempted reforms can lead to a 
decision to go ahead along the same path, change direction or, if outcomes are particularly 
grim, reverse course. Like pursuing a dream career, incremental abolition should be pursued 
as long at its final target appears viable, but it is important to stop in time. Through gradual 
steps towards a society without banks, incremental abolition will create the epistemic basis 
for reforming the monetary constitution. 
6.4.2 The case for incremental abolition 
I will now argue that incremental abolition is preferable to either Public FRB or Regulated 
Hybridity. To this end, I will consider two criteria by which to evaluate social experiments: 
(i) What are the risks and what are the potential rewards? and (ii) How much information 
does the experiment generate about the good and bad outcomes? 
First, risks and rewards. Like any experiment, a social experiment must meet ethical 
standards. The value of the evidence generated by the experiment must outweigh its risks. 
Given the available evidence, we cannot decide between Public FRB and Regulated 
Hybridity. The very reason to conduct an experiment like the one I have suggested is that it is 
unclear which outcomes will result. Incremental abolition will only be attractive to those who 
think it likely that future hybridity will give rise to financial crises and also recognize that 
Public FRB may negatively impact efficient and fair credit provision. I have argued for these 
assumptions in the previous section. 
Although there are risks in every proposal, the recurrent financial crises of the existing 
system are particularly bad. Moreover, they are difficult to foresee. The build-up of 
unsustainable debt levels takes place in the private sphere and information about risks is not 
available. Therefore, to simply retain hybridity is a social experiment with potentially 
dramatic consequences. This is not to deny that experiments in FRB come with considerable 
risks, since they involve a fundamental reshaping of the existing financial system.  
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Incremental abolition, in contrast, allows for avoiding the negative outcomes associated with 
both Regulated Hybridity and Public FRB. In moving towards a 100% reserve system, the 
risk of financial instability is addressed at the root. The closer one moves to FRB, the less 
likely a new financial crisis will be. If, somewhere along the way, FRB leads to unfair and 
inefficient credit provision, these cases can be documented and debated. Those who support 
the continued existence of private banks will leave few opportunities unused to emphasize the 
social costs of reform. But, unlike the gradual build-up of risk associated with insufficiently 
Regulated Hybridity, these costs will be more visible and open to critical evaluation. If its 
critics are right, Public FRB will lead to flagrant cases of failure to evaluate risks. In 
response, political institutions can either reform public credit provision or return to more 
extensive private provision of credit.  
Consider now the information that the different options generate. The decision to abolish or 
retain hybridity cannot be tried out and evaluated before it is implemented. Moreover, once 
made, that choice becomes a premise of future political deliberation. In this sense, the 
decision is an existential choice.307 It is a choice that can be made only once and once made 
changes the very way an agent understands itself. 
The Basel III process seeks to regulate hybridity, but I have argued that the prospects of 
addressing all objections against the existing banking system are questionable. Because the 
target of policymaking is Regulated Hybridity, alternatives to hybridity are left unexplored. 
This illustrates the worry that once hybridity or FRB is decided upon, thinking will 
increasingly narrow its scope to finding ways to make that choice work. To choose one 
alternative over others is to risk their bad outcomes and to forego the good outcomes of 
alternatives. If executed well, however, incremental abolition avoids such an existential leap 
into the dark. Rather, it provides insight into a much wider range of available options.  
6.4.3 Objections to incremental abolition 
Although it is not uncommon for public institutions to be involved in credit provision for 
specific public policy purposes, it is difficult to evaluate the economic consequences of 
widespread public provision of credit. Because my proposal of incremental abolition is 
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closely related to the Public FRB proposal, I will now discuss the two most important 
objections to FRB. I show that these objections do not hold for incremental abolition. 
First, there is the objection that only capitalist coordination sets adequate incentives for 
efficient provision of credit. Although it is too early to say what system will ultimately prove 
more effective, mere public ownership certainly does not preclude more or less adequate 
credit assessment. Consider the historical record of rating agencies. Rating agencies do not 
make investments themselves but are still quite good at rating the most common forms of 
retail credit. Moody’s corporate bond ratings, for instance, which assign bonds to 20 different 
risk-categories, ranging from least risky (Aaa) to riskiest (Ca-C), provide a typical example. 
In the period 1983-2009, Ca-C bonds had one-year default rates of 33.23%, but default rates 
were below 1% for the 10 safest ratings. Average default rates are consistently lower for each 
risk category.308 Risk ratings are also updated more or less effectively. Five years before 
default, the average company would still be in the 13th risk-category. One year before 
default, the average rating would be in the 17th risk category.309 If a small company like 
Moody’s is able to effectively rate corporate bonds, it is difficult to see why public 
institutions could not do the same.310 The only commercial incentive for Moody’s in 
providing accurate ratings is their reputation, which is an incentive that is also important for 
bureaucratic institutions.311 In many ways, Moody’s is like a privately-owned central planner. 
The only point I want to make here is that public institutions can weigh credit risk just like 
private institutions can. 
Public credit provision, however, does not need to limit its evaluation of investment projects 
to credit risk assessment. The long history of development banks shows that public 
institutions can assess risk adequately, while also applying environmental and social criteria 
to individual projects. Consider the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (currently simply known 
as KfW), which was founded in 1948 to fund German reconstruction. In 2015, it provided 
€79.3 billion in credit.312 The KfW currently has an important role in the green transition of 
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the German economy, funding 90% of onshore wind and over 50% of solar power.313 Brazil 
and China assign an even larger role to public development banks, which in part explains 
why they were the only major economies without banking failures in 2007 and 2008.314  
An entirely different worry is that public control over credit gives rise to a much more 
powerful, potentially ‘totalitarian’ state. The state would now have a tool to micromanage 
economic transactions and follow what individuals do much more closely. It is clear that 
public provision of credit does not need to constitute a form of public domination. Rather, the 
worry is that this reform and many like it would slowly erode the independence of the private 
sphere. In the words of Hayek, Public FRB would be one more step on the road to serfdom.315 
The first thing to note is that these arguments are, again, based on a very pessimistic view of 
public institutions. Clearly, democratic checks and balances can address the fear of state 
repression. These were missing in historically socialist states such that their experience 
cannot be simply extrapolated to all forms of public control of the economy.  
Second, if public institutions want to register the payments made by individual citizens, they 
do not require the abolition of banking for this. Governments can always pass laws that allow 
for tracing and reporting all payments conducted with private credit money. Economic 
privacy depends most obviously on the availability of cash, which could be issued, or 
discontinued, under any monetary constitution. Without wanting to downplay the risks of a 
totalitarian state, I think it is fair to say that the role of private banking sectors in safeguarding 
democracy and the rule of law is limited.  
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued for the incremental abolition of private money creation. To this 
end, I outlined five objections to unregulated private money creation. I then explored three 
proposals for reform: Classic FRB, Public FRB and Regulated Hybridity. I rejected Classic 
FRB, but argued that the latter both promise to addressing my objections to the existing 
monetary constitution. I argued that in these circumstances, political institutions have a 
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crucial role in generating a better epistemic basis for public decision-making. Through a 
stepwise extension of public control, incremental abolition allows existing capitalist societies 




7 The ethics of delegating monetary authority 
Where the authority over money is in private hands, there is no further question of whether it 
should be exercised democratically. But if, as I proposed in §6, money creation is to be 
brought under more extensive public control, the question becomes increasingly pressing to 
what extent public authority over money should be democratic. In this chapter, I explore this 
question by discussing the existing institutions of central bank independence. As I argue, 
there is no principled objection to delegating the authority over public money creation to 
unelected experts. But delegation of monetary policy is itself subject to a demand of 
democratic justification just like any other decision concerning the design of major societal 
institutions. I argue that the existing institutions of central bank independence lack an 
adequate justification and need to be reformed.  
By creating an independent central bank, the government delegates authority over public 
money to unelected experts. Within the confines of their mandate, these experts routinely 
weigh the benefits of economic output against the long-term cost of inflation. Their decisions 
can be momentous. After the Brexit vote, for example, the value of the Pound fell and the 
Bank of England expected inflation to exceed the target assigned to it by the government. 
Governor Mark Carney and his Monetary Policy Committee faced a choice. They could 
either intervene by raising interest rates, or accept inflation and protect the real economy 
from a major economic shock. In the end, the Bank decided not to intervene, arguing that to 
do otherwise would raise unemployment by 250,000.316 History is filled with such dramatic 
decisions.317 
Despite the political importance of the decisions they face, central banks have received much 
less attention from philosophers than the more familiar forms of executive, legislative and 
judiciary power.318 Central bankers make their own kinds of distributive choices. Moreover, 
their position as unelected experts raises important questions of political authority and 
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democratic legitimacy. These powers deserve investigation, and my aim here is to address 
this gap in the literature.  
In contrast to those who reject central bank independence entirely, I argue that it is in 
principle permissible for governments to delegate political choices to unelected experts. From 
a democratic perspective, what matters is whether the act of delegation serves the 
government’s ultimate economic policy aims. Although central bank independence limits the 
government’s control over public money, it can also improve monetary policy and thereby 
help the government pursue its broader economic policies. In what follows, I will first outline 
a moral framework for balancing competing considerations for and against delegating and 
then make a detailed case for democratic reform of existing institutions.319  
In discussing these questions, I pay specific attention to the historical changes catalysed by 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008. Before the crisis, central bankers referred to 
their era as that of a ‘Great Moderation’. 320 They assumed that recent economic policies had 
created a new period without financial crises, weaker economic recessions and stable prices. 
Within the confines of their mandate, central bankers would do little more than control 
interest rates on short-term credit. This was considered sufficient for steering the domestic 
economy to its natural equilibrium. In the words of the central banker already cited in §5, 
‘everything was simple, tidy and cozy’, but today ‘many certainties have gone’.321  
The crisis not only led to a redesign of banking regulation, it also transformed monetary 
policy, forcing central bankers to move far beyond their narrow areas of expertise. Central 
banks now experiment with a wide range of new instruments commonly referred to as 
unconventional monetary policy. They have lent out trillions in cheap loans and extended 
their trading to a wide range of financial products. The European Central Bank lends directly 
to oil and gas companies, car manufacturers and low-cost airlines. The Bank of Japan is a big 
player in Japanese stock markets. Central bankers currently debate even more experimental 
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policies, such as giving money to citizens directly. The crisis has also provoked heated 
debates on the goals of monetary policy, with stable prices pitted against financial stability 
and economic equality. Despite facing different, and much more complex, political choices, 
central banks have retained their pre-crisis independence, and their monetary policy mandates 
remain virtually unchanged. I will argue that this situation is untenable and that reform is 
overdue.  
In §7.1 I show that their discretion over both the goals and the instruments of monetary 
policy places central bankers among the most powerful policymakers. Against the claim that 
central bankers merely follow a legal mandate, I argue that these mandates are often vague 
and leave crucial questions open. Long before 2008, central bankers had surprising discretion 
in putting forward their own interpretation of their mandate, and acting on it.  
In §7.2 I outline a framework for evaluating the delegation of monetary policy to an 
independent central bank. I argue that it cannot be assumed that simply because central 
bankers are unelected, their power is illegitimate. Delegating monetary policy can stop 
governments from achieving their economic policy goals, which is a worry that I describe as 
one concerning domestic economic sovereignty. But, if central banks make good use of their 
powerful tools, delegation may be an effective means for achieving economic policy goals. I 
describe these benefits in terms of the quality of monetary policy. Any justification of central 
bank independence must balance loss of economic sovereignty against improvements to the 
quality of monetary policy. 
In §7.3 I draw on the framework of §7.2 to argue that central bank independence in its 
present form is no longer justifiable and needs to be reformed. I do this by outlining the 
arguments for central bank independence that were prevalent before the crisis. Focusing on 
the case of the European Central Bank, I then show that new instruments used by central 
banks, and new goals that they pursue create considerable loss of economic sovereignty. With 
regard to the quality of monetary policy, I argue that central bankers lack special 
competencies for carrying out their new tasks well. Delegation stands in need of justification, 
which can only be successful if the governance of central banking is reformed. 
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7.1 The powers of the central bank 
I will now describe the use of public money creation as a macroeconomic policy tool 
(§7.1.1). I then argue that within the confines of their mandate, independent central banks 
have considerable scope for political choices (§7.1.2).  
7.1.1 Monetary policy 
Monetary policy is the use of central bank credit and deposit facilities to pursue 
macroeconomic policy aims. Under the gold standard, the most important asset traded by 
central banks was gold, but today monetary policy is implemented by trading in low-risk 
financial assets such as sovereign bonds. Conventional monetary policy uses such trades to 
control short-term interest rates in financial markets. By introducing money into the financial 
system, the central bank lowers interest rates. By selling assets it has previously purchased, 
the central bank removes money from the market and increases rates.  
These trades do not involve legal sanctions or coercive force. Still, monetary policy can have 
far-reaching consequences for individuals. When interest rates go down, more credit will be 
available, and will be offered on more favourable terms. Conversely, higher interest rates 
incentivize saving at the expense of debtors. Interest rates directly influence the options for 
saving and borrowing available to citizens and firms. For ordinary citizens, most of the 
impact of monetary policy is indirect and mediated by macroeconomic conditions. When 
interest rates go down, consumption and investment pick up and employment increases. As 
this process plays out, prices eventually rise. Conversely, an increase in interest rates causes 
economic output to contract and the rate of inflation to decline. To give an idea of the size of 
the effect of such changes, it is estimated that a decision to increase the Federal Reserve’s 
target interest rates by 1% reduces industrial production by 4.3% over a two-year period.322 It 
leaves prices unchanged for the first two years, after which they gradually fall to 6% below 
where they would have been otherwise.323 In the years after the central bank raises rates, 
companies will go bankrupt, workers will lose jobs and wages will be lower. Epidemiological 
studies suggest that life expectancy goes down as a result and suicide rates go up.324 
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Monetary policy also impacts public finances through its effect on tax revenues and 
sovereign bond markets. High interest rates can easily preclude expansion of government 
expenditures.  
It is notoriously difficult to use monetary policy to achieve desired macroeconomic 
outcomes. Economists refer to the causal pathways that connect operations of the central 
bank to the macroeconomic outcomes as the transmission mechanism. This mechanism 
consists of different routes via which interest rates influence consumption, investment, and 
finally prices. The complexities of this mechanism, however, are profound. For one thing, the 
effects of a single change in monetary policy can pull in opposite directions. For another, 
some of these effects will materialise only after a few years. Due to the wide range of direct 
and indirect effects, monetary policy lacks any clear distributional pattern.325 The effects also 
extend far beyond national borders.326 Because of the time lags and the wide range of 
possible causal pathways, debates about monetary policy take place against a background of 
empirical disagreement and uncertainty.327 For these reasons, monetary policy is perhaps the 
most difficult economic policy decision that a capitalist state faces. 
The complexity of decisions concerning monetary policy makes some form of political 
representation unavoidable. Many citizens are not properly aware of the existence of 
monetary policy, let alone sufficiently familiar with the complexities of the transmission 
mechanism. Understanding and reflecting on monetary policy requires expertise and time 
rarely available to those outside a narrow circle of economic policymakers and finance 
professionals. In the absence of such knowledge, it is not possible to make an informed 
choice on how to use monetary policy. But, although this complexity makes governments 
reliant on experts, they can draw on this expertise in many ways. The need for some form of 
technocratic judgment does not preclude democratic accountability.  
When the central bank is independent, final authority over monetary policy is delegated to a 
committee of officials within the bank.328 These officials are appointed rather than elected, 
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and they are often appointed on the recommendation of the bank itself. Furthermore, positions 
on central bank boards and committees come with long, fixed terms, and once a committee 
member is appointed, only serious acts of misconduct are cause for dismissal. Parliamentary 
control of expenditures is limited or non-existent. An independent central bank is typically 
created once and for all by a legal mandate, which its officials are largely free to interpret 
themselves. In this system, accountability takes the form of providing a legal justification for 
policies and elected officials have hardly any formal means to object. Indeed, central bankers 
are even expected to obstruct government policies where their mandate requires this. The 
guiding question of this chapter is whether this status quo should be retained. A crucial 
assumption underlying that question is that central bankers make important decisions on 
political issues, but this is itself controversial. 
7.1.2 Political choices 
I now turn to a more detailed account of central bank mandates to argue that central bankers 
have considerable discretion in putting forward their own interpretation of their mandate. By 
political choices, I mean moral choices on important and contested issues in public policy. 
Central bankers typically argue that where such choices arise, the correct policy is determined 
by their mandate.329 In this sense, central bankers often describe themselves as merely 
instrument-independent in that they are free to decide how to set monetary policy, but not 
goal-independent in that central banks are strictly bound by the goals set out in the 
mandate.330 The goal of stable prices is given to them, and central banks merely decide on 
how to use the instruments of monetary policy to realise it.  
In practice, however, their mandates leave central bankers with wide discretion over not only 
the instruments they use, but also the goals that they pursue. Some mandates leave a minor 
role to governments in deciding what the central bank should do. The Bank of England’s 
mandate requires that the government communicate its (non-binding) understanding of price 
stability annually.331 In New Zealand, the central bank negotiates the ultimate target with the 
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government at the start of a new governor’s term.332 Most other central banks, however, 
interpret their mandate themselves. The most austere mandates simply state that the central 
banks should pursue a price stability objective. For example, the Bank of Japan Act states 
that monetary policy should be ‘aimed at achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the 
sound development of the national economy.’333. Although there are differences in 
formulation across mandates (‘currency purchasing power’334, ‘stability of the currency’335, 
‘achieve and maintain price stability’336), the goals set out in mandates are vague and only 
derive their operational meaning from interpretation. The vagueness is compounded by the 
fact that mandates often contain multiple goals. The European Central Bank has a primary 
objective of maintaining price stability and a secondary objective of supporting ‘the general 
economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Union’. In theory, these objectives include ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ 
and ‘peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth’.337 Similarly, the United 
States Federal Reserve is mandated to ‘promote effectively the goals of maximum 
employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates’338, but the mandate itself 
provides no guidance on how to deal with conflicts between these various goals.  
Despite considerable difference between their mandates, major central banks such as the 
European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve interpret their mandates in ways that are 
strikingly similar. The way they understand the goal of monetary policy is known as ‘flexible 
inflation targeting’.339 Central banks pursue the goal of inflation targeting, in the sense that 
they see it as their primary objective to keep the average growth of prices for consumption 
goods between one to three percentage points annually. Central bankers are hesitant to pursue 
economic policy aims that are incompatible with this inflation target. The inflation target is 
flexible, however, in that the central bank does not respond to every potential deviation. 
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Because raising or lowering interest rates is a blunt tool that has far-reaching and 
unpredictable consequences, central banks are reluctant to use it. Rather, the central bank 
seeks to realise the annual average over a longer time horizon. In doing this, it weighs the 
benefits of policy interventions against their cost in terms of other aims such as employment 
and growth. By occasionally deviating from strict priority of price stability, a central bank 
creates a better trade-off between inflation, employment and economic output than if it would 
seek to offset any deviation from the target immediately.  
In making these kinds of decisions, independent central banks are responsible for momentous 
decisions in economic policy. The introduction of this chapter discussed a dramatic example 
in the Bank of England’s decision to allow inflation to rise above its target after Brexit. In 
contrast, the German Bundesbank did not allow inflation to rise in response to reunification, 
thereby causing a deep recession.340 In pursuing a policy of flexible inflation targeting, 
central bankers have always made political choices. Still, I will argue that the Global 
Financial Crisis marks an important shift in how we should think about central bank 
independence. Central bankers now pursue their policy aims with a much wider range of 
instruments and juggle a wider set of goals in interpreting their mandate. Before discussing 
these new challenges in §7.3, I will develop a moral framework for reflecting on the 
permissibility of central bank independence.  
7.2 The permissibility of independence 
Independent central banks are created by governments. If their operations are legitimate, they 
are so because governments have delegated their authority over monetary policy. In this 
section I ask under what conditions it is permissible for democratic governments to delegate 
monetary policy to an independent central bank. In §7.2.1 I criticise the view that political 
choices should never be left to unelected officials. In §7.2.2 I argue that governments must 
decide where delegation is required. They should do this by weighing competing 
considerations of economic sovereignty and the quality of monetary policy.  
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7.2.1 Principled objections 
As far back as 1964, economist Paul Samuelson testified to the US Congress that the 
independence of the Federal Reserve was incompatible with the ideals of democratic 
government:341 
there can never be a place in American life for a central bank that is like a Supreme 
Court, or 1831 House of Lords—truly independent, dedicated to the public weal but 
answerable for its decisions and conduct only to its own discretion […].342  
Because experts are unelected, Samuelson thinks, their decisions should in the final instance 
be accountable to, and reversible by, democratic governments. I call this idea ‘Samuelson’s 
principle’.  
A long tradition of critics has sided with Samuelson in emphasising the conflict between 
democracy and central bank independence. In the same congressional hearings, Milton 
Friedman argued that the Federal Reserve should be made subject to a strict rule that would 
commit it to increasing the volume of money by a fixed annual rate.343 More recently, US 
lawmakers Rand Paul and Bernie Sanders have proposed tight congressional oversight of 
monetary policy which is meant to ‘Audit the Fed’.344 Progressive critics, in particular, have 
often objected to central bank independence on the grounds that it limits the power of 
democratically elected governments to pursue fiscal policy.345  
These critics all combine substantive complaints about the goals and instruments of monetary 
policy with objections premised on the ideal of democratic government. Whereas substantive 
complaints are generally technical and based on empirical data, democratic objections tend to 
be vague, and the exact nature of the democratic ideal at issue is often unclear. My 
framework seeks to clarify the moral issues at stake in such democratic objections.  
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Before turning to this framework, however, I want to explain why objections to central bank 
independence should not invoke Samuelson’s principle. From the perspective of political 
equality, citizens should ideally have roughly equal opportunities to influence political 
decisions.346 Political equality may at first seem to speak in favour of Samuelson’s principle, 
but I will argue here that it does not. Samuelson’s principle is implausible for three reasons: 
delegation of political choices to unelected officials is virtually unavoidable, often desirable, 
and by itself not undemocratic. 
Delegation of at least some political choices is unavoidable, since because there are simply 
not enough elected officials. It is true, of course, that the number of elected officials could 
(and probably should) be extended, but there are limits to how many officials can be 
effectively elected. In particular, there are limits to how many of those elected will have the 
expertise required to set monetary policy. It is of course possible to elect central bankers, but 
this kind of solution does not work across the board. Rigorously applied, Samuelson’s 
principle would not only prohibit central bank independence, but also a wide range of other 
independent regulatory agencies such as competition and antitrust authorities, financial 
market supervisors, and environmental commissions. It would also prohibit the delegation of 
war to the military. I believe that electing individuals for all these positions would diminish 
rather than increase the ability of citizens to influence political decisions.  
Delegation is for similar reasons often desirable. In cases where elected officials recognise 
that they lack the expertise and time to make good decisions, they rightly desire to delegate 
powers to officials who have the relevant expertise and time. There will often be no good 
reason for citizens to reject such delegation in favour of more direct control.  
Finally, Samuelson’s principle bars governments from making the decision to delegate, 
thereby limiting rather than strengthening democratic politics. Governments decide on 
delegation based on a wide range of practical and moral considerations. In deciding what 
delegation serves the interests of citizens and reflects their views, they realise democratic 
decision-making. Samuelson’s principle hinders governments from making this kind of 
decision in that it settles the issue in terms of a principle that is itself supposed to precede any 
democratic deliberation. In this way, adhering to the principle removes contested political 
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issues from democratic decision-making. Rather than contributing to democratic deliberation, 
Samuelson’s principle hinders citizens who support delegation from being able to have their 
voice heard in the political process. 
The ideal of political equality, then, should not be taken to prohibit delegating monetary 
policy to an independent central bank entirely. On the other hand, it should not be assumed 
that delegation is always permissible. At the very least, as a part of democratic politics, 
delegation is subject to the minimal procedural demand that governments justify their 
decisions. This justification must be adequate in that is based on plausible empirical premises 
and reasonable moral beliefs. In this sense, the decision to delegate monetary policy is not 
qualitatively different from many other decisions concerning bureaucratic delegation. The 
institutions of central bank independence are unique, however, in the particularly stringent 
limitations that they place on the ability of governments to influence monetary policy. But 
monetary policy is also unique in its complexity and its impact on the lives of individual 
citizens. It should be up to elected governments, drawing on supporting democratic 
institutions, to weigh competing benefits, costs and risk of delegation. It is up to critics of 
central bank independence to object to that justification. The final judgment is to be made in 
the legislative arena. 
7.2.2 Democratic justification 
So, what form should a successful justification take? What matters is whether delegation 
weakens or strengthens elected governments. Delegation is paradoxical in that, by ceding the 
direct exercise of power, those who delegate are potentially better able to achieve their own 
goals.347 When considering whether to delegate, the government must decide whether an 
independent central bank is the right means for achieving its goals.  
Delegation to an independent central bank is only permissible when the government pursues 
permissible economic policy aims and justifies delegation as a means for achieving those 
aims. There could very well be other motives for delegating monetary policy, but many of 
these motives are not suitable for justifying delegation. For example, critics have argued that 
central bank independence is meant to surreptitiously privilege the financial industry’s 
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interest in low inflation over wider societal interests in economic growth and low 
unemployment.348 Justifications of central bank independence tend not to invoke such 
motives, for obvious reasons, and focus instead on the contribution that it makes to economic 
policy. I will do the same here.  
With Richard Musgrave, I distinguish three kinds of economic policy aims: allocation, 
distribution and stabilisation.349 Allocation policies aim to regulate markets and guarantee the 
production of goods and services where private supply is insufficient. This concerns matters 
like education, health services and security. Government policies also aim to distribute 
economic resources over citizens. Finally, stabilisation policies aim to offset the effects of 
business cycles on aggregate economic output, employment, and price levels. The 
government must explain why an independent central bank is best at setting monetary policy 
for achieving the government’s economic policy aims. This raises the question why and 
under which conditions democratic governments are best placed to make economic policy for 
citizens.  
My framework assumes that governments are as a rule best placed to represent citizens in 
matters of economic policy. This means that the executive and the legislature are the political 
institutions that are most likely to realise just outcomes. There is no single feature of 
democracy that makes this the case. Crucial conditions for political representation are that 
governments receive adequate information about the views and interests of citizens, and are 
able and motivated to act on these considerations. Democratic governments do well in this 
regard because they are embedded in larger systems of public deliberation and decision-
making. Elections play an important role in ensuring that governments remain reliable 
representatives of citizens. Through elections, citizens provide governments with a mandate 
to act in the face of conflicting moral beliefs while respecting the views of all, even if 
elections alone cannot ensure that governments represent citizens adequately. 
The assumption that government are democratic and therefore generally best placed to 
represent citizens is, admittedly, optimistic. If one believes that democratic governments 
currently do not adequately represent citizens, that could be taken to justify central bank 
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independence as a second-best solution. The thought here might be that though there are good 
objections to delegation, governments simply make use of their powers. This, however, 
would first of all mean that reform of democratic institutions is required over and above 
reform of central banks. I will therefore assume here that governments are indeed best placed 
to represent citizens.  
Even if we make this assumption, that does not mean a government is always best placed to 
represent citizens in making every economic policy decision. For the narrow task of setting 
monetary policy, central banks may sometimes simply do better than elected governments in 
representing citizens. Once a government has been elected, the ability of citizens to influence 
its policy is limited.350 If central banks have more technical competencies and the right 
motivation, it is possible that they are all things considered better representatives. This, I 
argue, is the sort of case that defenders of central bank independence need to make. 
My moral framework is meant to structure intuitions where competing considerations are at 
stake. It evaluates central bank independence in conditions where economic policy is made 
by well-functioning democratic governments and monetary policy is delegated as a means 
towards achieving the government’s economic policy aims. To justify central bank 
independence in these conditions, the legislature must balance two competing considerations.  
The first is a consideration of (domestic) economic sovereignty. Economic sovereignty is the 
power of elected governments to realise their economic policy aims.351 The government 
should limit loss of economic sovereignty. 
When the government creates an independent central bank, it limits its powers in two ways. 
First, the government gives up one of its most powerful economic policy tools. Through 
monetary policy, governments can potentially influence conditions in financial markets and 
thereby realise it economic policy aims directly. Second, monetary policy can support 
expenditures by increasing tax revenues and lowering public borrowing costs in financial 
markets. These are costs that a government should take into account. 
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It is far from clear, however, how valuable the authority over monetary policy is to a 
government. A central bank that follows a mandate may pursue policies that are not very 
different from the preferred policies of the government. If the central bank merely executes 
the will of the government, the loss of economic sovereignty is minimal. The questions to ask 
concerning economic sovereignty are: (i) What policies are made unavailable to the 
government after central bank independence? And (ii) which of these policies would the 
government have preferred to pursue had the central bank not been independent?  
The second consideration to be balanced by the legislature is the quality of monetary policy. 
Governments should design central banks so as to achieve their economic policy aims. The 
claim that central bank independence is needed for this reason stands in need of further 
argument. In formulating these arguments, there will be no uncontested criterion for ‘good’ 
monetary policy but it is this kind of decision that governments are elected for. Government 
must explain both what good monetary policy consists in and why central bankers can be 
expected to pursue such a policy more effectively than the government itself. Historically, 
government control of the money supply has had disastrous consequences on the daily lives 
of citizens, but so have bad policies of independent central banks. Margaret Thatcher’s 
monetarist policies, pursued in opposition to the Bank of England, wiped out 15% of British 
industry and led to largely avoidable job loss for 1.5 million workers.352 The Weimar 
Republic’s at times independent Reichsbank is infamous for its contribution to German 
hyperinflation.353 It is an issue of considerable debate whether Helmut Kohl was right to 
leave monetary policy to the independent Bundesbank during reunification.354 In attempting 
to draw lessons from historical experience, the key questions concerning quality of monetary 
policy are: (i) What does good policy consist in? And (ii) what features of an independent 
central bank make it likely that this policy will be pursued? 
A satisfactory justification of central bank independence should show that any loss of 
economic sovereignty will be justified by an independent bank’s contribution to the quality of 
monetary policy. There is no simple rule for weighing these competing considerations. My 
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claim here is that this type of decision should in the end be made and justified by 
governments themselves.  
7.3 Central banking before and after the crisis 
Goverments should only delegate monetary policy if they have a justification that meets the 
demands outlined in §7.2. When existing practices can no longer be justified, they need to be 
reformed. In this section I argue that traditional arguments no longer justify existing practices 
and also that justifications along the same lines will not be successful. From this I conclude 
that existing practices are in need of fundamental democratic reform. Drawing on the 
framework from §7.2, I first outline the arguments for central bank independence that are 
prominent in the literature (§7.3.1). These arguments aim to establish that central bank 
independence does not lead to loss of economic sovereignty and improves the quality of 
monetary policy. The rest of the section will show that these arguments have been 
undermined by changes in central bank practice and the wider context of economic policy 
since the financial crisis. Focusing on the case of the European Central Bank, I show that 
both the development of new instruments and the increasingly broad range of goals that 
central banks pursue creates considerable loss of economic sovereignty (§7.3.2 and 7.3.3). 
These changes also undermine the reasons for thinking that delegation improves the quality 
of monetary policy (§7.3.4). 
7.3.1 Central banking before the crisis 
An extensive literature on the justification of central bank independence features in 
textbooks, policy debates and academic research. My aim here is to show that the main 
arguments from this literature fit the framework outlined in §7.2.  
Regarding economic sovereignty, arguments justifying independence begin from the 
monetarist premise that monetary policy should aim for price stability.355 It is then argued 
that, because there can be little debate over what monetary policy should ultimately aim for, 
loss of economic sovereignty will be minimal. A first argument for the monetarist premise is 
that, as I showed in §7.1, conventional monetary policy is difficult to predict and lacks a clear 
distributional pattern. This makes it an ineffective tool for the purposes of allocation and 
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distribution outlined in §7.2. If monetary policy has any use, then, it is for stabilising the level 
of economic activity, such as, for example, maintaining price stability. Second, there are 
reasons to specifically aim for price stability. Stable nominal prices facilitate long-term 
economic planning and make the outcomes of contracts, understood in real terms, fairer. 
Price stability also contributes to economic efficiency. Third, targeting stable prices does not 
preclude stabilising other aspects of the business cycle. Deflation results from high 
unemployment and underutilization of economic capacity. High inflation, conversely, follows 
periods of low unemployment and overutilization of economic capacity. A central bank that 
follows a strategy of flexible inflation targeting will also pursue the general economic policy 
aim of macroeconomic stabilisation. Finally, invoking Friedman’s expectation-augmented 
Phillips-curve, it is argued that ignoring inflation is unsustainable. If the central bank does not 
take price levels into account, it may achieve short-term gains in employment and output, but 
changing inflation expectations will ultimately undermine the efficacy of monetary policy. In 
sum, according to the traditional arguments, pursuing price stability is simply a sensible part 
of economic policy, and an inflation-targeting independent central bank does not, therefore, 
reduce economic sovereignty. 
Defenders of central bank independence also argue that it improves the quality of monetary 
policy. They draw on three important lines of argument to support this claim.  
One line of argument focuses on accountability and transparency.356 Accountability means 
being held to a clear standard in setting monetary policy. Transparency means providing a 
clear justification for policies. A government that controls the central bank can use monetary 
policy for a wide range of purposes. But due to its technical complexity, accountability and 
transparency of government monetary policy will be limited. In contrast, an independent 
central bank operating on a legal mandate has a clear policy priority and needs to justify its 
operations in light of that priority. In this way, keeping central banks independent makes 
monetary policy more accountable and transparent than if left to governments.  
Second, there is an argument from motivational competency. In the context of flexible 
inflation targeting, to have motivational competency is to be motivated in the right way to 
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achieve price stability and other goals of monetary policy. Governments, so the argument 
goes, lack patience and the ability to consider long time horizons. Central bankers, in 
contrast, will be more adequately motivated to set monetary policy for the long-term.357 
Perceived lack of motivational competency also gives rise to a problem of time-
inconsistency.358 Governments will prefer low inflation in the long run, but find it difficult to 
make a credible commitment to price stability. In response, private economic agents 
anticipate, and thereby create, high inflation. Delegating monetary policy to a central bank 
with a clear price stability mandate allows the government to commit credibly to price 
stability.  
The third line of argument focuses on technical competency. To have technical competency is 
to know how to achieve price stability and other goals. Deciding on monetary policy requires 
an understanding of the transmission mechanism. In point of fact, most elected officials lack 
these technical competencies, which limits their ability to judge the monetary issues. 
Although elected officials could in theory rely on empirical advice from central bankers, the 
more recent literature on inductive risk shows that it is often difficult to communicate 
inconclusive empirical evidence in a value-neutral way.359 Central bank independence 
secures that technical competencies are effectively used in deliberation.  
Central bank independence has always had its critics,360 but taken together these arguments 
have been widely accepted. I will now argue that times have changed: Economic policy and 
the practices of monetary policy have evolved to undermine the force of the traditional 
arguments.  
7.3.2 The instruments of central banking 
To begin, consider the instruments of monetary policy. Before the crisis, monetary policy was 
largely implemented by setting short-term interest rates. The European Central Bank, on 
which I will focus here, fulfilled its mandate by providing a relatively fixed amount of credit, 
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which was secured by low-risk collateral, to a small group of banks. Now, however, the ECB 
chooses from a far wider range of tools.  
In the direct aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the short-term credit markets in 
which the ECB normally set interest rates were severely disrupted.361  In response, the ECB 
started providing short-term credit against collateral in any amount requested by banks.362 
Even more strikingly, the ECB also loosened its collateral requirements on these loans to 
provide funding to troubled banks, thereby accepting greater credit risk.363 Through so-called 
‘currency swaplines’, the ECB borrowed from the Federal Reserve to provide European 
banks with emergency loans in dollars.364 With hundreds of billions in cheap credit, the ECB 
sought to improve the profitability of the banking sector and thereby boost credit provision. 
The ECB also became an important creditor for Eurozone governments. In response to 
dramatic spikes in the borrowing costs of member states, the ECB reluctantly took up a role 
as lender of last resort in stabilising sovereign bond markets. The ECB bought €185 billion in 
Greek, Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish bonds. The ECB also sent letters to individual 
heads of state to push for labour market reforms and other contentious economic policy 
choices. These measures were controversial in part because article 123 of the European 
Treaty explicitly prohibits lending to individual Eurozone governments. In a high-profile 
court case, the ECB defended its operations as falling under its price stability mandate.365  
The ECB has also expanded its monetary policy with so-called quantitative easing (or QE).366 
In QE operations, the central bank buys financial assets to lower long-term interest rates. 
When the current QE programme ends in December 2017, the ECB will have spent a 
projected €2,252 billion on mostly public but also private sector bonds. QE is contested 
because it works in part by increasing the value of financial assets, ownership of which is 
concentrated in the top 5% of households. It is also feared to lead to asset price bubbles. 
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More recently, attention has turned to the Corporate Securities Purchase Programme as a part 
of which national central banks purchased bonds in non-financial firms. These purchases are 
contested because they potentially increase the profitability of individual firms. National 
branches of the ECB have focused purchases on gas and oil companies (in Spain and Italy), 
and car manufacturers (in Germany). Bond purchases also feature the controversial Austrian 
gambling company Novomatic, the French luxury firm LVMH and the Irish low-cost airline 
Ryanair. Sustainable energy sources are entirely absent from the Corporate Securities 
Purchase Programme.367  
The ECB is not the only central bank to have dramatically extended its range of monetary 
policy tools. At the height of the crisis, the emergency credits of the Federal Reserve totalled 
$7.7 trillion. All major central banks take part in swap lines and many have built up large 
investment portfolios as part of their policies. The size of the ECB’s quantitative easing is 
comparable to similar programmes in the US and UK. Its operations are much smaller than 
those of the Bank of Japan, which currently buys 90% of newly issued government bonds and 
is set to be the largest owner of 55 of the NIKKEI 225 firms by the end of 2017. 368  
Debate is now picking up on the use of even more powerful unconventional tools. In theory, 
the central bank can increase private spending by printing money and transferring it directly 
to individual citizens.369 Others argue that central banks should buy bonds from the domestic 
development banks to fund public infrastructure and thereby encourage economic activity.370  
To what extent do these changes undermine economic sovereignty? While the immediate 
crisis measures were consequential, it is not clear that governments would have made 
different choices. This is much less obvious for the use of new instruments in the following 
years. Most of these tools are far less blunt. They can target individual states, firms and even 
citizens. By leaving these powerful instruments to central banks, governments lose economic 
sovereignty. A government with more control over the instruments of monetary policy will be 
better placed to achieve its economic policy aims.  
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7.3.3 The goals of central banking 
Now consider the goals of monetary policy. In interpreting its mandate, the central bank 
operationalises the aims of monetary policy and determines how to deal with trade-offs 
between different goals. The traditional arguments assume that monetary policy pursues a 
strategy of inflation targeting while at most occasionally considering economic output and 
employment. As discussed in §7.1.2, the mandate of the European Central Bank is general 
and vague where it concerns the goals of monetary policy. Before the crisis, price stability 
provided monetary policy with a relatively uncontested ultimate target. In 1998, the 
Governing Council of the ECB issued a press release specifying the ultimate target as a 
medium-term inflation rate below 2%. A 2003 press released modified this aim to an inflation 
rate below, but close to, 2%. This decision, which the Treaty does not explicitly assign to the 
ECB, raised few eyebrows.  
The crisis has cast doubt on the importance of price stability and led the ECB to juggle a 
much wider range of goals. First, the ECB currently operates at the very limits of what can 
still be described as flexible inflation-targeting. Despite its non-conventional monetary 
policies, the ECB has had great difficulties maintaining its target. From mid-2013 till 
November 2016, Eurozone inflation has been below 1% and, despite months of negative rates 
and asset purchases, was at 1.4% in October 2017.371 Every month it becomes more difficult 
to describe ECB policy as pursuing the avowed target of 2% inflation over the medium term. 
Second, there is now much more disagreement on the costs of inflation and the measures that 
are justified to maintain price stability. Economists disagree over whether current low 
inflation is acceptable, or whether the ECB should in fact do more, or as the German 
government believes, even less. They also debate whether 2% is indeed the right target, or 
whether a higher or lower target might be preferable.372  
Third, the distributive consequences of monetary policy now feature much more prominently 
in economic policy debates. The mandate of the ECB was developed at a time when 
economic inequalities were considered transient or even desirable aspects of economic 
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growth. This is no longer the case and the question of the distributive effects of monetary 
policy is currently at the centre of economic policy debates. As already noted, quantitative 
easing operations increase the value of financial assets, and it is far from clear that these 
effects are transient.373 Given the nature of the monetary policy instruments currently in use, 
a central bank that does not take economic inequalities into account hinders governments that 
pursue progressive distributional ideals. 
Fourth, in the wake of the crisis, central banks have acquired a wide range of new roles that 
can conflict with the goal of price stability. In the case of the ECB, I already discussed (i) 
lending to banks that lose access to market funding; (ii) lending to Eurozone governments 
that lose access to market funding; (iii) adjusting collateral policy to support banks, and (iv) 
implementing quantitative easing operations. Other roles that I have not yet discussed are (v) 
designing, approving and monitoring financial assistance to member states; (vi) micro-
prudential supervision; (vii) comprehensive balance-sheet assessment of banks (so-called 
‘stress tests’); (viii) macro-prudential supervision; amd (ix) surveillance of member states in 
line with new EU fiscal rules (x) agent for EU crisis prevention funds ESFS and ESM.374 The 
ECB’s stated monetary policy goals would require it to privilege price stability over other 
roles at all times, but it is not clear that this is now happening, nor whether this is in line with 
the economic policy of Eurozone governments.  
Finally, there is a close interaction between decisions on instruments and goals. It can make 
sense to pursue the goal of price stability with one instrument, but not with another. For 
example, a government may prefer lending targeted at green investments to loans that merely 
increase the provision of mortgages. If only the latter option is available, that government 
may oppose pursuing price stability.  
In sum, even if the monetary policy goals that were agreed before the crisis were relatively 
uncontroversial then, this is no longer the case now. As a consequence, the existing narrow 
mandate and its interpretation by the ECB has been and will often be at odds with the 
economic policies of Eurozone governments. Other central banks, which face similar 
circumstances and also balance a wide range of new competencies, have been forced to 
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confront similar questions. In the new era heralded by the financial crisis, existing institutions 
of central bank independence remove these decisions from governments and therefore entail a 
considerable loss of economic sovereignty.  
Central banking practices are unlikely to return to the pre-2008 status quo. The past decade 
has seen a turn away from deregulation and market-based policies towards more active 
economic management and government intervention. Economic inequality and financial 
stability are now firmly rooted in the political agenda, and for good reasons. Moreover, even 
for the narrow goal of price stability, it has become clear that setting short term interest rates 
is not a sufficient means for achieving it. Once interest rates are at 0, policymakers need to 
make difficult decisions on what instrument to use and what goals to pursue. A government 
that can influence the goals of monetary policy will be in a much better position to achieve its 
economic policy aims. 
7.3.4 The poverty of central bank deliberation 
There is no reason to assume that central banking will return to its pre-2008 state. I have 
shown that this makes central bank independence into a considerable impediment to 
economic sovereignty. Following the framework outlined in §7.2, we must now ask whether 
this can be justified by considering benefits of central bank independence for the quality of 
monetary policy. If it turns out that central banks are simply much better at dealing with their 
new challenges, then it would be permissible, maybe even mandatory, for governments to 
delegate monetary policy and refrain from interfering.  
The plausibility of that assumption depends on both how one defines good monetary policy 
and what reasons one has to think that central bankers are best placed to make it. Evaluating 
this claim raises many tricky issues, for example, whether closed-group, depoliticized 
deliberation is to be preferred over public debate where complex issues such as monetary 
policy are concerned. To develop a decisive case for democratic legislation over expert rule 
will require a much more in-depth investigation than is possible here.375 Instead, I will argue 
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in this section that none of the three main lines of argument for thinking that central bank 
independence improves the quality of monetary policy continue to hold true. 
Before 2008, central banks had clearly defined goals that they could pursue by means of one 
instrument. As we have seen, central banks now have many more instruments to use in 
pursuit of a much less clearly defined set of goals. In addition to undermining economic 
sovereignty, these developments also cast doubt on the three lines of argument in favour of 
delegating authority to central banks. 
In pursuing a narrow mandate of price stability, central bankers needed a narrow set of moral 
and technical competencies. The crucial motivational competency was to value low inflation. 
The crucial technical competency was to understand the transmission mechanism. To pursue 
a wider range of goals, central bankers need more diverse moral and technical competencies 
and it is far from clear that they currently possess them. Positions on central bank boards are 
mainly taken up by civil servants and finance professionals. Data on twenty developed 
country central banks shows that between 1950 and 2000, 95% of board members were men 
and 47% had never had a job outside finance or bureaucracy.376 Central bank positions often 
explicitly require such a professional background. For example, the European Treaty 
prescribes that ‘members of the Executive Board shall be appointed […] from among persons 
of recognised standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters’.377 
Central bankers will, therefore, have career incentives closely tied to bureaucratic and finance 
positions. Because inflation reduces the real value of financial assets, price stability is of 
particular importance to the financial industry.378 It is then not surprising that central bankers 
with a finance background prefer higher interest rates than those with a government 
background.379 Finance-related career incentives may perhaps be compatible with realising a 
narrow price stability mandate, but they raise conflicts where wider public interests are at 
stake.380 Moreover, contemporary career trajectories make it the case that central bankers are 
generally trained in a narrow set of economic policy competencies. Their technical expertise 
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will be drawn predominantly from the discipline of economics, and, more specifically, from 
the fields of monetary and financial economics. Such competencies are relevant, but adequate 
deliberation on monetary policy in the 21st century will require a wider range of professional 
backgrounds.  
The current situation also raises important questions of accountability and transparency. 
Under the status quo, central banks have extensive freedom to deliberate on the goal, 
strategy, and instruments of monetary policy. Such deliberation, which occurs in part through 
creative interpretation of central bank mandates, takes place in a closed committee and with 
limited democratic accountability. In the absence of a clear mandate for new policies, 
justifications provided for policy choices often aim at legal permissibility rather than 
explaining the rationale behind the choice itself.  
In the absence of a clear mandate and procedure that facilitates deliberation, reasoning about 
monetary policy is impoverished. Consider again its distributive effects. From the perspective 
of existing mandates, any consideration of these effects is subordinated to the pursuit of price 
stability. As Claveau, Dietsch and Fontan (2016) show, central bankers rarely discuss the 
topic of economic equality, downplay its significance, and tend to focus on its role in relation 
to price stability. Adequate deliberation on distributive effects would require weighing the 
costs of increased inequality against the importance of matters like price stability and low 
unemployment. Today, however, if central bankers want to consider the distributive effects of 
their policies, they are forced to cloak their arguments in terms of their price stability 
mandate. Conversely, if central bankers ignore distributive effects entirely, they unduly 
impoverish their deliberations. The interpretation of a price stability mandate is not the 
appropriate medium for settling this type of complex distributive issues, but ignoring these 
issues is not appropriate either. 
From this, I conclude that central banks are currently not well-placed to meet the challenges 
raised by their new instruments and goals. 
7.4 Conclusion 
Existing structures of central bank independence take the state’s most powerful policy tool 
from governments and place it in the hands of unelected experts. Before the crisis, central 
banking involved the use of one instrument to achieve the relatively uncontested goal of price 
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stability. In these circumstances, governments could justify the delegation of monetary policy 
by relying on controversial, but reasonable and widely accepted premises. After 2008, the 
operations of central banks have changed and the traditional arguments are no longer valid. 
While nothing I have said precludes that central banks should retain some degree of 
independence, existing institutions are no longer tenable. The status quo can be reformed to 
introduce more democratic decision-making in at least three ways. First, amendments to 
existing mandates can extend the goals of monetary policy and explain how they should be 
weighed against each other. Second, mandates can assign a more prominent role to 
governments in deciding on the instruments and goals of monetary policy. Third, central bank 
deliberation should be improved by extending the available expertise and modifying existing 
career incentives. Most likely, a combination of all is needed. There is no simple rule to 
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